Showing posts with label Exports. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Exports. Show all posts

Thursday, August 5, 2021

India macro-economic review: Pre-monetary policy

 

Covid economy: Lockdown, Transition to Normalization & setback

More than a year ago, EGROW research paper discussed the economics of lockdown[1] and the transition to normalcy. The transition played out as we had envisaged and normalisation had occurred by March 2021 as anticipated.

Second Covid wave started in April and we were back into another transition period, characterised by regional, better targeted restrictions in terms of services and selected district lockdowns. In the last meeting we had pointed that public forecasts were following the covid waves, but our analysis of the second wave allowed us to see through it.

The available forecasts were much too affected by short term developments resulting in a high correlation between covid cycle and GDP forecasting cycle. Our analysis of the delta variant, in EGROW foundation research paper, clearly showed that the new variant is not part of the old wave which is more or less over. Based on our dual S curve model, we predicted that the covid variant would spread very rapidly and then decline just as rapidly as it grew. This is what happened by end of July.

The key point to note is that people were focussing on the wrong issue. It was not the incompetence of the government or the carelessness of the public which was critical in the second wave, but the high transmissibility and severity of the new variant(s). This has been proved by the spread of the Delta variant in the UK, Indonesia, other SE Asian countries, US and China.

Based on the second wave model, published in May 2021[2], we had concluded that FY22, Q1 GDP would be much worse than predicted by anyone and Q2 GDP would bounce back much faster that anyone was expecting. Consequently, Q2 GDP would make-up most, but not all of the losses during Q1. With H2 growth recovery still on track, the full year growth would remain within our six month earlier forecast of 10% +/- 1 percent, with a downside risk. That is how the economic recovery has played out so far.

In our 2020 paper on fiscal policy during the transition[3] emphasis was on logistics disruptions, and supply chain disruptions during the transition period. Logistics problems were much severe in other parts of the world than India. There were problems of sudden stops and sudden starts. The logistic costs of Indian exports went up by only 20 percent, compared to the logistic cost of exports from China to the US, which went up by 100 percent or more.

In the USA this was aggravated by a shift in demand, from services to goods. Demand for manufactured products and imports of the same shot up. This resulted in unexpected pressure on logistic chain.  The logistics of delivering commodities are completely different from services and there was a shortage of ships and containers, and those costs went up. As covid wave dies down, we will see a reverse shift, the demand will shift back to services. Disruptions in the supply chain are an important factor to keep in mind. E.g. semiconductor disruptions, the natural resource commodity disruptions, etc.

As our analysis indicated, inflationary pressures from logistics and supply chain disruptions would have a large temporary component in India, USA and worldwide, because of its origin in the supply chain disruptions. However in the case of India inflation is also strongly affected by global petroleum oil and edible oil prices, both of which have increased substantially during the last six months.

Macroeconomics of Indian economy: Exports, Investment and private consumption

There has been a surge in exports from India especially in the Q1 and till July. The macroeconomic issue is to determine how much of this is temporary and permanent. There have been many indications in the data and personal observations that supply chain shifts are occurring. Most of the surge seems to be due to the shift in supply chains. This has two elements- incremental demand and diversification and risk reduction. There is increasing willingness to pay 10-20 percent higher cost of imports from India, to reduce China risk. This willingness is increasing with the unpredictable behaviour of Chinese authorities, ranging from random actions with respect to capital markets and tech companies and severe lockdowns in many cities purportedly based on a few Covid Delta cases numbering in the tens.

The government must make sure, with the help of industry associations, that any new bottlenecks are identified and solved expeditiously, to ensure that this great opportunity is translated into permanent increase in World export shares.

The government’s provision for Capital expenditure was increased by 30-34 percent in the budget. This will finance construction intensive infrastructure in FY22. The momentum was somewhat disrupted by the second wave but will pick up in Q2 FY22 and stimulate complementary private investment. We expect the Digital economy to lead private investment during FY22. However, much of this investment comes under intangibles and will not be visible in the usual indicators of fixed investment. 

Doubts remain about the speed of recovery of private investments because of the depletion of private saving/increase in indebtedness of those affected by Covid infections and those with employment/income losses during lockdowns. EGROW’s research paper in 2020 had pointed to the importance of distinguishing between Contact Services, goods and their related services, and non-contact services. The key new element is the dynamics of the shift in relative demand for goods and services. The shift from savings to goods consumption took place during the lockdown and transition period was when fears of contagion were high. As vaccination drives proceed and fears of Covid contagion subside, there will be a gradual shift back to services and a reduction in the pressure on the demand for goods. This will translate into reduced pressure on logistics chain, logistics costs and inflationary pressure on commodities.

In India, a nationwide third wave is highly unlikely unless there is a new mutation similar to the delta variant. But, regional variations in the number of cases will be observed.

The overall GDP is expected to be 10% -/+ 1 percent, with downside risk higher because of the second wave. Though the second wave is over on a nation-wide level, we may continue to see regional flare ups as have happened in Kerala, Maharashtra and the Northeast. However, given the learnings from the first two waves (Govt, business, public), the increase in Sero-positivity (2/3rd of population) and the higher vaccination levels (1/3 of adults), a nationwide third wave can only happen if there is new Covid variant comparable in transmissibility and severity as the delta variant. Nobody can predict this, but the medical community can ensure that any such variant is detected quickly and contained before it becomes another wave!

The interest rate should, and is likely to, remain unchanged. So too the future guidance on monetary policy.

Capital depletion, capacity destruction!

The government and RBI must be alert to any, “Capacity destruction” and “capital depletion in informal enterprises” that has taken place under the radar of regular data collection. The formal sector, particularly the corporate sector is flush with cash and have reduced their demand for credit. The medium-large firms in the MSME sector will also have sufficient access to credit once their demand revives. My concern is for the self-employed and the micro & small enterprises which have exhausted their personal and family sources of working capital and may have difficulty obtaining the capital needed to restart their enterprises. The government and RBI must be on the look-out out for sectors/industries/services where capital depletion has happened and ensure that help is provided for restarting their business.

Saturday, October 13, 2018

China: Tariff war, Debt bubble, Over investment & Growth.


Q1: The IMF has downgraded China's economic growth by 0.2 percentage points to 6.2% for the (calendar) year 2019. Meanwhile, you have predicted China's growth could slip to below 5%. When do you expect this to happen?
A1: All official forecasts, including IMF, World Bank, ADB, relate to official country data. My forecast of a decline in China's GDP growth rate to 4.5% to 5.5% , relates to the real (underlying)GDP growth rates. The gap between official & real rates in China is likely to rise sharply next year and then close slowly. This official data may only reflect the full extent of real growth slowdown in about 3 years i.e. 2021!

Q2: How will China's growth slowdown impact the rest of the world? What will be the impact on the Indian economy?
A2: We must distinguish the immediate short term (ST) impact from the medium & long term one (MLT). The ST effect will be to slow China’s export growth and Imports linked to it i.e. natural resources from developing countries, capital goods from developed countries & intermediate inputs from Asian supply chains. Therefore, GDP growth in these countries may be adversely affected in short term. In MLT a slowing of Chinese growth and investment in manufacturing & other tradable goods will reduce excess global capacity in tradable goods. This will increase profitability in manufacturing, investment & GDP growth in India and other competing countries.

Q3: You have pointed out that China's growth will be impacted by the tariff war and domestic credit bubble. Can you quantify the impact of these two factors?
A3: The USA is the largest market for China’s exports. A rise in US tariffs on imports from China has both a direct effect on its exports and an indirect effect on FDI investment in supply chains located in China. Together these could reduce China’s growth by 0.75% to 1.25%, if higher US tariffs are maintained. Exit from the debt-credit bubble would reduce growth by 0.5% to 1%. These supply chains will relocate out of China over next year or two, increasing FDI & investment in competing countries in Asia, and increase exports from & GDP of these countries.

Q4: Tariff war is largely being pushed by President Trump. If the restrictions do not escalate into a war, is the Chinese economy still at risk?
A4: The effect of an additional (above rates for others) 25% US import tariff on all imports from China, if sustained for 3 to 5 years will result in a deceleration of China's GDP growth. The measures directed at preventing forced transfer of technology and theft of technology from US companies will continue in parallel and ensure that, reverse engineered US R&D cannot be passed off as innovation.

Q5: How bad is the domestic credit bubble in China? Can the country manage a soft landing?
A5: The Chinese economy has seen among the largest increase in debt among the systemically important economies (US, Euro Area, Japan, UK, India), since the Global Financial crises(40% of total global debt increase). An earlier debt-credit bubble burst in 2015 & a new one was initiated in 2016, but channeled a little more through the fisc and combined with a tightening of capital controls on residents/citizens. Increased external & internal controls make it easier to ensure a financial soft landing. They do not ensure a soft landing in terms of real Economic growth.

Q6: How can China maintain its growth momentum in a de-globalized world
A6: The massive increase in World Trade ended with the Global Financial Crisis. China which benefited hugely from this globalization, has avoided the severe consequences of this reversal of globalization by increasing its share of global import and by pumping credit into its economy. These measures have kept its growth from falling below 6.5%. The US tariffs on China mean that countries which have lost because of the mercantilist growth model followed by the communist party of China are no longer willing to accept these costs. Similarly credit fueled growth cannot be sustained indefinitely. Thus, a decline in China's GDP growth rate is inevitable. The only question is when and how smoothly? China can smoothen the adjustment to a lower growth rate by allowing wages to rise to level consistent with its Per Capita GDP & eliminating directed lending to unprofitable SOEs, Exporters, Party capitalists and high risk, low return investments.

Q7: You have talked about the opportunities for India from the US-China tariff war. What are they?
A7: From the start of the US-China tariff war, late last year-early this year I have emphasized the huge opportunity for India to attract supply chains located in China to India. The new US approach to China's communist party run non-market, non-transparent economy creates great uncertainty for export-oriented supply chains located in China. Given India's free market, open democratic system the Indian economy provides a stable long-term location for such investment. This is particularly so for labour intensive products & processes and where cyber security is a concern as in electronics, telecom & electrical control systems. However, we need to get our own policies and institutions in order. The EoDB external indicator is still very poor. Complaints of tax terrorism are still heard from foreign companies. We need to drastically simplify bureaucratic procedures for FDI & other Export production.

Q8: There is talk of decoupling or disentangling of the US and Chinese economy, what are your views?
A8: There is very high likelihood of a decoupling of the US and Chinese economies over the next 10 years. This will affect significant effects on Geo-economics and Geopolitics. We must be prepared to grab the opportunities this will throw up while remaining alert to the dangers.

To read more,
 "Effect of China Slowdown on India", Policy Paper No. WsPP 1/2017, April 2017, ChinaIndia17feb20Apr.docx .



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