UnConventional War: Counter Terror Strategy

Introduction

   Though there is no sign of the creation of an Unconventional War command or Directorate in the Integrated Defense Staff, a  more comprehensive Counter Terror strategy, seems to be emerging.[i]  This emerging Counter Terror (#CT) strategy attempts to increase the costs & reduce the benefits, of unconventional war to the Pakistan Military. The CT strategy has the following elements:

Cross-Border War

    Identification of the Pakistan Army in Pakistan occupied J&K as a terrorist army, engaged in unconventional war against India and therefore a target of unconventional Defence against the terrorists it trains, manages and pushes across the LOC. The Pakistan army's targeting of army bases in J&K, using their Jehadi terrorist subalterns, has finally broken the back of the Indian Pacifist camel. No distinction need now be made between the Jehadi army in occupied J&K and its Jehadi subalterns operating in J&K. The Indian army will no longer wait till they push Jehadis across the line of control under covering fire, but will act proactively to disable the terrorists and their army facilitators & bosses as soon as they can be identified.

Media

    The northern army command will become the single point conduit for day to day communication with the media, on anti-Terror and cross border actions. This will cut out leaks and debilitating speculation. The change was first instituted with the DGMO announcing surgical strikes & followed recently by army spokesman announcing destruction of terrorist-army bunkers. Whether this will result in a formation of a professionally staffed and well equipped media, communication and public relations cell, remains to be seen. 

Domestic

    A clear policy on terrorism/Jehad within J&K. The Jehadis and their facilitators and sympathizers must choose whether they are with the terrorist or against the terrorists. If the former don't expect to be treated as peaceful law abiding citizen, but as a terrorist sympathizer. If you are not with the Jehadis, not only can you exercise your full rights as a citizen of India but you can expect us to facilitate economic opportunity for you & your family everywhere in the country. All elements of this approach are not yet fully developed/elaborated. The fact that it's difficult to distinguish, is no excuse for not trying to identify those who have run with the hares and hunted with the hounds and to categorize the fence sitters who deliberately provoke the security forces. An unconventional war cannot be won without getting the majority of population to rise against terrorist violence and join the diplomatic process of grievance redressal.

Financing

    Terrorist financing channels will be identified, pro-actively investigated and pursued with a view to choking off flows from Pakistan and other Salafi-Takfiri-Wahhabi sources. This includes much more rigorous scrutiny of FCNR funding for so called charities & religious institutions, beside the hawala channels traditionally use by corrupt politicians and therefore often shielded from scrutiny in the past. NIA raids on Hawala channels and J&K separatists are an indicator.

Diplomacy

     An important element of the anti-terror strategy is sharpened diplomacy to expose Pakistan's double game of simultaneously financing, training, managing & directing terrorists and appearing to help the US in tracking terrorists who threaten the USA. More importantly, this exposure is to be supplemented/complimented by responding to Pakistan's allegations wrt Kashmir Valley, by exposing Pakistan military's war against civilians in Pakistan occupied J&K, Baluchistan and Sindh (including its capital Karachi). However a foreign media strategy must be developed and implemented as part of overall diplomatic strategy.

Jehadi Leadership in AfPak 

   It remains unclear how the Pakistan and Afghan based Jehadi leaders of the Pakistan army's pet terrorist organizations are to be undermined or incapacitated? But perhaps it is best to let some of this remain a little vague.

References

https://www.facebook.com/arvindvirmani2/posts/771265773040679 

http://dravirmani.blogspot.in/2016/01/terrorism-is-unconventional-war.html .

 

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[i] http://dravirmani.blogspot.in/2016/01/terrorism-is-unconventional-war.html .

Terrorism is Unconventional War

Introduction

   State sponsored Terrorism is unconventional War. Unconventional war can only be won by unconventional means: Different Strategy, tactics, weapons, training, resources. It will be a grave mistake to try & fight such a long term unconventional war with conventional means such as complete mobilization or the fabled Cold Start Doctrine (which is mostly an acceleration of the very slow mobilization process followed historically).  Armed forces  and security agencies need new thinking and approach and completely different level of human resources & training and type & quality of equipment from the conventional. For instance the use of Aerostats equipped with infrared cameras to detect infiltration and use of armed drones to attack terrorists, instead of Hercules aircraft for detection (used in Pathankot) or attack helicopters to detect & attack them.

Asymmetric Defense

     Given the entrenched conventional Defense thinking in the three services, para-military border forces, State police, politicians media & intelligentsia, we need an Asymmetric Defense doctrine (ADS) to give all players broad guidance on how to approach this issue. The National Security Advisor could anchor and guide the formulation of such a doctrine and ensure co-ordination, integration & effectiveness of the diverse elements of asymmetric defense. The creation of an empowered Chief of Defense Staff (4 star CDS) with responsibility for strategic planning, HRD & equipment acquisition decisions and Asymmetric Defense, would help accelerate the change.  There are arguments for and against the creation of a Special Forces Command under the CDS, given that each branch already has its own special forces. However, a  special department/division for unconventional/asymmetric defense is needed within the Integrated defense Staff (IDS), which includes designated posts for RAW and other intelligence agencies. Its first task could be to develop an Asymmetric Defense Strategy (ADS). As noted earlier this may requires unconventional ways of thinking and operating that are alien to regular armed forces.   Under the guidance of the NSA, it could also sort out some of the operational issues (such as co-ordination) that arise in case of a terrorist attack on a defense installation or area & develop SOPs for the same.

.

Intelligence

     Formation of the Triad of counter terror (CT) institutions: NIA, NATGRID, NCTC is needed to improve internal defense. A review of intelligence institutions may, however, suggest greater integration of overlapping functions through fewer organizations.

     The foundation of unconventional Defense is precise actionable intelligence. We need a quantum jump in capability across Asia (central, west & east). For instance the quality of intelligence required to carry out a precision drone strike is higher than the average quality of intelligence currently available, even for S Asia. Local language competence/skills and cultural understanding is essential for obtaining good intelligence and for recruitment. The capabilities of RAW must be strengthened to deal with State sponsored terrorism as well as potential future threats from Middle East & North Africa. Central Asia and South East Asia must not be underestimated as potential geographies for inteligence.

Media

   A critical (new) aspect of asymmetric war is the public narrative, domestic & international. Media is a fundamental theater of unconventional war.  Indian media barons, anchors & personalities, must educate themselves on this issue & then educate the Indian public about unconventional/asymmetric war that we have faced for >20 yrs & how to counter it. For instance, it is well recognized that an important objective of terrorism is to create panic & uncertainty and instill fear and paranoia in the population. Therefore the calmness and collectedness with which the government and all other institutions of democracy and society function during such an attack is a measure of our success. Thus it is a mark of their failure when the PM and Cabinet ministers are able to go about their schedule business without interruption.

      The media is an important instrument for creating & influencing public, political and intellectual opinion in democratic countries(including India & USA). A significant element of Pakistan's media game plan is to convince its targeted audience that it is more sincere in its search for peace than India, despite its periodic nuclear saber rattling and continued sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. The complex game of India-Pakistan talks, including subjects to be discussed and how, which country cancelled, started or restarted talks, is a tactical tool for achieving its public relations objective. Both war mongering(blood curdling demands for revenge) and peace mongering (e.g. criticism of Indian instead of Pakistan government for cancelled/stalled talks) helps support Pakistan's media narrative. A balanced approach by discussants and analysts on Indian media, supports India's National interests. 

Diplomacy

   Diplomacy is a vital element of how other countries, their foreign policy experts and informed global public opinion perceives terrorism carried out against us. Thus Pakistan has successfully convinced the US, many of its allies and Indian track II participants, that (a) General Kayani's policy of tacitly allowing extreme Islamism to flourish under his charge, has been replaced by General Sharif's policy of countering internal terrorism & extremism. (b) It is the hard line attitude/approach of PM Modi & his hard-line supporters that is the main roadblock to India-Pakistan peace [not Pakistan's unchanged strategy of terrorism (by pet terrorists like Let, JeM & HeM) under the nuclear umbrella].

    PM Modis surprising halt in Lahore, the discussions leading up to it, and the subsequent terrorist assault on Pathankot Air base has given the lie to this false narrative. Indian diplomacy and media must ensure that global public opinion understands & appreciates this point. Indian strategic interlocutors must also ensure that we get the equipment (e.g. armed drones) and technology needed to deal with cross-border terrorism. 

Conclusion

   A long term perspective is essential for dealing with an opponent whose long term objective is to undermine India's Strategic position in the region and whose Medium term objective is territorial aggrandizement. Short term revenge cannot & must not be our objective. Our primary goal is to deter terrorism against us. But terror will only cease when it entails unacceptable asymmetric cost on the sponsors of terror against us.  Acquisition and demonstration of the capability for doing so, is long overdue. The National Security Advisor and to some extent his boss will be judged on their success in this matter during the 2019 election.

Terrorism is Unconventional War

Introduction

   State sponsored Terrorism is unconventional War. Unconventional war can only be won by unconventional means: Different Strategy, tactics, weapons, training, resources. It will be a grave mistake to try & fight such a long term unconventional war with conventional means such as complete mobilization or the fabled Cold Start Doctrine (which is mostly an acceleration of the very slow mobilization process followed historically).  Armed forces  and security agencies need new thinking and approach and completely different level of human resources & training and type & quality of equipment from the conventional. For instance the use of Aerostats equipped with infrared cameras to detect infiltration and use of armed drones to attack terrorists, instead of Hercules aircraft for detection (used in Pathankot) or attack helicopters to detect & attack them.

Asymmetric Defense

     Given the entrenched conventional Defense thinking in the three services, para-military border forces, State police, politicians media & intelligentsia, we need an Asymmetric Defense doctrine (ADS) to give all players broad guidance on how to approach this issue. The National Security Advisor could anchor and guide the formulation of such a doctrine and ensure co-ordination, integration & effectiveness of the diverse elements of asymmetric defense. The creation of an empowered Chief of Defense Staff (4 star CDS) with responsibility for strategic planning, HRD & equipment acquisition decisions, would help accelerate the change.  There are arguments for and against the creation of a Special Forces Command under the CDS, given that each branch already has its own special forces. However, a  special department/division for unconventional/asymmetric warfare is needed within the Integrated defense Staff (IDS), which includes designated posts for RAW and other intelligence agencies. Its first task could be to  develop an Asymmetric Defense Strategy (ADS). As noted earlier this may requires unconventional ways of thinking and operating that are alien to regular armed forces.   Under the guidance of the NSA, it could also sort out some of the operational issues (such as co-ordination) that arise in case of a terrorist attack on a defense installation or area & develop SOPs for the same.

.

Intelligence

     Formation of the Triad of counter terror (CT) institutions: NIA, NATGRID, NCTC is needed to improve internal defense. A review of intelligence institutions may, however, suggest greater integration of overlapping functions through fewer organizations.

     The foundation of unconventional Defense is precise actionable intelligence. We need a quantum jump in capability across Asia (central, west & east). For instance the quality of intelligence required to carry out a precision drone strike is higher than the average quality of intelligence currently available, even for S Asia. Local language competence/skills and cultural understanding is essential for obtaining good intelligence and for recruitment. The capabilities of RAW must be strengthened to deal with State sponsored terrorism as well as potential future threats from Middle East & North Africa. Central Asia and South East Asia must not be underestimated as potential geographies for inteligence.

Media

   A critical (new) aspect of asymmetric war is the public narrative, domestic & international. Media is a fundamental theater of unconventional war.  Indian media barons, anchors & personalities, must educate themselves on this issue & then educate the Indian public about unconventional/asymmetric war that we have faced for >20 yrs & how to counter it. For instance, it is well recognized that an important objective of terrorism is to create panic & uncertainty and instill fear and paranoia in the population. Therefore the calmness and collectedness with which the government and all other institutions of democracy and society function during such an attack is a measure of our success. Thus it is a mark of their failure when the PM and Cabinet ministers are able to go about their schedule business without interruption.

      The media is an important instrument for creating & influencing public, political and intellectual opinion in democratic countries(including India & USA). A significant element of Pakistan's media game plan is to convince its targeted audience that it is more sincere in its search for peace than India, despite its periodic nuclear saber rattling and continued sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. The complex game of India-Pakistan talks, including subjects to be discussed and how, which country cancelled, started or restarted talks, is a tactical tool for achieving its public relations objective. Both war mongering(blood curdling demands for revenge) and peace mongering (e.g. criticism of Indian instead of Pakistan government for cancelled/stalled talks) helps support Pakistan's media narrative. A balanced approach by discussants and analysts on Indian media, supports India's National interests. 

Diplomacy

   Diplomacy is a vital element of how other countries, their foreign policy experts and informed global public opinion perceives terrorism carried out against us. Thus Pakistan has successfully convinced the US, many of its allies and Indian track II participants, that (a) General Kayani's policy of tacitly allowing extreme Islamism to flourish under his charge, has been replaced by General Sharif's policy of countering internal terrorism & extremism. (b) It is the hard line attitude/approach of PM Modi & his hard-line supporters that is the main roadblock to India-Pakistan peace [not Pakistan's unchanged strategy of terrorism (by pet terrorists like Let, JeM & HeM) under the nuclear umbrella].

    PM Modis surprising halt in Lahore, the discussions leading up to it, and the subsequent terrorist assault on Pathankot Air base has given the lie to this false narrative. Indian diplomacy and media must ensure that global public opinion understands & appreciates this point. Indian strategic interlocutors must also ensure that we get the equipment (e.g. armed drones) and technology needed to deal with cross-border terrorism. 

Conclusion

   A long term perspective is essential for dealing with an opponent whose long term objective is to undermine India's Strategic position in the region and whose Medium term objective is territorial aggrandizement. Short term revenge cannot & must not be our objective. Our primary goal is to deter terrorism against us. But terror will only cease when it entails unacceptable asymmetric cost on the sponsors of terror against us.  Acquisition and demonstration of the capability for doing so, is long overdue. The National Security Advisor and to some extent his boss will be judged on their success in this matter during the 2019 election.