India-Pakistan Relations: Speak softly but carry a big stick

  

Strong passions are raised whenever Pakistan is in the news. Some argue against any talks with Pakistan. Others argue for strong retaliation after every violent incident. Still others say that talks are not a favor to anyone; they are an essential part of diplomacy.  Neither the use of force nor diplomacy can serve if we are confused about our Strategy and Objectives.  The basis of ‘strategy’ is an unsentimental understanding of the opponent and his strategy and objectives.

     After the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, the Pakistan Military, supported by the entire Pakistan establishment, developed a two pronged strategy of dealing with India: Acquire nuclear weapons and use these as a shield to carry out Jihad against India.[i]  Pakistan’s international policy and much of its internal policy was driven by this obsession of revenge against India and was fully supported by and implemented by the elites of Pakistan. 

       So the first question we have to answer is whether there is any change in this dual policy towards India?  The Al Qaida attack on the USA (9/11) has clearly set in motion a process of learning among the US, UK and other Western analysts and policy makers. The erosion of the international carte blanche for Pakistan, forced a rethink by the globalized English speaking elites of Pakistan. But Inside Pakistan they are a shrinking minority. With the coming of democracy, the leaders of the major Pakistani political parties (PPP, PML-N) have realized that their own and their parties interests are not identical to those of the Pakistan Military and appear to be willing to consider changing the anti-India policy.  However, in a democracy policy changes when there is support for change.

      Unfortunately, as the old (English educated) elite has begun to realize that the Frankenstein terrorists they have created may destroy Pakistan itself by taking it back into a medieval age, the new Urdu speaking (Sunni) elites appear to be fully behind the terrorists. General Zia ul Haq (1977-98), imposed a policy of state-led Islamization, by bringing in his concept of Sharia, including the infamous blasphemy law. Under his regime, the extreme Ahl-e-Hadith version of (Sunni) Islam, was introduced in (all) school curricula as a result of which, “An entire generation of Pakistanis studying in public (and secular) schools has grown up viewing not only non-Muslim minorities but also Muslim minorities as “the other,” as “unpatriotic,” and as ‘not Muslim enough’.”  This is manifested in the murder of anyone daring to challenge the extreme views of the Sunni fundamentalists, who also believe that US, Israel and India are their main external enemies

   In this context, the Indian Governments strategy to deal with Pakistan should have two prongs:

(1) Increase the costs to the Pakistan Military of its anti-India Jihad.  This includes, (i) a diplomatic effort to impede the flow of financial aid and sophisticated equipment & technology to the Military, (ii) a semi-automatic & forceful military response to cease fire violations, (iii) targeted attacks on valuable (but not iconic/symbolic) assets by a small super-specialized commando force, in response to terrorist incidents and (iv) taking the fight to anti-India Jehadi organizations across S Asia, by developing covert assets, in retaliation for their training & nurturing of terrorists in India.

(2)  Identify, discuss and implement economic, cultural and other policies that are good for the people of both India and Pakistan.  For instance, theory and empirical evidence points to the fact that normal trade, transit, investment backed by good trans-border and trans-Asian (from C. Asia/Iran to Myanmar) infrastructure would be in the interests of both countries and their people.  Asymmetric concessions are unnecessary. Similarly, genuinely open and symmetric social and cultural policies would be mutually beneficial and can and should be pursued without interruption.
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A version of this article appeared in the Hindustan Times Editorial page on November 17, 2013, under the title, “Speak Softly but carry a big stick.”

 http://www.hindustantimes.com/comment/columns/speak-softly-but-carry-a-big-stick/article1-1152545.aspx

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[i] Trilateral Nuclear Proliferation: Pakistan’s Euro-Chinese Bomb, IDSA Monograph Series No. 1, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, December 2006. http://www.idsa.in/monograph/TrilateralNuclearProliferationPakistansEuro-ChineseBomb_avirmani_2006 .

Indo-Pakistan Relations a la Nawaz Sharif

Introduction

     In an earlier note in this journal I had outlined how Pakistan policy towards use of Jehad against India is likely to evolve with the departure of US/NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2014 (http://dravirmani.blogspot.in/2013/02/pakistan-army-action-possible-motivation.html).  The recent fairly successful election in Pakistan has given rise to intense speculation of the changed prospects of better relations between the two countries.  Aggressive questions by Indian Media have forced Nawaz Sharif to express positive sentiments about peace with India and to invite the Indian PM for events normally not attended by foreign dignitaries.  This has already given rise to a counter statement by Syed Salahuddin, head of Hizbul Mujahideen(HM) and member of the Jehad Council warning him not to dilute Pakistan's anti-India policy. What is the likely policy orientation of a Nawaz Sharif led Civilian Pakistan Government and how if at all is it likely be to be different from policy under the previous Civilian Government?

Nawaz's Support Base

  Nawaz Sharif owes his clear victory in the election at least in part to, (a) The branding of PPP & ANP as "secular parties" by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its deceleration of war on them during the elections (assassinations/bombing of their candidates, workers and supporteres). (b) Close relations with and support of the Jehadi parties in Punjab like the Jamat U Dawa(JuD) / Lakshar-e-Toiba(LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad(JM).  Add to this the votes and seats won by Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the Jamat e Islami (JI), the religious fundamentalist base is large.  Like any good politician he is unlikely to openly challenge the objectives of these parties (e.g. Salafi/Wahabi Islamization of Kashmir), which he perhaps shares.  He may however, try to convince them to change their strategy and tactics in the interest of Pakistan's global image and failing economy. 

The other part of his support base, the lower middle class youth looking for jobs and earning opportunities and businessmen looking for profits, could in contrast provide him with an equally strong base for normalizing economic relations and exploring new avenues for mutual economic benefit.  To the extent that terrorist bombings and assassinations in Pakistan are a threat to foreign, non-resident Pakistani and even domestic investment (capital flight), the base could support strong measures to restore law and order in Pakistan.

Pakistan Army Objective

  As I wrote earlier, "As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned the most important event that will shape its behavior in the next two years is the accelerated withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan. This withdrawal provides it a golden opportunity to restore its hegemony in Afghanistan.  Ideally the Army would like to reestablish the dominant position it had before the Taliban was driven out of Afghanistan and established its headquarters and operating bases in Pakistan (Queta Shura, Wazirstan et al).  Failing this it would be happy with a regime that sub-serves the Pakistan Army’s interests.  This is likely to be the central and most vital objective of the Pakistan Army and its primary operational instrument the ISI, during the next two-three years."

I concluded that, " The hostile Pakistani army action across the LOC is a signal to the Pakistani jihadists that the Pakistan army and Government are not abandoning their anti-India policy, in their respective quests:  The Army for a dominant role in Afghanistan, financed and underwritten to the maximum extent possible by the USA and the Civilian Government for normalization of relations with India so as to remove the stigma of being dubbed “terrorist central” and to reduce the control of thee Army over the political system and government."

Democratically Elected PM

     Nawaz Sharif's assumption of the reins of government with a democratic mandate reinforces these conclusions and fleshes them out more clearly.  Nawaz Sharif in full co-operation of the Army is likely to promote a shift of Jehad related activities (promoting, training, organising, managing jehad), out of Pakistan and into Afghanistan and the badlands of the Af-Pak borders to increase deniablity.  As he said,  he will "not allow Bombay type attacks from the soil of Pakistan."  He may also try to moderate the Jehadi's anti-India & anti-US rhetoric and to keep it out of media that can be accessed easily by foreigners and foreign (including Indian) media. On the other hand he may give a freer hand to diplomats and Jehadi's on speaking about Kashmir related issues, while simultaneously stepping up the decibal level on the need for Indo-Pak peace.

Economic Relations

    If Nawaz Sharif and his party choose, they can bring about complete normalization of economic-business relations(including investment), trade and transit (to Afghanistan & Central Asia) policy and infrastructure connectivity between Pakistan (+PoK/AK) and India (including J&K). As these are mutually beneficial relations, on our side the need is to meet each other half way (there is no need for special concessions by either party).  many of these ideas were discussed at a Seminar that I attended at the Wilson Center in Washington with eminent Pakistani economists & retired bureaucrats in late 2012. If Pakistan chooses it could become the trading and transport hub for connecting thriving economies of  Central Asia, India, Afghanistan (mineral resource potential) and Iran/Gulf countries. The TAPI pipeline project could be brought more firmly on the agenda.  Permanent Normal Trading Status (MFN) is economically minor but politically important foundation on which this mutually beneficial relationship can be built. As noted by many observers, the two Punjabs could play a very important role in creating the positive narrative to smooth the political path.

     In this, I differ somewhat with Mr Shyam Saran (BS 15/5/13) who favors an incremental approach. I would favor an approach that asks the new government how quickly and how far they are willing to go on all economically related issues and be willing to move as fast as they are able to do.  I must warn that moving fast does not mean making asymmetric concessions: If the new democratically elected government of Pakistan cannot convince its on electorate of the benefits to Pakistan of economic normalization, then no amount of concessions can help in convincing the masses: They would merely be seen as attempts to bribe special interests to adopt anti-national policies.  Both bilateral and SAARC processes need to be activated to provide a greater flexibility.

        On our side, we need to isolate such non-concessional, mutually beneficial relations from becoming hostage to jehadist bombings in India.  Empty gesture that do not harm the Pakistan Military, its terrorist instrument the ISI, and the Jehadists managed by them, have no effect on their behavior.  We really have to be more innovative and bolder in disrupting the Jehad supply chain and taking the fight to them.

Conclusion

     In my view there is likely to be little or no substantive change in policy towards cross border Jehad, though it may be better nuanced and supported by a more credible civilian government narrative, which will again fool many analysts in the West (you can fool some of the people all of the time).  However, the new government has the support base and democratic mandate to take significant steps towards normalization of economic relations with India.  We should be prepared to meet them half way to wherever and however quickly they want to move on this area.

Changing Focus of Pakistan Army

On January 8, 2013 Pakistani soldiers crossed over the ‘Line of Control” in Mandhar sector of J&K and killed two soldiers, beheaded one of them and took the head back as a trophy.  Most of the discussion in the media has focused on the response that India has made or should make to this specific act. This note focuses on possible motives and motivation behind this act and how this should shape our response.

Objectives

                As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned the most important event that will shape its behavior in the next two years is the accelerated withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan.  This withdrawal provides it a golden opportunity to restore its hegemony in Afghanistan.  Ideally the Army would like to reestablish the dominant position it had before the Taliban driven out of Afghanistan and established its headquarters and operating bases in Pakistan (Queta Shura, Wazirstan et al).  Failing this it would be happy with a regime that subserves the Pakistan Army’s interests.  This is likely to be the central and most vital objective of the Pakistan Army and its primary operational instrument the ISI, during the next two-three years. 

The tantalizing hints of a change in Pakistan Army doctrine purportedly downgrading India’s unchallenged position as “sole enemy,” are likely diplomatic publicity designed to restore Western perceptions of Army led Pakistan as a “trusted ally”.  At the same time the Jehadis within the Army–ISI and the “Good Taliban” need to be reassured.  The following statement of Maj-Gen Asim Saleem Bajwa, DG, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) keeps open the possibility of doing both: “Army prepares for all forms of threats. Sub-conventional threat is a reality and is a part of a threat matrix faced by our country. But it doesn’t mean that the conventional threat has receded (quoted in the Express Tribune).”

Signal to Who?

What then could be the motivation for this relatively small but aggressive action across the LOC?  Several commentators have asserted that this action is designed to send a signal to the Indian Army.  To buttress this argument they have pointed to the increase in cease-fire violations compared to a year ago.  It has been argued that with the resumption of military and civilian Aid to Pakistan, the Army is again emboldened to ratchet up hostile actions against India, without fear of a serious response from the Indian Government.  The factors mentioned by these analysts are certainly relevant for the assessment of the motivation and timing of specific actions of the Pakistan Army and ISI.  However, another possibility is that the hostile action is a signal to Pakistan’s own Jehadi’s , both within the army and outside it.

Pointers

One of the interesting pointers in this direction is the statement of LeT’s Hafiz Saeed, that this incident was part of the hostile and violent Indian actions across Pakistan and India’s repeated attempts to undermine peace!  When a terrorist wanted by the USA, with a reward on his head, a hate monger who gives vitriolic speeches against Indians, talks about “Peace” it is worth noting!  Not because it reflects a change of heart, but because it reflects what his handlers would like him to say.  The fact that newspapers report that he visited POK a few days before the aggressive act, and may have had a direct or indirect role, suggests that the Army wanted the Jihadists to be fully aware of this action, even if India downplayed it (as perhaps they mistakenly expected).  Subsequently he gave an interview to the Us press trying to portray himself as an ordinary person

The second pointer is how quickly Pakistan’s civilian government (EAM Rabani) responded by its diplomatic statement of willingness to refer the incident to the UN, knowing full well that with Pakistan currently chairing the UN security council, India would be more than usually reluctant to refer the incident to anyone outside established bilateral channels.  The civilian government has repeatedly faced demands from Pakistani Jihadists to take India to the UN on Kashmir.  This was followed by an appeal from the OIC for a fact finding team to J&K.  The Army knew beforehand that such an opportunity could arise and perhaps used it as an argument to obtain prior Civilian government approval for limited action on the LOC, that could be used to counter Jehadi criticism of the Army and government “inaction” on Kashmir.  A third pointer is the discovery of mines with Pakistani markings from the Maoist insurgents and reports of ISI activity in the troubled Rhongiya areas on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border.  The Huriyat leaders who visited Pakistan soon after the incident were reportedly told by the Army brass as well as the leaders of the LeT and the JeM not to participate in any Indian Govt peace initiative for the next year.  More recently the release of ‘Afghan Prisoners’ purportedly to meet the Afghan demand (for handover of Taliban leaders based in Pakistan) half way and to aid the Afghan peace process has been followed by reports that the released leaders are back fighting the US forces.  As the middle ranks of the Taliban fighters had been depleted by US drone strikes, the Pakistan Army as usual thought it could play both sides of the aisle by replenishing depleted Taliban ranks in Afghanistan while  presenting this as a peace gesture to the Afghan government (and the USA/UK).   

Conclusion

The hostile Pakistani army action across the LOC is a signal to the Pakistani jihadists (once referred to by a Pakistani friend in Washington as “Paltu Kuttas” – ‘Pet dogs’) that the Pakistan army and Government are not abandoning their anti-India policy, in their respective quests:  The Army for a dominant role in Afghanistan, financed and underwritten to the maximum extent possible by the USA and the civilian government for normalization of relations with India so as to remove the stigma of being dubbed “terrorist central” and to reduce the control of the Army over the political system and government.  The greater challenge for India is therefore to,

(a) Help stave off a fundamentalist takeover of Afghanistan, and (b) Prepare for a renewed threat to India (including J&K) from Pakistan controlled jihadists operating from fundamentalist (re-)controlled regions of Afghanistan.  This requires a multipronged Indian effort to increase the cost to the Pakistan Army of a policy of training, financing and directing jihadists and terrorists across the sub-content.

PS: An earlier version of this note was sent to a newspaper for consideration in mid-January, soon after the incident occurred.