Tuesday, August 25, 2015

Chinese Economy: Post GFC


Introduction

   A series of recent developments in China have exposed the extent of growth slowdown in China, previously hidden by the careful control that the CCP exercises over information.  This means that in the short term the external environment will become more uncertain as markets understand and absorb this new information. The effect on the real economy however depends on how much of the growth slowdown has already occurred and has been transmitted to commodity markets and China’s supply chain. As with the growth slowdown that has already occurred (from 10% to 6-7%), further deceleration will have both a positive effect through lower oil & other commodity prices, and a negative one from Chinese excess capacity in tradable goods.  However, in the medium term a decline in the growth rate of the Chinese economy will be co-related with a decline in investment in manufacturing and other tradable goods, reducing the over-capacity created by past Chinese investment.  This will benefit the Indian economy.

Trends & Bubble

     The Chinese economy has long stood out as an economy that has been able to maintain very fast growth for several decades.[i] Right up to and including the Global Financial crises it had averaged a GDP growth rate of 9.9 per cent per annum for three decades. However a study of such fast growing economies also showed that such high growth rates cannot be maintained indefinitely.[ii]  Some of us had predicted at the end of the 1990s, that the growth slowdown would occur around the middle of the current decade.[iii] The advent of the Global financial Crisis in 2008, increased greatly the probability of this growth slowdown occurring during the 2010s. I had also suggested that the degree of slowdown could be minimized if and only if the basic model of Chinese growth was changed from a “net export-investment” led one to a to neutral one with respect to wages & profits, consumption & investment, manufacturing & services and exports & imports.[iv]  This did not happen.
   The massive credit policy response of the Chinese government, which cannot be distinguished from fiscal-monetary policy, given that the Chinese banking system was practically a department of its Finance Ministry, masked the, degree to which the global slowdown in GDP and Trade growth had affected the Chinese economy. At that time I had warned in the IMF that this credit fueled growth could be maintained for a maximum of three to five years, before growth would slow down. The credit boom raised the formal debt:GDP ratio of the economy increased from 121% of GDP in 2008 to 163% of GDP by 2013. The debt routed through the unregulated shadow banking sector has been estimated by private analysts to have increased by a 100% of GDP. The effects of the debt fueled bubble were felt not just in manufacturing excess capacity but also in the real estate sector. We know from the history of such debt fueled bubbles, as analysts began to warn in 2014, that  substantial proportion of bring down the rowth rate sharply (hard landing) when they burst.  
    A number of reports have appeared over the past few years about empty apartment complexes and even empty cities in China. This and other indicators such as growth in electricity consumption, led several analysts (including us) to conclude that China’s actual growth was likely a per cent point below the officials numbers released by the Government i.e. around 6%. Recent developments suggest that the growth is trending down further by about 1 to 2%, below the 6% that is likely already happened, i.e. it may be trending towards a 4-5% level.  Thus growth rates of 4% or lower, representing a hard landing for the Chinese economy,  are no longer unimaginable for the Chinese economy, if fundamental structural reforms to shift from an export-investment led economy to a domestic consumption led economy do not take place. 

Market Developments & Devaluation

       The panic reaction revealed by the use of draconian control methods to prop up the stock market in June and the shock devaluation in August suggest that the Communist Party (CCP) may have lost its ability to manage the economy and maintain a growth rate of around 6% (a much wanted soft landing). Consequently the probability of a decline in Chinese growth rate to 4% (feared hard landing) has now increased to 30%, from less than 10% a year ago and about 1% about three years ago.  

Monetary Policy

    China's monetary policy actions on August 24, 2015, fall into two categories: A conventional reduction in Banks reserve ratio combined with a cut in the benchmark lending rate. These will have little or no effect on China's growth rate, which is on a clear declining trend and is currently around 6% even though official data suggest it is close to 7%. Over the past year or so China's capital account has moved from a net inflow to a net outflow situation. Before the devaluation these outflows were likely met from foreign exchange reserve draw down. This would reduce the monetary base and lead to a tightening of monetary policy. Thus the monetary policy action may also be seen as a move to counter this tightening.  
     Looking forward, expectation of further devaluation could accelerate the capital outflow. Thus the authorities are confronted by a dillema. If the exchange rate is genuinely freed it could set off a spiral of capital outflows and further devaluations. The other option is to hold the exchange rate, meet all outflows from the ample foreign exchange reserves and offset the consequent monetary tightening by further reductions in the bank reserve ratios and (controlled) interest rates. The authorities are likely to lean towards the latter option, perhaps interspersed with small devaluations of the Yuan, linked to visible changes in the external environment for China.
   The second part of the monetary actions consisted of increasing financing for banks and financial institutions that operate in rural areas and provide consumer credit for consumer durable (automobile) purchase. Though such lending has long term potential it is probably too little and too late to have an impact in 2015.

   Though the monetary actions will have little effect on China's real growth rate, they have helped correct the over-reaction in several global markets, starting with European markets and to a lesser extent in the US and Indian market.

China Growth Projection

    Real economic growth is therefore likely to slip towards the 4-5% level unless more fundamental reforms of China's growth model takes place. This includes a complete halt in lending to State, provincial and Party inked companies for investment in sectors with excess capacity and the diversion of this lending to the service sector and small & medium consumers. Further there is need for complete decontrol of wages, so household income income and consumption can rise & drive the Chinese economy. The political economy of China's Communist Party suggests, however, that the CCP will not undertake any reform that appears to undermine its unchallenged control of the economy and risks building alternative center of politico-economic power eg a genuine large scale domestic private sector.

  Chinese economic growth has likely already slowed to 6%. A further slow down to 4% would imply that 2/3rd of the growth slowdown has already occurred while 1/3rd is still to take place. Correspondingly, 2/3rd of the real impact of the China slowdown on natural resource prices and producers, on prices & producers of metals and other commodities and supply chains into its manufacturing machine have already occured. Only another third remains to be actualized. 

Implication for India

      Indian policy can minimize the adverse short term direct effects of Chinese hard landing by ensuring that the “Real effective exchange rate (36 country)” of the rupee does not appreciate (repeat not).  This is critical to maintaining medium term competitiveness, given the negative growth of Indian goods exports for the last seven months and the worsening of the balance on goods and services (in GDP) during the last three quarters.  Temporary measures to control any potential dumping by Chinese firms during the next year or so would also be justified, but these must be withdrawn once the immediate threat has passed.  India can minimize the negative effect of a Chinese hard landing by accelerating the reforms that are already on the Government's menu, such as the GST, bankruptcy law and other measures proposed in the last two budgets, plus the "Ease of Doing Business" and "Skilling India."

    In the medium-long term the reduction in profitability of investment, beginning to be revealed in the worsening profitability of foreign (FDI) firms operating in China, will also become visible in State and party controlled enterprises. With lower investible surpluses these State & party controlled firms will be forced to cut down their investment, and stop creating capacity that adds to global excess capacity in traded goods, particularly manufacturing.  Over time this will help reduce excess capacity globally and benefit India and other countries suffering from an imbalance between effective global demand and subsidized capacity creation by China.  In particular the globalized Indian corporate sector, producing standardize products such as metals and basic chemicals will benefit in the medium term.

   As a Chinese hard landing will put pressure on the global economic recovery, to really benefit from a Chinese hard landing, India may have to expand the menu of policy to other areas such as private entry into government monopoly controlled infrastructure, more competitive Banking sector, a reform of the EXIM policy through elimination of "specific duties" on textiles and a thorough overhaul of the QR-tariff regime for agriculture and Education policy & regulatory reform (including Health education) to enhance “Educate in India”. Sustained movement on institutional reforms (Police, legal & judicial reforms) is also important for long term growth sustainability.



[i] Arvind Virmani,”Potential Growth Stars of the 21st Century: India, China and The Asian Century,” Occasional Paper, Chintan, October 1999, www.icrier.org/avpapers.html and Arvind Virmani, “Star Performers of the 20th (21st) Century: Asian Tigers, Dragons or Elephants, Occasional Paper, Chintan, September 1999, www.icrier.org/avpapers.html .
[ii] Arvind Virmani, ““Accelerating And Sustaining Growth:  Economic and Political Lessons,” IMF Working Paper No.  WP/12/185, July 2012
[iii] China-India GDP growth Projections:Summary extracts from 2004 to 2014 (with references to originals).  IndiaChinaGrProjs04to14.docx .
[iv]  Arvind Virmani, “Global Crisis: Impact on China and India,” Keynote Address at a CII-CPR seminar, “Debating Inclusive Futures: Prosperity And Inequality In India and China,” March 19, 2009, New Delhi. http://www.cprindia.org/semiid.php?s=82  and Arvind Virmani, “Global Crisis: Impact on Growth Strategies”, Co-lead Presentation at the, Development Debate on Export Competitiveness, Korea Development Institute-WBI, Seoul Korea, March 10, 2010. http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/WBIvideos/avirmani/avirmani.html .

Monday, August 3, 2015

An Ideal Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) for India

with Surjit Bhalla



Introduction

    As India moves towards implementation of an inflation targeting mechanism, the debate about the structure of this policy has intensified. To date, monetary policy has been the exclusive domain of the RBI, and within the RBI, under the exclusive and sole discretion of the Governor. To be sure, the RBI has a large and competent staff which feeds inputs to the governor. In addition, the Governor has a seven member Technical Advisory Committee, composed of non-RBI experts, who deliberate, and recommend, monetary policy, including Repo rates, to the RBI. However, the RBI is not bound to the TAC recommendations. In this regard, the RBI governor has complete and absolute authority on monetary policy as do his counterparts in Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Chile, Mexico), New Zealand, and Sweden (a partial listing of countries where the central bank governor has absolute authority).

Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Committee

   In March 2011, the previous UPA government appointed a nine member Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Committee (FSLRC) under the chairmanship of former Supreme Court judge, Justice Srikrishna.  The committee was to decide on various regulatory aspects of Indian financial institutions, including the RBI.  Srikrishna had just completed (June 2010) a tenure for the UPA government on the bifurcation of the state of Andhra Pradesh, which eventually did happen in 2014.

UPA Finance Ministers (PC Chidambaram, Pranab Mukherjee) consistently had problems with the RBI governors. Possibly because of these strained relationships, the FSLRC seemed to endorse the view that RBI wings needed to be clipped, and then some. In the first FSLRC report (March 2013) the proposal for monetary policy implementation was as follows:  "the creation of an MPC that would determine the policy interest rate.  In addition to the Chairperson and one executive member of the board, the MPC would have five external members. Of these five, two would be appointed by the Central Government, in consultation with the Chairperson, while the remaining three would be appointed solely by the Central Government."  However, V1.0 did allow the RBI governor to have veto power in the MPC decisions under “extreme circumstances”.

FSLRC V1.0 was a mixture of vote and veto – 2 members from RBI (Governor & Deputy Governor for economics & monetary policy, two external members selected by Governor and 3 selected by the Central Government.  All five would, however, formally be appointed by the Central government (read Ministry of Finance or MoF).  Implicitly, four of the five external members of the MPC would have to agree to a course of action different from the Governor to override him.

Expert Committee on Monetary Policy Framework

   Subsequently RBI’s Expert Committee headed by Deputy Govorner Urjit Patel’s report in Jan 2014, recommended an MPC with a difference balance. The report advocated inflation targeting along with an MPC, and the latter was to be constituted as follows: "The Governor of the RBI will be the Chairman of the MPC, the Deputy Governor in charge of monetary policy will be the Vice Chairman, and the Executive Director in charge of monetary policy will be a member.  Two other members will be external, to be decided by the Chairman and Vice Chairman on the basis of demonstrated expertise and experience in monetary economics, macroeconomics, central banking, financial markets, public finance and related areas." This Report was noteworthy for the fact that it would be near identical in power structure to the present, no MPC structure i.e. RBI in control. Even if both external members of the MPC disagreed with the Governor, he would always have at least a 3-2 majority, thus effectively ensuring a veto for the Governor (without the need for a formal veto).

FSLRC Version 2?


   On July 23rd, Government put a draft proposal for comments on its web site, which some assumed was version Version 2.0 of the FSLRC proposal, but what is apparently a modification based on comments received by the MOF on the original FCLRC recommendations.   According to this modification, the MPC which would comprise of 3 members of the RBI (instead of 2 before) and four external members nominated by the MoF – and no extreme circumstances and no veto power! This recommendation goes against almost any definition of an independent central bank.

Global Practice & Recommendation

   The table lists the practice of monetary policy in 14 selected countries. It can be seen that the FSLRC V2.0 is comparable to a few of the selected countries – e.g. Korea, Norway, Philippines. While some parts of the media have suggested that the Indian structure is similar to Thailand, that is not the case; while Thailand does have a 7 member committee, all 7 members are appointed by the Central Bank.  

Israel seems to have the best mix among the existing systems. The Governor chairs the MPC consisting of 6 members, with three outside members selected by the Central Bank. In case of a tie, the Chair has the deciding vote (not clear on Israel central Bank website). This is our first proposed structure of the MPC, based on the best in emerging market practice.

Our second proposed structure (and the one we really prefer) is that the MPC be a
formal five (or seven) member body with the Governor as Chairman and four (or six) outside professional experts as members.  The experts cannot be employees of either the RBI or the Government of India. All four (six) members must have knowledge and expertise in macroeconomics and monetary and/or fiscal policy. The government will have the right to suggest a list of names for the consideration of the RBI, but the Governor will have the right to choose and appoint those he wants, subject to the above criteria. The decisions of the MPC will however be binding on the Governor. This means that if and only if three (four) of the four (six) independent members of the MPC agree on a policy course different from that proposed by the Governor, would the Governor  be obliged to accept their decision.

Conclusion

Regardless of which of our proposed structures is adopted, we want to emphasize that it is important that RBI have both the responsibility and accountability of monetary policy. It should also be, and seen to be, independent of the government of India. Finally, accountability of the RBI would mean twice a year presentations (and grilling!) by parliamentarians, not unlike the practice in the US. The latter, of course, cannot happen if the parliament is not allowed to function!



Table: How does the rest of the world manage monetary policy?
Country
Is there a special Monetary Policy Committee?
Composition of Monetary Policy Committee
Total
Central Bank
External

External Appointments by

Central Bank
Government
External/Government Dominance







Philippines
Yes
7
1
6

0
6
Australia
No
9
2
7

0
7
Korea
Yes
7
2
5

0
5
Norway
Yes
7
2
5

0
5
India (FSLRC V1.0)
Yes
7
2
5

0
5
India (Draft Financial Code, FSLRC V2.0)
Yes
7
3
4

0
4
Chile*
No
6
5
1

0
0
Central Bank Dominance







Israel
Yes
6
3
3

3
0
Thailand
Yes
7
3
4

4
0
UK
Yes
9
5
4

0
4
India (Urjit Patel Committee)
Yes
5
3
2

2
0
Sweden
Yes
6
1
5

5
0
Complete Central Bank Control







Canada
No
6
6




Indonesia
No
6-9
6-9




New Zealand
No
1
1




South Africa
Yes
8
8




India (present)
No
1
1




Source: Central Bank websites







*Veto power exists for the Finance Minister, unless all 5 Central Bank Board members unanimously agree on a decision

 --------------------------
A version of this article was published on July 29, 2015 in the Indian Express and the Financial Express (http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/an-ideal-mpc-for-india/ and http://www.financialexpress.com/article/economy/an-ideal-mpc-for-india/109713/ respectively)