Showing posts with label RBI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RBI. Show all posts

Sunday, March 29, 2020

Implications of Pandemic & Consequent Economic Crisis: What to Do About It


Questions from Asit Ranjan Mishra, Senior Editor, Mint

Q1-How do you assess the economic fallout of Covid-19 outbreak on Indian economy?
A1: There is an unprecedented shock to every economy in the World, including the Indian economy. There are three aspects. One the Lock-down, which is unprecedented even when compared to that in the key economies involved World War 2. It practically immobilizes the work force and thus reduces production to zero in 80-90% of economy. The #Lock-down in China, the first globally, were also an unprecedented disruption of production-inputs, the supply of intermediate goods, given China's role in so many critical Global supply chains and its monopolization of so many products. The contagion fear before the lock down, which will remain after the lock down, constitutes a huge demand shock for contact services which involve dense collections of people like air, rail & bus transport, Tourism, Restaurants & Hotels, Entertainment, Malls & retail markets.

Q2- From the standpoint of a shock to the economy as well as the financial market, how similar or different do you think the Corona virus outbreak is vis-a-vis the global financial crisis of 2008.
A2: The Pandemic is a Real Supply cum Demand shock to the economy, which will affect the financial system. The Global financial Crisis was a financial system collapse, which propagated into the Real economy. In that sense they are opposites. However, once the effects reach from one to the other, lots of similarities emerge with respect to the financial elements of the current crises and how to deal with them. The real elements are different and so will the fiscal measures to deal with it have to be different.
    As in the previous Financial Crisis, the Monetary Authority has now to ensure, that the Financial System keeps functioning smoothly and liquidity issues don’t undermine Solvent Financial institutions and result in Contagion from insolvent companies and financial organizations. RBI must ensure that key Institutions (like Banks) have enough liquidity, critical financial markets, like those for Foreign exchange, have adequate liquidity and Critical Instruments like Government Security do not show any upward spikes in rates. The last also requires close Monetary-Fiscal Co-ordination. RBI has also to ensure undue rise in risk premiums on undeveloped markets like those for CPs, by ensuring enough general liquidity and negative real Repo rates. RBI as an institution has sufficient experience from the Global Financial crisis to deal with these issues.

Q3-Forecasters and rating agencies like Moody’s have revised downward their growth estimate for India to 2.5% for 2020 calendar year? Do you find such estimates plausible?
A3: We are in the process of estimating the likely GDP growth in 2020-21.  Analytically, it's useful to divide the economy into three parts and three phases. These are the (a) Essential Commodities and Services, (b) The Contact Services in which fears of epidemic will continue to reduce Demand, and the (c) Rest of the economy. The phases are (1) The lockdown phase and near Lockdown conditions, (2) The phase of gradual recovery (3) Restoration of economy to "normal" growth.
     Right now, the available forecasts seem to be heavily dependent on assumptions about when the Pandemic will peak. Uncertainty will remain high, till the SARS Corona Virus 2 Pandemic has peaked in India, USA, EU and China.

Q4-How do you see the economic relief package announced by the government and the financial package by the RBI? Will they be enough under the current circumstances?
A4: Both packages are rightly designed to deal with Phase 1(as defined above), the impact of the Lockdown, which covers 80-90% of the economy, and the succeeding 4-6 weeks. The best part is the assurance that the Govt now has its ear to the ground and using information to design and modify packages. The challenge is therefore shifting to effective implementation. As States are responsible for both Health and Welfare and effectiveness of Health and Social welfare measures depends on the States, who are present at ground level.

Q5-Do you think India should announce a large stimulus package including a bailout for Indian companies affected badly?
A5: Fiscal stimulus is completely the wrong thing to do in a lock-down, when there is no supply of or demand for any commodity or service, besides essential commodities. During this period, Fiscal measures must focus on ensuring survival of citizens, by ensuring access to free food and health Services, for those who do not have cash. 
    Once the lockdown is over and we enter phase 2 (as defined above). Fiscal measures must be targeted at industries and sectors which are most severely affected by the Epidemic (Contact Services mentioned above). Next in line must be industries and sectors which were already badly hit by the growth recession and whose situation has worsened because of the Pandemic. In this context, elimination of Cesses & Surcharges in both GST and Personal Income Taxation, will play an important role.

Q6-Do we have to revisit and reset the self-imposed redlines in fiscal policy such as fiscal deficit and debt to GDP ratio limits to revive the Indian economy?
A6: The Mantra of "Fiscal space" is completely irrelevant during the Crisis. The FRBM should be suspended or reformed to take explicit account of such crises. Ignoring Fiscal deficits during the crisis to institute temporary expenditure does NOT mean that irresponsible introduction of, and commitment to, schemes which will sink the deficit in the medium-long term.

Q7-Should a stimulus be more effective through direct and indirect tax cuts or direct cash transfers?
A7: Once the economy comes out of the crises mode and enters Phase 3, the primary policy issue will be how to speed its recovery back to its growth potential. In this context tax reforms (Direct Tax Code, GST) are far more important than expenditure reforms. Tax reduction must be considered as part of these tax reforms, to provide short term stimulus, while ensuring long term fiscal sustainability through improved voluntary compliance and higher buoyancy. Direct cash transfers will of course be necessary for those affected by crisis, but overall increases will be sustainable if and only if combined with reduction of leakages(inefficiency and corruption) in major subsidies like fertilizer and food corporation.

Q8-Is it the right time to revisit the idea of Universal Basic Income and guaranteeing social security to all the vulnerable people?
A8: The Universal Basic Income (UBI) concept, though it may be relevant for Developed countries, is irrelevant for India. A "Targeted" UBI is a contradiction of the term "Universal". We in India had developed the concept of Direct Cash Transfers(DCT) to the bottom 40% of the Population in the mid-2000s, pursuant to which we recommended the creation of a Universal ID (UID) to help target such transfers. With are Bureaucratic Socialist system heritage of evasion & corruption and abysmal conviction rates for illegal activity, a sustainable system requires close attention to incentives. We need a system of Net Income Transfers, which meshes DCT into the existing personal income tax system through an integrated, “Negative Income tax  (NIT)”.  The time to consider it will however be in 2021-22, after the economy is on road to recovery

Q9-Do you think Covid-19 will accelerate the process of deglobalization already visible through intensifying trade wars?
A9: De Globalization started after the Global Financial Crisis and is clearly visible in the declining World Trade to GDP ratio as well as in reduced Capital flows, particularly to Emerging Market economies. These trends will intensify and expand to include greater restrictions on low tech migrant workers.

Q10-How do you think economies may change the way they work, say two to three years from now? What policies will guide cooperation and competition among them?
A10: The Partial Economic Decoupling and Hight Tech decoupling set in motion by the Tariff War will accelerate. The decoupling will be between free, open democracies which follow rule of law domestically and accepted rules of country behavior internationally and those who merely pay lip service to these principles of acceptable behavior.

Q11-Do you apprehend more pressure now on global supply chains to withdraw from China?
A11: Yes there will be an accelerated diversification of Global Supply Chains from China, particularly in industries which China had monopolized through Subsidies, NTBs and mercantilist practices.

Q12- What of 2021 and beyond? Will the Indian economy be stuck in low level equilibrium of 5-5.5% for the next few years?
A12: That would be a disaster of unmeasurable proportions for the Indian economy and the Welfare of its people. Union and State Govts (e.g. GST council) use the current hiatus in economic activity to prepare a comprehensive calendar of Reforms to be implemented during H2 of FY21 and H1 of FY22. Besides comprehensive reform of GST and Indirect Code, it must include reform of External sector & Exim policy, Agriculture, Skilling (incl Apprenticeship), Regulatory reforms for promoting Educate in India. Land and Labor flexibility for Coastal/Special Export Zones & Import Substitution Zones, Electricity Distribution & pricing for Industry, and Manufacturing subsidies for Industries monopolized by Dictatorships who don't follow Global Rule of Law.
      A tragic once in a century crisis like this, also provides an unprecedented opportunity to transform the Indian Economy. We would be compounding the tragedy if we waste this opportunity. 
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Note: A version of this note appeared in Mint, Monday, 30th March 2020 t.co/TwKlSlWFro ).

Monday, August 3, 2015

An Ideal Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) for India

with Surjit Bhalla



Introduction

    As India moves towards implementation of an inflation targeting mechanism, the debate about the structure of this policy has intensified. To date, monetary policy has been the exclusive domain of the RBI, and within the RBI, under the exclusive and sole discretion of the Governor. To be sure, the RBI has a large and competent staff which feeds inputs to the governor. In addition, the Governor has a seven member Technical Advisory Committee, composed of non-RBI experts, who deliberate, and recommend, monetary policy, including Repo rates, to the RBI. However, the RBI is not bound to the TAC recommendations. In this regard, the RBI governor has complete and absolute authority on monetary policy as do his counterparts in Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Chile, Mexico), New Zealand, and Sweden (a partial listing of countries where the central bank governor has absolute authority).

Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Committee

   In March 2011, the previous UPA government appointed a nine member Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Committee (FSLRC) under the chairmanship of former Supreme Court judge, Justice Srikrishna.  The committee was to decide on various regulatory aspects of Indian financial institutions, including the RBI.  Srikrishna had just completed (June 2010) a tenure for the UPA government on the bifurcation of the state of Andhra Pradesh, which eventually did happen in 2014.

UPA Finance Ministers (PC Chidambaram, Pranab Mukherjee) consistently had problems with the RBI governors. Possibly because of these strained relationships, the FSLRC seemed to endorse the view that RBI wings needed to be clipped, and then some. In the first FSLRC report (March 2013) the proposal for monetary policy implementation was as follows:  "the creation of an MPC that would determine the policy interest rate.  In addition to the Chairperson and one executive member of the board, the MPC would have five external members. Of these five, two would be appointed by the Central Government, in consultation with the Chairperson, while the remaining three would be appointed solely by the Central Government."  However, V1.0 did allow the RBI governor to have veto power in the MPC decisions under “extreme circumstances”.

FSLRC V1.0 was a mixture of vote and veto – 2 members from RBI (Governor & Deputy Governor for economics & monetary policy, two external members selected by Governor and 3 selected by the Central Government.  All five would, however, formally be appointed by the Central government (read Ministry of Finance or MoF).  Implicitly, four of the five external members of the MPC would have to agree to a course of action different from the Governor to override him.

Expert Committee on Monetary Policy Framework

   Subsequently RBI’s Expert Committee headed by Deputy Govorner Urjit Patel’s report in Jan 2014, recommended an MPC with a difference balance. The report advocated inflation targeting along with an MPC, and the latter was to be constituted as follows: "The Governor of the RBI will be the Chairman of the MPC, the Deputy Governor in charge of monetary policy will be the Vice Chairman, and the Executive Director in charge of monetary policy will be a member.  Two other members will be external, to be decided by the Chairman and Vice Chairman on the basis of demonstrated expertise and experience in monetary economics, macroeconomics, central banking, financial markets, public finance and related areas." This Report was noteworthy for the fact that it would be near identical in power structure to the present, no MPC structure i.e. RBI in control. Even if both external members of the MPC disagreed with the Governor, he would always have at least a 3-2 majority, thus effectively ensuring a veto for the Governor (without the need for a formal veto).

FSLRC Version 2?


   On July 23rd, Government put a draft proposal for comments on its web site, which some assumed was version Version 2.0 of the FSLRC proposal, but what is apparently a modification based on comments received by the MOF on the original FCLRC recommendations.   According to this modification, the MPC which would comprise of 3 members of the RBI (instead of 2 before) and four external members nominated by the MoF – and no extreme circumstances and no veto power! This recommendation goes against almost any definition of an independent central bank.

Global Practice & Recommendation

   The table lists the practice of monetary policy in 14 selected countries. It can be seen that the FSLRC V2.0 is comparable to a few of the selected countries – e.g. Korea, Norway, Philippines. While some parts of the media have suggested that the Indian structure is similar to Thailand, that is not the case; while Thailand does have a 7 member committee, all 7 members are appointed by the Central Bank.  

Israel seems to have the best mix among the existing systems. The Governor chairs the MPC consisting of 6 members, with three outside members selected by the Central Bank. In case of a tie, the Chair has the deciding vote (not clear on Israel central Bank website). This is our first proposed structure of the MPC, based on the best in emerging market practice.

Our second proposed structure (and the one we really prefer) is that the MPC be a
formal five (or seven) member body with the Governor as Chairman and four (or six) outside professional experts as members.  The experts cannot be employees of either the RBI or the Government of India. All four (six) members must have knowledge and expertise in macroeconomics and monetary and/or fiscal policy. The government will have the right to suggest a list of names for the consideration of the RBI, but the Governor will have the right to choose and appoint those he wants, subject to the above criteria. The decisions of the MPC will however be binding on the Governor. This means that if and only if three (four) of the four (six) independent members of the MPC agree on a policy course different from that proposed by the Governor, would the Governor  be obliged to accept their decision.

Conclusion

Regardless of which of our proposed structures is adopted, we want to emphasize that it is important that RBI have both the responsibility and accountability of monetary policy. It should also be, and seen to be, independent of the government of India. Finally, accountability of the RBI would mean twice a year presentations (and grilling!) by parliamentarians, not unlike the practice in the US. The latter, of course, cannot happen if the parliament is not allowed to function!



Table: How does the rest of the world manage monetary policy?
Country
Is there a special Monetary Policy Committee?
Composition of Monetary Policy Committee
Total
Central Bank
External

External Appointments by

Central Bank
Government
External/Government Dominance







Philippines
Yes
7
1
6

0
6
Australia
No
9
2
7

0
7
Korea
Yes
7
2
5

0
5
Norway
Yes
7
2
5

0
5
India (FSLRC V1.0)
Yes
7
2
5

0
5
India (Draft Financial Code, FSLRC V2.0)
Yes
7
3
4

0
4
Chile*
No
6
5
1

0
0
Central Bank Dominance







Israel
Yes
6
3
3

3
0
Thailand
Yes
7
3
4

4
0
UK
Yes
9
5
4

0
4
India (Urjit Patel Committee)
Yes
5
3
2

2
0
Sweden
Yes
6
1
5

5
0
Complete Central Bank Control







Canada
No
6
6




Indonesia
No
6-9
6-9




New Zealand
No
1
1




South Africa
Yes
8
8




India (present)
No
1
1




Source: Central Bank websites







*Veto power exists for the Finance Minister, unless all 5 Central Bank Board members unanimously agree on a decision

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A version of this article was published on July 29, 2015 in the Indian Express and the Financial Express (http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/an-ideal-mpc-for-india/ and http://www.financialexpress.com/article/economy/an-ideal-mpc-for-india/109713/ respectively)