The public debate on foreign entry into print media largely treats it as a single, broad, undifferentiated sector, even though most discussants seem to be discussing the narrow issue of foreign entry into the newspaper business. A few discussants may perhaps also have newsweeklies in the back of their mind when expounding their views on this subject. The current article tries to put some new ideas into the public arena so that a differentiated FDI policy can be defined for various categories of media.
Ability to compete and to derive the maximum benefit from competition depends on the society’s knowledge base. A closed economy breeds lazy thinking and action. We can only compete at the frontiers of knowledge if we have access to that knowledge and have absorbed, adapted and incorporated into the knowledge base of our society and economy.
The Indian economy can become a Knowledge based economy by 2025 if we can attain universal access to primary and secondary education in the next decade or so and we open our minds to the best and latest knowledge from all over the world. A competitive, wisely regulated media, both print and electronic, has an important role to play in this process.
A couple of decades ago, most services were considered as non-tradable across frontiers as they had to be delivered at the point at which they are consumed/used. The technological transformation of the communication industry coupled with the developments in transport & travel has transformed the picture over the past decade or two. Even greater changes are in the offing in the next decade as previously non-tradable services become tradable.
What has not been fully realised, however, is that there are many services besides ITES where we have a comparative advantage or could create one, to become a significant exporter and player on the world stage. The common strengths that can underlie this success are:
• They are all dependent on communication facilities, even though the precise type of facility may differ. For instance Radio/TV broadcasting stations and telephone exchanges are both communication facilities, though the former is used for public communication and the latter for private communication. With the rapid pace of technology development we should not be surprised to see in the near future, radio/TV facilities being used for private communication and telephone exchanges for public communication (internet news station).
• The use of English in global commerce and trade in services.
• The advantages of free and open society, the freedom of information, thought and expression.
There are also some differences between different services. For instance Software is more dependent on analytical skills while media and entertainment is more culture and society dependent. Nevertheless, with globalisation, cultural diversity is itself an advantage that can be exploited to produce a unique product, if merged skilfully with the basic cultural & society specific characteristics of the target audience (artistic joint product/venture).
Automatic 100% FDI should be allowed in the following activities in the print media:
• Internet Publishing can be carried out from anywhere in the world and its content sent anywhere instantaneously. Any restrictions on this type of publishing are therefore futile.
• India is well placed to be a major exporter of publishing and printing services. It could replicate the success of Hong Kong by allowing free entry of foreign printing and publishing services into the country. This would cover printing facilities as well as associated services like layout design.
• The business of publishing for export on the same basis as the EOU/EPZ policy for industry and the Special Export Zone (SEZ) policy. Material allowed for domestic sale would (of course) be subject to the press and other laws applicable to imported material or incoming media.
• Publishing of commercial or private material such as stationary, brochures, pamphlets, leaflets, diaries, calendars, house magazines, journals & newsletters and all other published matter which is not explicitly restricted by a lower foreign equity limit.
SCIENCE, HUMANITIES & PROFESSIONS
We need to raise the educational and intellectual quality of our entire population and labor force. Foreign competition will reduce prices or increase quality (or both) and help extend the reach of publications to the entire educated population. Automatic 100% foreign approval should be given in areas, which are potentially of the highest benefit to the society and economy. Lower automatic limits could be set in areas in which the benefits are less clear-cut or there is demonstrated possibility of either cultural or nationalistic bias.
Science is universal and common heritage of mankind. It does not belong to any nation or culture. Automatic 100% foreign equity should therefore be allowed in the Publishing of Books and Journals in Science & Technology, Social Sciences, Professional areas (medicine, management, business, accounting, law etc.) and Humanities (Art, literature, geography). This would also apply to “self-help” or “do-it-yourself” books in these areas. It should also cover educational material and topical magazines (e.g. Scientific American, Psychology Today) in the same subjects, with the following proviso:
Possible Exceptions
The 100% automatic approval would not apply to publication of educational material in history, directed at children up to the level of high school. It would also not apply to any literary work that glorifies or justifies violence in any way or makes it attractive by mixing it with sexual titillation. Finally it would not apply to any material containing geographical maps that misrepresent the boundaries of India to show Indian Territory as belonging to another country (we can perhaps take a relaxed attitude if it were shown as Indian Territory which is disputed).
CULTURAL GLOBALISATION
RECIPROCITY PRINCIPLE
We should have no objection in principle to publications on Culture, Society and Entertainment being published and sold in India as long as this is not at the expense of Indian culture, social norms & practices. The basic touchstone for deciding on foreign equity should be a criterion of globalisation. Globalisation of culture must be a two way street, with the rest of the World having the same access to Indian culture as we do to theirs (reciprocity). This has two aspects:
C1 Exports
If a publisher is willing and able to use India as an export base whenever it finds that India is a competitive location we should freely permit foreign entry. The export criteria would be very simple. At least one copy of each book or journal in each language sold in India must be exported as proof of exports. If some language is not considered exportable the publisher must substitute another international language besides English (e.g. Japanese, Chinese), or a more explicit criteria for exports (e.g. 10% of production). If our reasoning that India is or will soon become a very competitive location is correct, the publisher will in due course himself find it profitable to export more from India.
The idea is therefore not motivated by foreign exchange earnings considerations at all but by informational considerations. That is the entrant must after entry seriously consider whether it would be profitable to export from India. If anyone comes to a negative conclusion there must not be any legal pressure to go against a well-informed commercial judgement.
C2: Content
Globalisation of media cannot merely mean that all the existing cultural (e.g. soap operas) and nationalistic (e.g. war news) content created in democratic USA, UK and other English speaking countries is merely transferred to India. Globalisation must also mean that the cultural and nationalistic content created by the 1/6th of humanity living in democratic India is brought to a global audience (in due course).
Two criteria which could define globalisation of publishing are;
C2a: Country Maximum
That content from the USA (22%), Japan (8%), China (11%), Germany (5%) and UK (3%) cannot exceed their respective shares in world GDP measured at PPP. The idea is to ensure cultural diversity and discourage a homogenisation of culture based on World media oligopoly.
Publishers should be allowed to offset any divergence from criterion C2a by a point for point increase in the share of Indian content. For instance if the publication has only 2% content on China, the remaining 11% can be substituted by Indian content.
C2b: India Minimum
That Indian content must be greater than India’s share in world GDP at PPP (about 4.5%) in the third year after entry and rise to India’s share in world population (17%) by the tenth year of production. The content referred to here can be interpreted liberally to include any non-Indian content provided by any author/writer of Indian origin (up to children of parents who once held Indian passports). Again the idea is to ensure cultural diversity and that the Indian cultural perspective is fully reflected in this diversity.
CULTURE, SOCIETY & ENTERTAINMENT
The reciprocity principle outlined above can also be applied to the areas of culture, society and entertainment. In the area of scholarly & semi-scholarly books & journals providing analysis & information, such as books and journals on food, popular music and films, automatic foreign equity up to 74% could be permitted subject to criterion C1 & C2b and up to 51% subject to C1 alone. Higher foreign equity could be considered by the FIPB depending on more formal export commitment or commitment to provide Indian content. In the case of popular novels, magazines & comic books with the primary purpose of entertainment, automatic foreign equity up to 74% could be granted subject to criterion C1 and C2 and up to 51% subject to C1 and C2b. FIPB route would apply if proposal cannot meet condition C2. This condition can be relaxed by substituting it by formal export commitment.
The globalisation criterion enunciated above can also be applied to foreign entrants in the field of current affairs and news programs, along with a third one relating specifically to India (C3). The need for this clause arises because reporting of international affairs is strongly influenced by Nationality, as demonstrated by reporting of the war in Afghanistan and related issues of Pakistani involvement in terrorism in the region.
C3: Editorial Control
Editorial control, in the sense of control over editorial policy and content must vest with Indian nationals. The business managers and those who control commercial decision can, however, be foreigners. There could also be a grace period during which editorial policy is completely under the control of foreign editors.
Foreign entry into publishing of newspapers and news magazines dealing with current affairs and news can be allowed subject to criteria C1, C2 and C3. This could be done through the FIPB route subject to a maximum of 49% foreign equity.
Sunday, June 23, 2002
Tuesday, June 11, 2002
China, India and the Asian Century?
We have shown in the previous article that India and China are likely to be among the three fastest growing economies in the World in the first decade of the 21st century with a mean growth rate of 7.3% and 7.5% per annum respectively. This has certain implications for the Global Economy.
Over the last two decades or so the important role played by economic factors in international relations has been recognised and appreciated. Prof. Kissinger has written about the emergence of six ‘Great Powers’ in the 21st century (USA, EU, China, Japan, Russia and India). This is particularly so since the disintegration of the USSR, as poor economic performance and growth was a major factor in undermining its stability and power. Prof. Paul Kennedy, in his book, ‘The Rise and Fall of Great Powers’ also gave economics considerable weight in the evolution of the Global balance of power. In the last decade or two fast growing economies have received a lot of attention and importance not only in World Capital Markets but also in World Capitals. Fast growth of East and South East Asian economies between the mid-seventies to the mid-nineties (coupled with the large Japanese economy) led to talk about the 21st century being the ‘Asian Century.’ Others more cognisant about the growth of Latin American countries like Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Argentina (coupled with the largest economy-USA) talked about the ‘Asia-Pacific Century’. The ‘Tequila crises’ along with the more recent ‘Asian crises’ seems to have put paid to such talk. This along with the strong US growth over the last decade has revived talk of a “Second American Century”.
In addition to economic growth, size is another feature of any economy, which determines its international importance. China and India are among the five largest economies in the world, in term of Gross Domestic Product at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP for short), with a growth rate much higher than each of the other three economies in this group. Though their per capita income (PPP) is between 5.5% and 17% of that of the other three economies, or perhaps paradoxically because of it, their future growth is of special interest to the World. This interest arises from the possibility of catch-up and large contributions to world GDP growth in the first two decades of the 21st century. The general consensus is that China’s performance in the late 20th century has been outstanding while that of India has been quite poor (with some exception during a few years in the nineties) and far inferior, to the point of non-comparability, to the (former) “miracle growth economies.” This article uses the growth projections in the last article to draw implications for power relations.
In terms of relative size, measured by GDP in purchasing power parity, the five largest economies in the world in 1998 were the USA, China, Japan, Germany and India. This is a much better way to compare the relative size of different economies than nominal exchange rate based estimates.. By the end of 1999 India will overtake Germany to become the fourth largest economy. Taking the tentative growth projections in Table 2 and estimating a per capita GDP growth rate for the USA, Germany and Japan as 2%, 1.5 to 1.9% and 0.9 to 1.5% per annum over the next decade we make some illustrative projections for the large countries. The Indian economy is projected to be 7-15% larger than that of Japan (in terms of GDP at PPP) in 2010. Thus by 2010 India’s economy will be among the three largest in the world after the USA and China. Its per capita GDP (at PPP) would still however be about one-fifteenth to one-twelfth of Japan’s and about one-tenth that of Germany.
A market exchange based estimate is useful for trade related comparisons, as tradable goods are the ones least affected by the application of PPP measures. The countries with the largest contribution to World GDP growth in 2010, in terms of absolute US $ value of additional GDP (at market exchange rate) will also be China, USA, Japan and India. In that year, China’s contribution is projected to be about 45% and India’s about 18% that of the USA. Japan’s contribution will be 17-24% and Germany’s 13-18% of that of the USA. These increments to GDP would also be an approximate measure of their incremental contribution to World trade in goods and traditional services (e.g. international transport & communication). With a host of newly tradable services likely to enter world trade in the next decade, the PPP based indicators may provide better indicators for the increase in trade in previously non-traded services.
Conclusion
While attention has been focused on the Asian Tigers, Asian NICs and the Chinese dragon during the past two decades, the performance of the Asian Elephant, India went largely unnoticed till 1998. In terms of per capita income the accepted measure of economic performance, India was the eighth fastest growing economy in the world during 1980-98. It was estimated to be the sixth fastest during the last two decades of the 20th century (though this estimate may now have to be revised). Only S. Korea and Singapore among the ‘Asian Tigers,’ Thailand & Indonesia among the NICs (Newly Industrialised Countries) and China (the newest Asian HPE), will have a higher trend growth rate during these two decades.
In the first decade of the 21st century India’s growth ranking is projected to improve further to the top three. In the next decade therefore India is forecast to grow faster than the ‘Asian Tigers’ and the ‘Asian NICs’. Its only Asian (or Emerging market) competitor in the growth sweepstakes will be China the newest Asian entrant to the group of star performers. The cycle of history will after half a century have turned full circle, with these two large emerging economies again engaged in friendly competition for the number two slot in the economic growth and development sweepstakes.
By 2010 India will be the third largest economy (PPP). In that year its contribution to the growth of the World economy in current US $ s will also be the third or fourth largest. Despite its relatively low per capita income, India will therefore be (along with the USA, EU, China and Japan) one of the five most important economies in the world in 2010. Further 11 of the 16 fastest growing economies in the next decade may be Asian countries constituting half the World’s population (in 1998). Though the next quarter century will still be part of the previous American century, the contours of the ‘Asian century’ will be clear even to sceptics by 2025.
A stable ‘Balance of Power’ within Asia will be critical to World peace in the last three-quarters of the 21st century. It is therefore in the interest of the USA to use its position as the sole super power, to help build (during the next decade or so) an internally consistent and stable balance of power within Asia that is sustainable without American military intervention.
Over the last two decades or so the important role played by economic factors in international relations has been recognised and appreciated. Prof. Kissinger has written about the emergence of six ‘Great Powers’ in the 21st century (USA, EU, China, Japan, Russia and India). This is particularly so since the disintegration of the USSR, as poor economic performance and growth was a major factor in undermining its stability and power. Prof. Paul Kennedy, in his book, ‘The Rise and Fall of Great Powers’ also gave economics considerable weight in the evolution of the Global balance of power. In the last decade or two fast growing economies have received a lot of attention and importance not only in World Capital Markets but also in World Capitals. Fast growth of East and South East Asian economies between the mid-seventies to the mid-nineties (coupled with the large Japanese economy) led to talk about the 21st century being the ‘Asian Century.’ Others more cognisant about the growth of Latin American countries like Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Argentina (coupled with the largest economy-USA) talked about the ‘Asia-Pacific Century’. The ‘Tequila crises’ along with the more recent ‘Asian crises’ seems to have put paid to such talk. This along with the strong US growth over the last decade has revived talk of a “Second American Century”.
In addition to economic growth, size is another feature of any economy, which determines its international importance. China and India are among the five largest economies in the world, in term of Gross Domestic Product at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP for short), with a growth rate much higher than each of the other three economies in this group. Though their per capita income (PPP) is between 5.5% and 17% of that of the other three economies, or perhaps paradoxically because of it, their future growth is of special interest to the World. This interest arises from the possibility of catch-up and large contributions to world GDP growth in the first two decades of the 21st century. The general consensus is that China’s performance in the late 20th century has been outstanding while that of India has been quite poor (with some exception during a few years in the nineties) and far inferior, to the point of non-comparability, to the (former) “miracle growth economies.” This article uses the growth projections in the last article to draw implications for power relations.
In terms of relative size, measured by GDP in purchasing power parity, the five largest economies in the world in 1998 were the USA, China, Japan, Germany and India. This is a much better way to compare the relative size of different economies than nominal exchange rate based estimates.. By the end of 1999 India will overtake Germany to become the fourth largest economy. Taking the tentative growth projections in Table 2 and estimating a per capita GDP growth rate for the USA, Germany and Japan as 2%, 1.5 to 1.9% and 0.9 to 1.5% per annum over the next decade we make some illustrative projections for the large countries. The Indian economy is projected to be 7-15% larger than that of Japan (in terms of GDP at PPP) in 2010. Thus by 2010 India’s economy will be among the three largest in the world after the USA and China. Its per capita GDP (at PPP) would still however be about one-fifteenth to one-twelfth of Japan’s and about one-tenth that of Germany.
A market exchange based estimate is useful for trade related comparisons, as tradable goods are the ones least affected by the application of PPP measures. The countries with the largest contribution to World GDP growth in 2010, in terms of absolute US $ value of additional GDP (at market exchange rate) will also be China, USA, Japan and India. In that year, China’s contribution is projected to be about 45% and India’s about 18% that of the USA. Japan’s contribution will be 17-24% and Germany’s 13-18% of that of the USA. These increments to GDP would also be an approximate measure of their incremental contribution to World trade in goods and traditional services (e.g. international transport & communication). With a host of newly tradable services likely to enter world trade in the next decade, the PPP based indicators may provide better indicators for the increase in trade in previously non-traded services.
Conclusion
While attention has been focused on the Asian Tigers, Asian NICs and the Chinese dragon during the past two decades, the performance of the Asian Elephant, India went largely unnoticed till 1998. In terms of per capita income the accepted measure of economic performance, India was the eighth fastest growing economy in the world during 1980-98. It was estimated to be the sixth fastest during the last two decades of the 20th century (though this estimate may now have to be revised). Only S. Korea and Singapore among the ‘Asian Tigers,’ Thailand & Indonesia among the NICs (Newly Industrialised Countries) and China (the newest Asian HPE), will have a higher trend growth rate during these two decades.
In the first decade of the 21st century India’s growth ranking is projected to improve further to the top three. In the next decade therefore India is forecast to grow faster than the ‘Asian Tigers’ and the ‘Asian NICs’. Its only Asian (or Emerging market) competitor in the growth sweepstakes will be China the newest Asian entrant to the group of star performers. The cycle of history will after half a century have turned full circle, with these two large emerging economies again engaged in friendly competition for the number two slot in the economic growth and development sweepstakes.
By 2010 India will be the third largest economy (PPP). In that year its contribution to the growth of the World economy in current US $ s will also be the third or fourth largest. Despite its relatively low per capita income, India will therefore be (along with the USA, EU, China and Japan) one of the five most important economies in the world in 2010. Further 11 of the 16 fastest growing economies in the next decade may be Asian countries constituting half the World’s population (in 1998). Though the next quarter century will still be part of the previous American century, the contours of the ‘Asian century’ will be clear even to sceptics by 2025.
A stable ‘Balance of Power’ within Asia will be critical to World peace in the last three-quarters of the 21st century. It is therefore in the interest of the USA to use its position as the sole super power, to help build (during the next decade or so) an internally consistent and stable balance of power within Asia that is sustainable without American military intervention.
Monday, June 10, 2002
Potential Growth Stars of the 21st Century
This article identifies countries with potential to be the fastest growing ones in the first decade of the 21st century.” An October 1999 paper by the author identified the fastest growing economies of the last two decades of the 20th century, analysed these growth patterns and used these for making projections for the first decade of the 21st century [http://finance.nic.in/avirmani]. The per capita GDP growth forecasts on which the ranking is made, are based on the growth trend analysis.
Three of the eleven high growth economies from the 1980-2000 period, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indonesia loose their place among the star performers in the 21st century (table 2). In fact Malaysia is no longer in the top ten during 1980-2000. Hong Kong growth has been on a declining trend, which had already taken it to the bottom of the star set during 1980-2000. It seems to have reached the end of its high growth curve. There is a question mark on whether it can even grow at the top of the high-income countries’ growth range, given the change in its political status coupled and its currency board system. The Asian crises coupled with the additional costs imposed by the Euphoria-Panic cycle will push Indonesia down from its earlier 9th position. The political upheaval and transformation may also add to the delay in recovery as the new political system takes time to settle down. Half a decade may pass before Indonesia can hope to get back into the ranks of the star performers.
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Table 2 : Per Capita GDP Growth Forecast for 2000-10
Country Rank Avg gr rt
Ireland Top 3 6.9%
China* Top 3 5.9(4.9)%
India** Top 3 5.7%
Chile Top 5 4.6%
Korea, S Top 5 4.4%
Vietnam Top 10 3.5%
Singapore Top 10 3.0%
Thailand Top 10 3.0%
X Top 10
X Top 10
-----------------------------------------------
Notes:
1) The forecast for 2000-2010 is based on analysis of past trends.
2) * The forecast for China assumes that past over-estimates of growth by 2% would be gradually corrected over the decade (0.2% point per annum).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The top three performers in the first decade of the 21st century are forecast to be Ireland, China and India. Ireland and India share two characteristics. They were the two surprise entrants to the ranks of the star performers in the last two decades of the 20th century, and the only two in the accelerating phase of high growth during these decades. Even if Ireland reaches a plateau, maintenance of this growth rate would make Ireland the fastest growing economy.
China seems to have entered the decelerating phase. Any forecast of China’s growth is, however, complicated by the fact that past growth is over estimated by an average of 1 to 2% per annum. We have assumed an overestimation of 2%, and projected it to be corrected through better statistical systems over the next decade, to become 0% by the end of the decade. This yields an average growth rate of 5.9% (published) per annum which is marginally higher than that estimated for India. If a full correction of 2% is made growth rates of per capita GDP would be 4.9% (actual). This would lower China’s rank below that of India, but still leave China among the top three performers during the next decade.
The China forecast is based on our analysis of euphoria and the possibility of accumulated negatives in a society and polity such as China. Among the inconsistencies or incongruities, which suggest such hidden negatives are:
a) Reports of masses of unemployed people roaming the countryside looking for work. A typical low-income Asian “labour surplus economy” is characterised by disguised unemployment in the rural sector. For such a country to have mass open unemployment after 18 years of 10.6% (or even 8.6%) growth, denotes inconsistency.
b) Low-income countries have relatively low domestic saving rates, higher domestic investment and a corresponding deficit on the current account of the Balance of payments. China in contrast has phenomenal levels of domestic savings and investment coupled with very high levels of FDI and a surplus on the current account for 12 of the past 17 years (with an average surplus about 0.5% of GDP). This historical anomaly is sustainable.
c) China has comprehensive capital controls, a current account surplus and rising foreign reserves for much of the period. Yet the post crisis years have seen repeated discussion/speculation of a Chinese devaluation. With capital account controlled, a devaluation in the presence of current account surplus and rising reserves is a complete violation of market economics.
d) China’s labour intensive exports are highly competitive, not so the capital-intensive exports produced by the state enterprises. Yet a very large variety of such exports at unbeatable prices are increasingly found in developing countries. The possibility that these entail implicit subsidies in the form of losses financed by loans from the State banks is high. Late nineties estimates of non-performing loans of around 24% (50% in 2001) of GDP support this hypothesis. It would also suggest future difficulties with respect to export growth.
Despite these potential negatives our forecast assumes a decline in average real per capita GDP growth of only about 2% points from its performance in the last two decades.
India on the threshold of the 21st century is still a low-income country with an enormous amount of catch up still left. The greatest strength is the free, open and democratic society and polity, which ensures that all weaknesses and problems are fully exposed and debated. The actual growth rate will depend on the pace and depth of reforms that follows from this knowledge. Growth may be slower than projected if some critical reforms such as the reallocating and improving the quality of government expenditure are not undertaken in the next 5 to 10 years. Achievement of per capita GDP growth above the projected 5.7% would require a substantial step-up in the pace of economic reforms. The projected growth rate of 5.7% per annum over the next decade is 1.6 per cent point higher than the trend growth rate during the last two decades. It would move India from 6th rank in 1980-2000 to third or higher rank in 2000-2010. This is a feasible because India will undergo a demographic transition during the next two decades, which will lower the dependency ratio (dependents per worker) and could increase per capita GDP growth rates by about 0.7%.
South Korea is the only other country to retain its position among the 6 fastest growing economies while Chile moves up to this sub-category. Korea has previously had very sharp drops in growth. The current drop is however much sharper and reflects a larger accumulation of negative factors requiring policy reform and new approaches. It is likely to move back towards its long-term trend growth rate, ensuring its position in the top six. Chile has been moving up the growth rankings and appears set to continue on this path even though its past recovery-record is mixed. Several setbacks were semi-permanent and reduced trend growth while others were followed by a renewal of vigorous growth. The growth slowdown this time is relatively minor and therefore expected to be reversed.
Vietnam, Singapore and Thailand are the other three star performers of the last two decades, which may remain stars. Though Vietnam seems to have come to an end of one growth cycle, it has the potential to re-accelerate given sufficiently purposeful reforms. There is however the possibility that such reforms will not take place for political reasons and Vietnam will drop out of the top ten. Thailand still has high growth potential but also an accumulated baggage of un-addressed negatives. The degree of attention and success in dealing with the accumulated problems will determine its growth ranking. In both cases an average pace of reforms is assumed in placing them in the top ten. Singapore will continue on its gradually declining growth trend but likely remain in the top ten during the next decade.
Promising potential candidates for inclusion among the star performers of the 21st century are Sri Lanka, Norway, Laos, Poland, Bangladesh and Uganda. Thus for the two slots vacated by Asian countries in the top ten, three of the six potential candidates are from Asia and four out of six are poor countries in which policy reforms will play an important role. Over a slightly longer horizon Indonesia remains a candidate while Malaysia’s performance could still be in the top 15. Given that 11 of the 16 fastest growing economies in the next decade could well be Asian the possibility of an ‘Asian century’ cannot be ruled out.
Three of the eleven high growth economies from the 1980-2000 period, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indonesia loose their place among the star performers in the 21st century (table 2). In fact Malaysia is no longer in the top ten during 1980-2000. Hong Kong growth has been on a declining trend, which had already taken it to the bottom of the star set during 1980-2000. It seems to have reached the end of its high growth curve. There is a question mark on whether it can even grow at the top of the high-income countries’ growth range, given the change in its political status coupled and its currency board system. The Asian crises coupled with the additional costs imposed by the Euphoria-Panic cycle will push Indonesia down from its earlier 9th position. The political upheaval and transformation may also add to the delay in recovery as the new political system takes time to settle down. Half a decade may pass before Indonesia can hope to get back into the ranks of the star performers.
-------------------------------------------------------
Table 2 : Per Capita GDP Growth Forecast for 2000-10
Country Rank Avg gr rt
Ireland Top 3 6.9%
China* Top 3 5.9(4.9)%
India** Top 3 5.7%
Chile Top 5 4.6%
Korea, S Top 5 4.4%
Vietnam Top 10 3.5%
Singapore Top 10 3.0%
Thailand Top 10 3.0%
X Top 10
X Top 10
-----------------------------------------------
Notes:
1) The forecast for 2000-2010 is based on analysis of past trends.
2) * The forecast for China assumes that past over-estimates of growth by 2% would be gradually corrected over the decade (0.2% point per annum).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The top three performers in the first decade of the 21st century are forecast to be Ireland, China and India. Ireland and India share two characteristics. They were the two surprise entrants to the ranks of the star performers in the last two decades of the 20th century, and the only two in the accelerating phase of high growth during these decades. Even if Ireland reaches a plateau, maintenance of this growth rate would make Ireland the fastest growing economy.
China seems to have entered the decelerating phase. Any forecast of China’s growth is, however, complicated by the fact that past growth is over estimated by an average of 1 to 2% per annum. We have assumed an overestimation of 2%, and projected it to be corrected through better statistical systems over the next decade, to become 0% by the end of the decade. This yields an average growth rate of 5.9% (published) per annum which is marginally higher than that estimated for India. If a full correction of 2% is made growth rates of per capita GDP would be 4.9% (actual). This would lower China’s rank below that of India, but still leave China among the top three performers during the next decade.
The China forecast is based on our analysis of euphoria and the possibility of accumulated negatives in a society and polity such as China. Among the inconsistencies or incongruities, which suggest such hidden negatives are:
a) Reports of masses of unemployed people roaming the countryside looking for work. A typical low-income Asian “labour surplus economy” is characterised by disguised unemployment in the rural sector. For such a country to have mass open unemployment after 18 years of 10.6% (or even 8.6%) growth, denotes inconsistency.
b) Low-income countries have relatively low domestic saving rates, higher domestic investment and a corresponding deficit on the current account of the Balance of payments. China in contrast has phenomenal levels of domestic savings and investment coupled with very high levels of FDI and a surplus on the current account for 12 of the past 17 years (with an average surplus about 0.5% of GDP). This historical anomaly is sustainable.
c) China has comprehensive capital controls, a current account surplus and rising foreign reserves for much of the period. Yet the post crisis years have seen repeated discussion/speculation of a Chinese devaluation. With capital account controlled, a devaluation in the presence of current account surplus and rising reserves is a complete violation of market economics.
d) China’s labour intensive exports are highly competitive, not so the capital-intensive exports produced by the state enterprises. Yet a very large variety of such exports at unbeatable prices are increasingly found in developing countries. The possibility that these entail implicit subsidies in the form of losses financed by loans from the State banks is high. Late nineties estimates of non-performing loans of around 24% (50% in 2001) of GDP support this hypothesis. It would also suggest future difficulties with respect to export growth.
Despite these potential negatives our forecast assumes a decline in average real per capita GDP growth of only about 2% points from its performance in the last two decades.
India on the threshold of the 21st century is still a low-income country with an enormous amount of catch up still left. The greatest strength is the free, open and democratic society and polity, which ensures that all weaknesses and problems are fully exposed and debated. The actual growth rate will depend on the pace and depth of reforms that follows from this knowledge. Growth may be slower than projected if some critical reforms such as the reallocating and improving the quality of government expenditure are not undertaken in the next 5 to 10 years. Achievement of per capita GDP growth above the projected 5.7% would require a substantial step-up in the pace of economic reforms. The projected growth rate of 5.7% per annum over the next decade is 1.6 per cent point higher than the trend growth rate during the last two decades. It would move India from 6th rank in 1980-2000 to third or higher rank in 2000-2010. This is a feasible because India will undergo a demographic transition during the next two decades, which will lower the dependency ratio (dependents per worker) and could increase per capita GDP growth rates by about 0.7%.
South Korea is the only other country to retain its position among the 6 fastest growing economies while Chile moves up to this sub-category. Korea has previously had very sharp drops in growth. The current drop is however much sharper and reflects a larger accumulation of negative factors requiring policy reform and new approaches. It is likely to move back towards its long-term trend growth rate, ensuring its position in the top six. Chile has been moving up the growth rankings and appears set to continue on this path even though its past recovery-record is mixed. Several setbacks were semi-permanent and reduced trend growth while others were followed by a renewal of vigorous growth. The growth slowdown this time is relatively minor and therefore expected to be reversed.
Vietnam, Singapore and Thailand are the other three star performers of the last two decades, which may remain stars. Though Vietnam seems to have come to an end of one growth cycle, it has the potential to re-accelerate given sufficiently purposeful reforms. There is however the possibility that such reforms will not take place for political reasons and Vietnam will drop out of the top ten. Thailand still has high growth potential but also an accumulated baggage of un-addressed negatives. The degree of attention and success in dealing with the accumulated problems will determine its growth ranking. In both cases an average pace of reforms is assumed in placing them in the top ten. Singapore will continue on its gradually declining growth trend but likely remain in the top ten during the next decade.
Promising potential candidates for inclusion among the star performers of the 21st century are Sri Lanka, Norway, Laos, Poland, Bangladesh and Uganda. Thus for the two slots vacated by Asian countries in the top ten, three of the six potential candidates are from Asia and four out of six are poor countries in which policy reforms will play an important role. Over a slightly longer horizon Indonesia remains a candidate while Malaysia’s performance could still be in the top 15. Given that 11 of the 16 fastest growing economies in the next decade could well be Asian the possibility of an ‘Asian century’ cannot be ruled out.
Saturday, June 1, 2002
District Level Poverty: Estimates and Analysis
INTRODUCTION
The Planning Commission prepares State Specific Poverty lines and Poverty levels (head count ratios) by rural and urban sectors. These poverty rates are now available for the 2000-01 NSS 55th round. Poverty rates at a more dis-aggregated level are only available at the level of NSS region for 1993-94 the previous large sample NSS survey. As the NSS does not provide district level data, poverty estimates are not available at the district level.
This paper uses an econometric methodology to provide district level NSS estimates using the region wise poverty data. These estimates are then used to rank the districts by degree of poverty (from highest to lowest). The districts falling outside one standard deviation on the upper side of the ranking can be said to be districts with relatively high poverty, while those outside two standard deviations on the upper side can be said to be those with very high poverty. The list of such districts can be used identify special pockets of poverty for which a geographical approach to economic growth, infrastructure development and poverty reduction is the most appropriate. To the extent that so many of our development programs are directed towards removing the causes and/or consequences of poverty, this can also contribute a better understanding of the micro-determinants of poverty.
METHODOLOGY
This paper uses NSS region data on available district level variables such as urbanisation, labour productivity in agriculture (Value of agricultural output per male agricultural worker), proportion of SC/ST in the district population and infrastructure variables to derive estimates for the district. The district level variables are first averaged across each NSS region. Cross sectional effect of urbanisation, agricultural labour productivity, caste and infrastructure variables on poverty are then estimated. This regression is then used to derive district level poverty based on the variation of the district level variables from their average for the region.
Results
Determinants of PovertyThe estimated equation is as follows (numbers in bracket are t statistics):
(1) Poverty = 60.224 – 0.8232 POPurban – 1.1181 Yag/Lml + 0.4648 POPsc
(13.7) (-11.0) (-10.4) (4.1)
0.3747 POPst + 0.1820 POPmuslim – 0.3843 PostalFac – 0.00003 PHsC
(7.2) (2.4) (-6.7) (-4.9)
Multiple R2 = 0.772, R2 = 0.596, R2 (adjusted) = 0.5235.
Where Yag/Lml is the Value of agricultural output per male agricultural worker (Bhalla et al) POPurban is the proportion of urban population, and POPsc POPst & POPmuslim are respectively the SC, ST & muslim populations as a proportion of the total (1991 census) averaged over the NSS region. PostalFac and PHsC are the proportion of villages with postal facility and Primary Health sub-Centers respectively. Poverty rates are for 1993-94.
The equation shows that agricultural productivity and urbanisation play a strong role in reducing poverty. The former is the key to productive employment in rural areas and the latter plays both a direct role in generating urban jobs and an indirect role in providing the market for agricultural produce. The association of SC and ST population with poverty is also very strong. A one percent point increase in the SC and ST population increases the poverty rate by 0.47 percent point and 0.37 percent point respectively. The effect of Muslim population is smaller (0.18 percent point) though still significant at the 5% level. The effect of unemployment rate on poverty which was significant in the absence of the urbanisation variable is now insignificant.
It has been known for some time that ill health is an important factor in pushing people below the poverty line. Our results show that the existence of Primary health sub-centres in the rural areas has a significant affect on poverty reduction. This is rather remarkable given the absenteeism and poor quality of health care provided in government health centres and the large proportion of consumer expenditures on private health practitioners and facilities. There is generally one Primary health sub-centre per 5000 people. These sub-centers are staffed by an Auxiliary Nurse mid-wife and a male health worker and there primary objective is preventive health. It is known that the attendance record of the latter is not much better than that of doctors posted at Primary health centres. We understand, however that the attendance record of the Auxiliary Nurse Mid-wife (ANM) is the polar opposite, bordering on the perfect. This is perhaps an explanation for the effectiveness in reducing ill health and and poverty.
The only other variable with a significant effect on cross-regional poverty are postal facilities. Postal facilities can be channel for communications between market participants or for the flow of information and money orders from migrant labour. Different aspects could be important in different situations.
Other infrastructure variables like proportions of villages with electricity, pucca roads, drinking water, or primary schools, the density of railway station or bank branches and gross irrigated area have no additional effect on cross-regional poverty (i.e. are not significant when entered in this equation). An important reason for this is the high degree of multi- co linearity among many of these variable with the variables that turn out to be significant.
Agriculture Productivity
Using the same regional data we can also find out the effect of poverty and the available district level variables on un-employment.
(2) Yag/Lml = -6.7528 + 0.0472 UrbanPop + 0.1178 GrIrArea + 0.0977 POPsc
(-5.9) (3.2) (10.8) (4.4)
+0.0839 POPst + 1.4074 BankBrnch + 0.026 ElectVil – 0.0324 DrnkWtr
(4.2) (14.8) (2.3) (-4.8)
-0.035 PuccaRd
(-1.6)
Multiple R2 = 0.791, R2 = 0.626, R2 (adjusted) = 0.619.
Numbers in brackets are t statistics. GrIrArea is Gross Irrigated area, BankBrnch is the number of bank branches per lakh population, ElectVil, DrnkWtr and PuccRd are the proportion of villages that are electrified, have drinking water supply and have Pucca road connection respectively.
Some answers are provided by an examination of the determinants of differences in productivity across regions. Equation (2) shows that urbanisation, gross irrigated area, density of bank branches and electrification have a significant effect on agricultural productivity. The slightly lower level of significance of the last variable is probably due to the fact that the mere existence of electricity connections does not reflect either the amount or quality of electricity supply, and when absent it is probably substituted by use of hydro-carbon fuels. Better irrigation and electricity therefore influence poverty indirectly through their effect on agricultural productivity.
Pucca roads however turn out have no effect on agricultural productivity or poverty. It is possible that the quality of ‘pucca’ roads is not much different from that of ‘kutcha’ ones, while the absence of critical bridges etc. means that this variable is not reflective of good road connectivity. The connectivity provided by roads is probably captured jointly by the agricultural productivity and urbanisation variables, in that surplus agricultural produce arising from high labour productivity has to be transported to and sold in urban areas. The fact that density of bank branches is significant in the agricultural productivity regression but not in the poverty one, reflects the importance of payment mechanisms and perhaps credit in the supply of surplus agricultural produce to urban areas.
The only plausible explanation for the negative effect of drinking water supply on agriculture is that it is capturing the effect of low natural water supply. In other words for any given level of irrigation the lower the natural rainfall the greater is the need for piped drinking water supply. If provision of drinking water to villages has been need based, then this variable will be a good proxy for low rainfall (i.e. inverse correlation). We would expect that rainfall has a positive effect on agricultural productivity and consequently that water supply proportion is negatively co-related with agricultural productivity.
District Poverty Rates
Using the co-efficients estimated in equation (1) we can estimate district level poverty rates for all districts within a given region as follows:
(3) Poverty (district) = Poverty (region) – 1.1181 [Yag/Lml (district) – Yag/Lml (region)] - 0.8232 [POPurban (district) – POPurban (region)] + 0.4648 [POPsc (district) – POPsc (region)] + 0.3747 [POPst (district) – POPst (region)] + 0.182 [POPmuslim (district) – POPmuslim (region)] – 0.3843 [PostalFac (district) – PostalFac (region)] – 0.00003 [PHsC (district) – PHsC (region)]
The results of applying equation (3) to derive the district level poverty estimates for 1993-94 are presented in Table 1. The districts are ordered starting from those with the highest poverty rate to the lowest poverty rate. The mean poverty rate in these districts is 37.3% and the standard deviation is 19.8%. Poverty rates falling within one standard deviation of the mean are within the normal range of variability, and only those lying outside this range on the upper side can be classified as being abnormally high. There are 66 districts with a poverty rate higher than 57.2% (mean plus standard deviation). These can be classified as having a high poverty rate. Of these 66 high poverty districts almost half were in (undivided) Bihar (32). Currently 19 (about 28%) of these will be in Bihar and 13 (20%) in Jharkhand. Undivided Madhya Pradesh had 13 (20%) of the high poverty districts of which 9 fall in current Madhya Pradesh and 5 in Chattisgarh. The remaining high poverty districts are in Uttar Pradesh (9), Orissa (5), Maharashtra (4), West Bengal (2) and Tamil Nadu (1).
There were only four district with a poverty rate higher than two standard diviation above the mean (i.e. 77% in 1993-94). These are Gumla and Lhardaga in Jharkhand and West Nimar and Barwani in Madhya Pradesh.
Bihar (undivided) had high poverty in 58% of its 55 districts. These were situated in the northern, central and southern (Jharkhand) NSS regions. Orissa came next with high poverty in 38% of its 13 districts with the highest concentration in the Southern and Western regions. Madhya Pradesh (udivided) had high poverty in 20% of its 34 districts with the highest concentration in the South Western and Chattisgarh regions. Maharashtra with 12% of its 34 districts, UP with 11% of its 79 districts and West Bengal with also 11% of its 18 districts were in the middle. Tamil Nadu’s single high poverty district constituted 5% of its 18 districts. UP’s high poverty districts were concentrated in the Southern region with a few in the Eastern region , while the high poverty districts of West Bengal were in the Himalayan region. A regional approach could be adopted in most of these states with contiguous high poverty districts developed together in an integrated state sub-plan (s).
We can compare these proportions with the 1993-94 State Poverty rates. The ordering of the States by State poverty level is identical to the ordering of states by the proportion of their districts that have high poverty levels as defined above. Thus there is perfect rank co-relation between the two.
5 CONCLUSION
The paper shows that agricultural productivity and urbanisation have a very significant role in reducing poverty. Districts with higher SC, ST and Muslim population have a larger proportion of poor.
The Planning Commission prepares State Specific Poverty lines and Poverty levels (head count ratios) by rural and urban sectors. These poverty rates are now available for the 2000-01 NSS 55th round. Poverty rates at a more dis-aggregated level are only available at the level of NSS region for 1993-94 the previous large sample NSS survey. As the NSS does not provide district level data, poverty estimates are not available at the district level.
This paper uses an econometric methodology to provide district level NSS estimates using the region wise poverty data. These estimates are then used to rank the districts by degree of poverty (from highest to lowest). The districts falling outside one standard deviation on the upper side of the ranking can be said to be districts with relatively high poverty, while those outside two standard deviations on the upper side can be said to be those with very high poverty. The list of such districts can be used identify special pockets of poverty for which a geographical approach to economic growth, infrastructure development and poverty reduction is the most appropriate. To the extent that so many of our development programs are directed towards removing the causes and/or consequences of poverty, this can also contribute a better understanding of the micro-determinants of poverty.
METHODOLOGY
This paper uses NSS region data on available district level variables such as urbanisation, labour productivity in agriculture (Value of agricultural output per male agricultural worker), proportion of SC/ST in the district population and infrastructure variables to derive estimates for the district. The district level variables are first averaged across each NSS region. Cross sectional effect of urbanisation, agricultural labour productivity, caste and infrastructure variables on poverty are then estimated. This regression is then used to derive district level poverty based on the variation of the district level variables from their average for the region.
Results
Determinants of PovertyThe estimated equation is as follows (numbers in bracket are t statistics):
(1) Poverty = 60.224 – 0.8232 POPurban – 1.1181 Yag/Lml + 0.4648 POPsc
(13.7) (-11.0) (-10.4) (4.1)
0.3747 POPst + 0.1820 POPmuslim – 0.3843 PostalFac – 0.00003 PHsC
(7.2) (2.4) (-6.7) (-4.9)
Multiple R2 = 0.772, R2 = 0.596, R2 (adjusted) = 0.5235.
Where Yag/Lml is the Value of agricultural output per male agricultural worker (Bhalla et al) POPurban is the proportion of urban population, and POPsc POPst & POPmuslim are respectively the SC, ST & muslim populations as a proportion of the total (1991 census) averaged over the NSS region. PostalFac and PHsC are the proportion of villages with postal facility and Primary Health sub-Centers respectively. Poverty rates are for 1993-94.
The equation shows that agricultural productivity and urbanisation play a strong role in reducing poverty. The former is the key to productive employment in rural areas and the latter plays both a direct role in generating urban jobs and an indirect role in providing the market for agricultural produce. The association of SC and ST population with poverty is also very strong. A one percent point increase in the SC and ST population increases the poverty rate by 0.47 percent point and 0.37 percent point respectively. The effect of Muslim population is smaller (0.18 percent point) though still significant at the 5% level. The effect of unemployment rate on poverty which was significant in the absence of the urbanisation variable is now insignificant.
It has been known for some time that ill health is an important factor in pushing people below the poverty line. Our results show that the existence of Primary health sub-centres in the rural areas has a significant affect on poverty reduction. This is rather remarkable given the absenteeism and poor quality of health care provided in government health centres and the large proportion of consumer expenditures on private health practitioners and facilities. There is generally one Primary health sub-centre per 5000 people. These sub-centers are staffed by an Auxiliary Nurse mid-wife and a male health worker and there primary objective is preventive health. It is known that the attendance record of the latter is not much better than that of doctors posted at Primary health centres. We understand, however that the attendance record of the Auxiliary Nurse Mid-wife (ANM) is the polar opposite, bordering on the perfect. This is perhaps an explanation for the effectiveness in reducing ill health and and poverty.
The only other variable with a significant effect on cross-regional poverty are postal facilities. Postal facilities can be channel for communications between market participants or for the flow of information and money orders from migrant labour. Different aspects could be important in different situations.
Other infrastructure variables like proportions of villages with electricity, pucca roads, drinking water, or primary schools, the density of railway station or bank branches and gross irrigated area have no additional effect on cross-regional poverty (i.e. are not significant when entered in this equation). An important reason for this is the high degree of multi- co linearity among many of these variable with the variables that turn out to be significant.
Agriculture Productivity
Using the same regional data we can also find out the effect of poverty and the available district level variables on un-employment.
(2) Yag/Lml = -6.7528 + 0.0472 UrbanPop + 0.1178 GrIrArea + 0.0977 POPsc
(-5.9) (3.2) (10.8) (4.4)
+0.0839 POPst + 1.4074 BankBrnch + 0.026 ElectVil – 0.0324 DrnkWtr
(4.2) (14.8) (2.3) (-4.8)
-0.035 PuccaRd
(-1.6)
Multiple R2 = 0.791, R2 = 0.626, R2 (adjusted) = 0.619.
Numbers in brackets are t statistics. GrIrArea is Gross Irrigated area, BankBrnch is the number of bank branches per lakh population, ElectVil, DrnkWtr and PuccRd are the proportion of villages that are electrified, have drinking water supply and have Pucca road connection respectively.
Some answers are provided by an examination of the determinants of differences in productivity across regions. Equation (2) shows that urbanisation, gross irrigated area, density of bank branches and electrification have a significant effect on agricultural productivity. The slightly lower level of significance of the last variable is probably due to the fact that the mere existence of electricity connections does not reflect either the amount or quality of electricity supply, and when absent it is probably substituted by use of hydro-carbon fuels. Better irrigation and electricity therefore influence poverty indirectly through their effect on agricultural productivity.
Pucca roads however turn out have no effect on agricultural productivity or poverty. It is possible that the quality of ‘pucca’ roads is not much different from that of ‘kutcha’ ones, while the absence of critical bridges etc. means that this variable is not reflective of good road connectivity. The connectivity provided by roads is probably captured jointly by the agricultural productivity and urbanisation variables, in that surplus agricultural produce arising from high labour productivity has to be transported to and sold in urban areas. The fact that density of bank branches is significant in the agricultural productivity regression but not in the poverty one, reflects the importance of payment mechanisms and perhaps credit in the supply of surplus agricultural produce to urban areas.
The only plausible explanation for the negative effect of drinking water supply on agriculture is that it is capturing the effect of low natural water supply. In other words for any given level of irrigation the lower the natural rainfall the greater is the need for piped drinking water supply. If provision of drinking water to villages has been need based, then this variable will be a good proxy for low rainfall (i.e. inverse correlation). We would expect that rainfall has a positive effect on agricultural productivity and consequently that water supply proportion is negatively co-related with agricultural productivity.
District Poverty Rates
Using the co-efficients estimated in equation (1) we can estimate district level poverty rates for all districts within a given region as follows:
(3) Poverty (district) = Poverty (region) – 1.1181 [Yag/Lml (district) – Yag/Lml (region)] - 0.8232 [POPurban (district) – POPurban (region)] + 0.4648 [POPsc (district) – POPsc (region)] + 0.3747 [POPst (district) – POPst (region)] + 0.182 [POPmuslim (district) – POPmuslim (region)] – 0.3843 [PostalFac (district) – PostalFac (region)] – 0.00003 [PHsC (district) – PHsC (region)]
The results of applying equation (3) to derive the district level poverty estimates for 1993-94 are presented in Table 1. The districts are ordered starting from those with the highest poverty rate to the lowest poverty rate. The mean poverty rate in these districts is 37.3% and the standard deviation is 19.8%. Poverty rates falling within one standard deviation of the mean are within the normal range of variability, and only those lying outside this range on the upper side can be classified as being abnormally high. There are 66 districts with a poverty rate higher than 57.2% (mean plus standard deviation). These can be classified as having a high poverty rate. Of these 66 high poverty districts almost half were in (undivided) Bihar (32). Currently 19 (about 28%) of these will be in Bihar and 13 (20%) in Jharkhand. Undivided Madhya Pradesh had 13 (20%) of the high poverty districts of which 9 fall in current Madhya Pradesh and 5 in Chattisgarh. The remaining high poverty districts are in Uttar Pradesh (9), Orissa (5), Maharashtra (4), West Bengal (2) and Tamil Nadu (1).
There were only four district with a poverty rate higher than two standard diviation above the mean (i.e. 77% in 1993-94). These are Gumla and Lhardaga in Jharkhand and West Nimar and Barwani in Madhya Pradesh.
Bihar (undivided) had high poverty in 58% of its 55 districts. These were situated in the northern, central and southern (Jharkhand) NSS regions. Orissa came next with high poverty in 38% of its 13 districts with the highest concentration in the Southern and Western regions. Madhya Pradesh (udivided) had high poverty in 20% of its 34 districts with the highest concentration in the South Western and Chattisgarh regions. Maharashtra with 12% of its 34 districts, UP with 11% of its 79 districts and West Bengal with also 11% of its 18 districts were in the middle. Tamil Nadu’s single high poverty district constituted 5% of its 18 districts. UP’s high poverty districts were concentrated in the Southern region with a few in the Eastern region , while the high poverty districts of West Bengal were in the Himalayan region. A regional approach could be adopted in most of these states with contiguous high poverty districts developed together in an integrated state sub-plan (s).
We can compare these proportions with the 1993-94 State Poverty rates. The ordering of the States by State poverty level is identical to the ordering of states by the proportion of their districts that have high poverty levels as defined above. Thus there is perfect rank co-relation between the two.
5 CONCLUSION
The paper shows that agricultural productivity and urbanisation have a very significant role in reducing poverty. Districts with higher SC, ST and Muslim population have a larger proportion of poor.
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