Introduction
The so called “Reset” in India China
relations, has been widely and wrongly reported as a change in Indian strategy
towards China. A few analysts also suggest that it is a change in Chinese
Strategy towards India. If we define strategy and tactics conventionally, the
arguments for either of these hypotheses is unconvincing. [i]
To the extent it is a reset, it’s a tactical one extending the next few years,
not a strategic one relevant for the next 5-10 years.
India’s Foreign
Policy has changed over the last five years along with its redefinition of
itself as an “aspiring leading power”.[ii]
There is an effort, since 2014, to define India’s interests more clearly and to
pursue them without looking over our shoulder at every step, or to worry how
third parties will respond to these policies. This applies to policies such as,
(a) A firmer line, diplomatically and militarily, on Terrorism and (b) Building
strategic defence capabilities through partnerships, including with USA. There
is also an attempt to develop a more symmetric & reciprocal foreign policy
with respect to China. This has not been abandoned, but tactics and operational
actions must respond to new developments & this includes the reactions of
the adversaries and partners. These include the Trade Defence (/war) launched
by the Trump Govt against Xi Govt of China and the new risks it has created for
FDI investors in China’s export industry, and the reverberations of the Doklam
crises.
Symmetry & Reciprocity
To understand the Xi-Modi informal
summit of April 2018, and its implications, one has to step back to 2017 and
two sets of events: On 17 April 2017 Dalai Lama visited Tawang and addressed
thousands of Bhutanese devotees.[iii]
Chinese called this visit a provocation.[iv]
India’s official formal Position on the Dalai Lama has always been clear:
Following the millineal traditions of India and the 3/4 century traditions of
democratic India, He is an honored Religious figure and is free to carry out
his religious activities anywhere in India. It has been obvious for Long that
the Communist China doesn’t see it that way, as to them Religious activity (e.g.
in Arunachal Pradesh or Tawang) is indistinguishable from political activity.
Going further the party and its media organs have arrogated to themselves the
right to criticize visits of Indian dignitaries to Arunachal Pradesh.
The second event followed within
two months, likely the time it took the PLA to get approvals and orders
from the top leadership & translate them on the ground. On June 16, 2017
Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment began
extending an existing road which ran roughly North North-East in the disputed
Bhutanese Trijunction area of Dolam held by them, south South eastward across
a little creek. On 18 June 2017, around 270 Indian troops, with weapons and two
bulldozers, entered Dolam to stop the Chinese troops from constructing the
road.[v] The formal Indian position is also clear,
that there is a written agreement, under which none of the parties will do
anything to change the status quo in the India-Bhutan-China Tri-junction area
now commonly referred to as Dolam area.[vi]
India also has a long standing mutual security agreement with Bhutan under
which it assists Bhutan in protecting its territorial integrity and security.
India viewed the extension of the road SSE within the (Bhutanese) territory
held by China, as likely to change the “status quo” in the Tri-junction area in
favour of China and took action to stop it. The PLA and its leadership were
shocked and dismayed by this Indian action, and apparently sought to convey to
China’s top leadership as outright aggression by India on China, w/o bringing
to its attention the Tri-junction agreement.
It took two months
to resolve the crisis diplomatically.[vii]
Throughout this period the organs of the Communist Party of China, such as The
Global Times, verbally attacked and abused India, a playing out of what I have
termed the Three Wars Strategy ie Legal war, Media War and Psychological War
(or PsyOps) . India, it’s government and even the media, in contrast, kept
their diplomatic cool and played the issue without rancor or emotion.
However, there was a
period when it looked like the PLA may turn it into a hot war, on the species
assumption that it still had, as in 1962, the ability to “teach India a
lesson”. Indian forces were very confident that they could ensure China would
not gain, in net terms, from a hot war; Further it was in a position of
creating enough risk for the PLA that attacking Indian forces in the Northern boundary
areas had a positive, even though small, risk of PLA ending up with egg on its
face. India’s political leadership was equally clear that it was far more
beneficial to all to resolve the issue through diplomacy instead of war.
Indian Motivation: Risk Reduction
In Late February 2018, the foreign secretary
requested the cabinet secretary to advise Govt officials not to attend events
organized by the Tibetan leadership in exile. Though this was consistent with
the distinction that the Govt of India has always made between Religious
activities and political activities of the Tibetan exiles based in India, it
was rightly seen as a signal to the Chinese leadership that India was ready to
diffuse further the confrontational environment that had developed in 2017.
From India’s
perspective there were two important problems seen during the crises that
needed to be corrected. One, was the impression, appearing repeatedly, that the
top leadership was not fully and objectively briefed by the PLA and /or others
on the Indian position on the Tri-junction boundary areas, whence the need for a
top level informal summit. The second problem that seemed to emerge, was that
the PLA and consequently the Chinese military commission headed by General
secretary Xi, seemed incompletely aware of the capabilities of the Indian armed
forces, particularly the Indian Air Force, circa 2018. This problem was sought
to be addressed among other things by the Gagan Shakti exercise that preceded
the “informal summit”.
The uncertainty
created by US sanctions on Russian defense companies and to a lesser extent on
Iran, may have also weighed on Indian decision makers.
Chinese Motivation
There seem to be two
possible motivations for China to consider toning down the possibility of
conflict, at this time. One is the largely negative reaction to Chinese efforts
to expand its territory and territorial control across its entire periphery,
stretching from the Himalayan border, through the South China Sea to the East
China Sea, with a dawning realization that this is provoking all the effected
countries to explore and expand security co-operation among themselves and with
the USA & other powers in the Indo-Pacific. Its reaction to the “Quad” is symptomatic of
this concern, not necessarily a fear of the Quad per-se. The second more
immediate and clear motivation is the “technology defence” and “trade war” launched
by the US administration. By my estimate any direct trade war between USA and
China could result in a 2%-point decline in China’s growth at the cost of a
maximum 0.5% growth decline for the USA, a 4:1 advantage for the USA viz China.[viii]
Even if the trade
issue is resolved by China, by substituting imports from USA for imports from
Rest of the World (ROW) to satisfy the obsession with the bilateral CAD with
China, the uncertainty created for export oriented FDI in China will have a permanent
negative effect on China. Such investment now has much greater incentive to
diversify out of China to India and other Lower Middle-Income countries (LMICs).
For a while after
the possibility of a Xi-Modi summit surfaced in public domain, there was also
speculation that a major deal involving India’s NSG membership, working of the
UNSC subcommittee on designation of global terrorists and OBOR/CIPEC may be in
the offing. This speculation was partly fueled by expansive statements/articles
in the Chinese Communist Party controlled media. However Indian spokespersons,
directly or indirectly, soon dampened such speculations, and tried to focus it
on broader issues and understanding. It soon became clear, that even a
restatement of previous agreements and understandings, by a leader who was
positioned to lead China for the next couple of decades had a value in itself.
Wuhan Summit
The informal summit between President
Xi and PM Modi was held in Wuhan on April 27-28, 2018.[ix]
There were two noteworthy announcements:
(1) On giving “strategic guidance to their respective militaries to strengthen communications in order to build trust and mutual understanding and enhance predictability and effectiveness in the management of border affairs” or in China’s terse words, “strengthen confidence building measures and enhance communication and cooperation to uphold border tranquillity,” Some observers have read a lot into the non-mention of “Strategic guidance in the Chinese version of the summit discussions. This is likely due to the sensitivity of these words for the communist party and its internal institutional management (E.g. the implication that either such guidance from the CMC & its leader was absent earlier or that despite existence of such guidance it was unimplemented is unacceptable to the party leader).
(1) On giving “strategic guidance to their respective militaries to strengthen communications in order to build trust and mutual understanding and enhance predictability and effectiveness in the management of border affairs” or in China’s terse words, “strengthen confidence building measures and enhance communication and cooperation to uphold border tranquillity,” Some observers have read a lot into the non-mention of “Strategic guidance in the Chinese version of the summit discussions. This is likely due to the sensitivity of these words for the communist party and its internal institutional management (E.g. the implication that either such guidance from the CMC & its leader was absent earlier or that despite existence of such guidance it was unimplemented is unacceptable to the party leader).
This is an attempt
to fill the gaps in understanding and in communications that were observed
during the Dolam crisis, and to extend the border management procedures already
operational at the LAC to border areas such as the Trijunction, not
traditionally part of the LAC. The underlying objective for India is to
minimize the probability of a hot war through accident, mistake,
misunderstanding or misjudgment (of our capabilities). Apparently China and its
leader are equally interested in this objective at the current juncture, when
it its confronted with several challenges on economy, trade, N Korea, Taiwan
and South China Sea.
(2) The agreement to do a joint economic project in
Afghanistan to “open new areas of cooperation “
Afghanistan is a
country in which China and India have some overlap of interest, namely to keep
it from becoming a base for Jehadi Terrorism. Both India and China have some
advantages and limitations/constraints in Afghanistan. India has a clear
economic & social advantage based on its labor n term relationship with the
Afghan Govt & people. It’s major limit is access. China on the other hand
can provide security for its projects, through its influence with the Pakistan
Army & its terrorist network! A joint project in Afghanistan can minimize
each other’s constraints for mutual benefit. It also provides an opportunity to
develop a better understanding on cooperation in anti-terror and infrastructure,
by working together on an experimental basis.
Neti Neti
Given the vast amount of
misinformation, misunderstanding and baseless speculation, it’s also important
to state what this summit was not about and did not do. The summit was not
about India-China trade imbalances, economic cooperation in India or River
flows. It did not discuss/resolve the issue of China’s veto of India’s NSG
membership or our objections to OBOR (the term still used in Chinese). It
doesn’t change the time line of China-Pakistan alliance, which has been
developing for 30 years, and accelerated a decade ago with the agreement to
develop Gwadar into a Chinese logistic naval base disguised as a commercial
port.
The agreement to
explore cooperation in Afghanistan is not (repeat not) the first step towards “joining”
OBOR. Unlike AIIB or any other formal institution, with rules, regulations and
institutional structure, OBOR is whatever China defines it at any given time:
Its just a post-hoc collection of projects, motivated by excess capacity in
China, attempt to grab the diplomatic initiative from the established powers
and a National security strategy disguised as a commercial initiative.[x]
Conclusion
The Wuhan summit does
not change India’s understanding of the medium-long term strategic challenge
from China. It merely provides breathing space for us to up our development of
border infrastructure, fill basic gaps in defence production such as ammunition
and to replace outdated defence equipment. It gives us some breathing space to
get our own house in order, in terms of border infrastructure, shortage of and foreign
dependence on ammunition, reform of the National security structure (a la DPC)
and pending, excruciatingly slow decisions on Security partnerships with the
USA & other countries.
[i]
Difference between Strategy (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strategy
) and Tactics (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tactics
).
[ii]
Virmani, Arvind, “Foreign Policy
Under PM Modi, Policy Paper No. WsPP 4/2015, N Delhi, May 2015. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxkcmFydmluZHZpcm1hbml8Z3g6M2M2ZWZkMTg3NTU5MWYzMQ
. Virmani, India, “India's
National Security Doctrine: An Approach”, June 24, 2016 https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxkcmFydmluZHZpcm1hbml8Z3g6MTZjODVjZDg5ZmM2MTJjZA
.
[iv] How India
should respond to China's response to Dalai Lama visit to Tawang - Business
Line, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com › ... )
[vi] Doklam
Standoff-China Violates agreements with India and Bhutan » Indian Defence Review www.indiandefencereview.com
› spotlights , Why China's Legal Claims for Doklam Are Weak https://www.brookings.edu › 2017/08 › c... ).
[ix] India-China Informal Summit at Wuhan - The Ministry of
External Affairswww.mea.gov.in › press-releases › India...
