Introduction
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has interacted
with the leaders of four of the five countries/regions on the list of foreign
policy priorities mentioned in the President’s address to the opening session
of Parliament (SAARC, China, Japan, Russia, USA). He has also met leaders from
several other countries. It is therefore an appropriate time to take stock. In this note we focus on two questions: One, what
are the underlying changes in the directions of India’s Foreign policy. In other words, is PM Modi’s Foreign Policy likely
to differ from that of Soni-Man Mohan Government‘s? Two, what were the objectives of PM Modi’s
foreign policy actions in first four months, to what extent have they been
achieved and what remains to be done?
Directional Change
Every country’s foreign policy has, after
a change of government, elements of continuity and change. India under a Modi led BJP-NDA government is
no different. What are these changes in direction and emphasis? These changes
have not been explicitly articulated by the new government, but are implicit in
their pragmatic actions and “view of the world.” There are five areas in which
I see an emerging change in foreign policy: The centrality of economic &
technological development, the integrations of domestic and foreign policy with
respect to this objective, the emphasis on “national power” including “military
power” and “Soft power” and a reduction in self-imposed constraints on actions
that third counties may construe as inimical to their interests.
Economic Objectives
The first change in foreign policy is a much
greater attention to economic objectives. This is not merely a reiteration of
the economic development objective that has been India’s mantra since
independence, but a recognition of the
role of “technology” (broadly defined) in all aspects of economic development
& economic power. This involves an implicit benchmarking of the
technological capabilities of the Indian economy with respect to the global
best practices and/or global technology frontier, a perception of large gaps
across much of the economy and the goal of bridging these gaps through domestic
and foreign economic policy. How this is
different from earlier regimes is reflected in two policy initiatives: The
“Swach Bharat” campaign which doesn’t involve “high technology” but does
reflect a huge gap in sanitation systems and practices between India and the
developed countries and will require innovative technological, managerial, social
and public solutions. The second is the “Digital India” campaign, which
recognizes the gap between India and digitization frontier, but treats it as an
opportunity to solve problems of governance and corruption as well as its
innovative use for health education & training needs of a population four
times the size of the largest developed country (leap frogging). It is probably
the first time that an Indian PM elucidated India’s economic &
technological objective abroad(“India First”),
identified the specific role that
each country could play in achieving these objective and made that the center
piece of the discussion with that country!
Foreign-Domestic Policy Integration
The second change is a much greater alignment
of foreign policy with domestic objectives.
Though the talk about integrating national economic policies and foreign
policies started in the 1990s, this has only been episodically reflected in
domestic or foreign policy. The Indian
Prime Minister mentioned both the programs (“Swach Bharat”, Digital India/smart
cities) in his public statements in the USA & Japan. In his meetings with
leaders of advanced countries, he has been very explicit about Indian
objectives with respect to economic development and technological catch up and
in exploring how these countries can help India close these gaps. The message
to all inside and outside the government is quite clear: Both domestic and
international policy can/must/will be used to close the economic and
technological gap with more advanced countries across the entire spectrum from
basic sanitation to defense vehicles, aircraft & ships to the frontiers of
cyber space & outer space.
“India First” means that what India needs/wants from each economic &
technology power will be expressed with greater clarity & specificity and these
counties have to respond in the way think appropriate. India’s decisions will
then be based on comparative benefit-cost ratio of dealing with different
countries on a defined set of issues, not on philosophical and/or ideological
consideration of (non-) alignment.
National Power
The third change is a greater
emphasis on overall national power, with a more realistic assessment of the
appropriate role of military power. Economic power is the foundation of national
power, but above it must be a solid block of military-strategic power, topped
by a smaller cone of “soft power”.
[i]
The Modi govt. has a clearer
appreciation that economic power/economic relations cannot be a substitute for
military power/international security relationships, in deterring the
aggressive designs of ideologically driven foes. On the contrary economic
concessions may be viewed by militaristic ideologues as a sign of weakness to
be exploited and economic assistance as an expression of superiority to be
resented. Economic relations can complement international security
relationships by influencing the behavior of non-ideological, economically
rational players in the global system,
[ii]
but only military strength can deter militaristic ideologues and ensure peace.
Unconventional Threats
Operationally this has several
implications. One is the increased focus on unconventional threats (cross-border
terrorism, use of non-state actors, foreign ideologues-mercenaries). This
requires a buildup of World class equipment and skills over a much wider
spectrum of warfare & covert capabilities and a willingness to boldly attack the
aggressor in his safe havens. This is (in my judgment) already in the process
of change, both in terms of capabilities in counter-terrorism and defense
against non-state actors, but even more importantly in doctrines incorporating
a willingness to take calculated risks in using asymmetric capabilities.
Deterrence is however only effective, if
the adversary using these tactics is convinced that the new government will
respond to asymmetric warfare with appropriate actions across a much broader
menu of conventional & unconventional options.
As the diplomatic signals sent to our Western
neighbor (e.g. through track 2 dialogues and cancellation of Secretary level
talks) did not seem to be heard & understood by its “deep state”, it became
necessary to signal the seriousness of the change in overall strategy, through
a heightened (conventional) response to border firing/cease fire violations.
[iii]
Similarly unconventional psychological warfare & “creeping annexation”
tactics on the northern border are being countered by bold new plans (e.g. the
‘McMohan highway’ along the LAC in Arunachal) that have both a conventional defensive
and a signaling component.
Defense Production Capability
The second implication is a much
greater focus on national capability to produce a broad range of
defense equipment in India (though actual production of any specific item will
be influenced by financial benefit-cost). “Self-sufficiency” has been a slogan
from the days of “Nehruvian Socialism,” as it played second fiddle to the
ideological goal of preserving a Public sector monopoly over the means of
(defense) production and discouraging foreign participation in Indian JVs. This defense public sector veto over use of
private domestic & foreign capabilities for defense production within India
is being decisively broken by the new government, to give primacy to defense
self-sufficiency. The ability and willingness to transfer technology and help
build skills & research capabilities at lower cost, will consequently play
a much more important role in relations with Japan, Russia, USA and EU
countries. The reinvigorated approach to
national security is likely to manifest itself in a reversal (over the next
five years) of the trend decline in ratio of defense expenditures to GDP (since
the BOP crises of 1991).
Soft Power
The fourth change is a greater emphasis on global socio-politics and
“soft power”, the third dimension of national power. This includes the expansion of common ground
based on religious and cultural heritage & history of India (e.g. Hinduism
viz. Nepal, Buddhism viz. E & SE Asia, Yoga viz. West, modern Islam viz Indonesia, democracy viz Australia, Canada),
as well as the Indian diaspora across the World. PM Modi’s speech to the Indian
diaspora in New York, USA, was a very successful attempt to inspire the
diaspora to contribute to the economic & technological development of
India, either directly or indirectly through political participation in their
country of citizenship.
Confident Pragmatism
The fifth change is a freeing up of self-imposed, historical and mental,
constraints on developing the full potential of economic or security relations
with any country. Thus India’s economic
relationships with potential adversaries can be pursued relatively
independently from the security relationship, without one constraining the
other or being completely parallel. This
is most clearly apparent from the meetings PM Modi held with President Xi
Jinping of China, the economic agreements reached and the formation of the
BRICs Bank and AIB (Asian Infrastructure Bank). Further neither the economic nor
the security relationship with one country (friend or foe) will constrain the
economic or security relationship with any other country (e.g. economic &
security co-operation with Japan). Both
will be evaluated in terms of India’s primary objectives of closing the
economic and technological gap and building national power, in a pragmatic
forward looking manner jettisoning ideological blinkers and minimizing
historical baggage.
India Back On World Stage
Short Term/Immediate goals of PM Modi’s
foreign policy initiatives from the day he took the oath of office seemed to be
three (partly) overlapping ones: One
goal was to establish Mr Modi’s credentials as a National and International
leader. During the general election
campaign most political analysts had predicted that Shri Modi, a State leader with
no Central govt experience, wouldn’t be able to rise above his regional origins
and limitations. Mr. Modi wanted to lay
this specter to rest quickly & decisively so he could focus on achieving
his development objectives. The second
goal was to put India back on the global stage, from which it had fallen off
during the last 3-4 years, according to all objective analysts and observers. In
this he was backed/supported by advise from virtually all international
relations experts inside & outside the government. In this process he also wanted to convey to
the World, the change in foreign-domestic policy emphasis of his government
along the lines elucidated above. The
dramatic outreach to SAARC countries, the meetings with leaders of Japan, China
and USA, and a flurry of meetings with other countries (eg Australia, UK,
France), complemented by a number of foreign trips by the President and the
EAM, have achieved both these goals.
Confidence and Trust (B2G)
The third goal was to re-establish
international investor confidence in Indian economy and polity. The results of the general election, in which
the BJP and its allies won a decisive majority in the Lok Sabha, had already
opened the flood gates of capital inflows into India, before Shri Modi was
sworn in as Prime Minister. However,
this expression of confidence by foreign finance capital, had not been
reflected in a similar increase in gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). It was therefore felt necessary to communicate
directly with the largest foreign direct investors (FDI). The PMs goal was to
gain their trust & understanding of his seriousness in reversing the
effects of obstructive policies & procedures that resulted in the collapse
in growth of GFCF and removing bottlenecks in investment in infrastructure,
manufacturing etc. The US private sector
is the most important source of technology and foreign investment across a
broad spectrum of industries. The PM was largely successful in establishing
trust. However, given that foreign direct investment usually follows domestic
investment and both were waiting to see action on certain known policy &
regulatory problems, full restoration awaits action on the domestic policy
& regulatory front. Now that two important State elections are over and the
government has re-started the reform process, we will soon be able to judge
whether enough has been done to revive GFCF from the second half of 2014-15. I
expect the legacy problems for foreign private sector operations (B2G) and
general bottlenecks facing all direct investment (domestic & foreign) in
India to be sorted out within a year, restoring a flourishing Business to
Business (B2B) relationship.
Strategic Partnership
The US is still the sole super power and
likely to remain so for at least a decade and stands head and shoulders above
others in the depth and breadth of strategic and defense technology. Thus Indo-US relations have a special
salience and it was particularly important to restore them to the level before
the global financial crisis and the series of policy missteps since then. It
was therefore important for PM Modi to convey the changes in the new Govt.’s
approach to foreign policy and for US President to understand these at first
hand.
Geo-economic Constraints
Despite the considerable overlap in the
long term strategic interests of US and India in Asia, it is unclear how
quickly a genuine strategic partnership will develop given the inherent differences
in economic perspective between a rich global power and a poor regional one.
The USA, like many rich countries is a net
exporter of technology with high per capita but low incremental pollution while
India is a net technology importer with low per capita but high incremental
pollution.
These differences need to be
recognized and dealt with objectively & fairly.
[iv]
There is also a conflict of interest between the profitable capital-intensive,
export competitive US agriculture sector and India’s labor-intensive, low
productivity, subsistence agriculture with 66% of population dependent on it. These
gaps will narrow over the next decade or so, along with the gap in per capita
income.
In the meanwhile, a pragmatic
approach is needed to resolve these differences and/or minimize the negative
fallout of unresolved differences. There are indications in the joint
statement, of the beginning of such an approach.
Strategic Opportunities
There are also some differences arising
from the historical interests, commitments and actions of a long term “Super
Power,” and an India two decades from becoming a “Great Power,” whose regional
security suffers collateral damage from Super powered actions.
[v]
However, the reasonably high convergence
of interests on Terrorism and on maritime security in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific,
can form the core of a strategic understanding, while pragmatically allowing
for greater differentiation in the respective approaches to individual
countries in West Asia.
[vi]
The outcome of PM Modi’s discussions
with President Obama appears to be a deeper understanding on and heightened
co-operation in, counter-terrorism (safe havens, “financial and tactical
support for networks such as Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, the
D-Company, and
Haqqanis”).
There are also hints of enhanced cooperation
in Defense procurement, production and technology development and on Maritime
Security in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific Region. The former includes (a)
An extension of the Framework for US-India Defense Relationship(2005) and a
Reinvigoration & expansion of Political-Military Dialogue. (b)The setting
up of Task Force under Defense Trade & Technology Initiative, whose first
meeting was in Sept 2014, to decide on specific projects & technologies.
Maritime security is to be enhanced through likely technology transfers to the
Indian Navy (e.g. the magnetic catapult for Indian aircraft carrier) and an
expansion of Malabar exercises. Thus the outlook for further development of
Indo-US strategic partnership is cautiously optimistic at this point.
Conclusion
The PM Modi led Indian government is
changing the emphasis of India’s Foreign and National security policies.
Elements of this change in approach are already visible. These involve a
clearer definition of Indian interests (“India First”) in terms of economic and
technological development, a greater focus on these goals in foreign policy and
a consequent integration of domestic and foreign policies. Other changes
involve a greater focus on development of national power, in particular an
enhancement of the somewhat neglected element of military power, its broader
definition to include asymmetric warfare of which State financed-directed
non-state actors are a dangerous part, and a jettisoning of self-imposed
constraints of ideology and misplaced fear of offending other countries who display
no such squeamishness in their behavior.[vii]
Overall a much more confident, credible and effective national security-foreign
policy is predicted to emerge over the next five years.
-------------------
[ii] The economic collapse of the USSR and changes in
China’s behavior after the global financial crisis, are instructive in this
regard. China shifted from export-investment led growth to aggressive
geo-economic (IPR, espionage) & geopolitical behavior (Arunachal. E & S
China Seas).
[iii]
Cross-border terrorism in J&K (as measured by no of deaths) increased from
1993 to 2001 and declined after 9/11 because of the deal reached between
US-Pakistan. In response Pakistan changed its Jehadi tactics by using Nepal as
a conduit and Bangladesh as a base for terrorism. It also gradually started
recruiting and training Indian Muslims as terrorists(IM).
[iv] A
(national) patent is a monopoly right conferred on the inventor in the
interests of the nation as a whole. Thus, for instance, the optimal length of
the patent is likely to be shorter in a poor country than in a rich country. A bilateral/multilateral
agreement has to be a compromise between the rich country/countries and the
poor country/countries. There is no inherently right length!
[vi]
US analysts should remember that in the US scheme of geographical divisions,
India is included in the “Pacific command(USPACOM)” and not in the “Central
Command (USCENTCOM)” covering West and Central Asia.
[vii] One
must, however warn against the unfortunate tendency of some prominent Indians
toward bombast & hyperbole. Those who accuse PM Nehru of publicly making tall
claims and assertive statements viz China, after denuding & hollowing out
the armed forces through neglect & resource starvation, should be very
careful about chest thumping based on hypothetical (future) capabilities that
will take decades to build.