Friday, May 22, 2015

Does Modi Government have an Economic Model?

  

      One of the reasons for the disillusionment of the educated middle class with the Central Government during 2010 to 2012 was the contradiction between the well-publicized turn to moral philosophy and legal rights and the media exposure of corruption and inefficiency.  The pendulum had swung too far to the abstract & the legal from the pragmatic and the practical.  The incompetence and corruption that intervened between philosophy and results, needed to be addressed, for the public to see beneficial outcomes.
   Has the pendulum swung too far in the other direction?   Is the new government focused excessively on lists of programs and projects and thus prone to ad hoc and inconsistent decisions, without big picture or philosophy to guide individual ministers and bureaucrats?  Does “Modinomics” mean the “Gujrat model”? If this State originated model is applicable only to a sub-set of the larger set of issues dealt with by the Central government, does it mean that “Modinomics is directionless”?  Does the Modi led government have a development philosophy or model, to guide policy and institutional reform decisions?
We can discern three principles underlying Shri Modi’s approach to economic development.
1)      Business is the creator of productive jobs in the economy. All types of business (tiny, small, medium, large; domestic, FDI; private, public sector; manufacturing, services, agriculture), have to play their due role. Effective use of technology and skills is what makes both employment and business, productive.  The jungle of laws, rules, controls and procedures has stifled growth of business, productive jobs and employment. Cutting through this jungle will let the light of the sun on to the ground where these business enterprises and entrepreneurs operate, so that they can blossom. Many policy pronouncements, such as on “Ease of Doing business,” are driven by this underlying approach.
2)      Good Governance is the key to Government provision of Public Goods and Services and successful Social Welfare programs.  Between the input of funds and the achievement of desired outcomes lies the black hole of Government.  Efficiency, honesty (viz corruption) and sincerity (public service, national interest) in government functioning is therefore a critical element in achieving any Social welfare objectives.  Further, technology (e governance) can be an effective instrument for achieving efficiency improvements.  The Federal principles enshrined in the constitution plays a much more important role in defining the areas of responsibility of the Central & State Governments than social philosophy or ‘superior’ moral sensibility.
      Government is also seen to have an important role in creating the economic environment (macro, infrastructure, financial systems, skills, technology development and adoption) in which the business (mentioned in 1) can grow and produce productive employment. However, this aspect differs from earlier governments, only on the relative emphasis placed on different elements of the economic environment.
3)         Government controlled Assets, infrastructure and business can be used to generate profits for investment and growth. This reduces the need for both taxes and tax incentives and for subsidies, all of which are distorting and usually lead to corruption. There is also a belief that this government can manage the public sector, honestly, sincerely and efficiently to generate larger profits and speedily direct these into investment in sub-sectors that will accelerate economic growth (rather than crowding out private investment as happened so often in the past).  Parts of this approach are still evolving, particularly the identification of government owned business, assets and financial institutions that generate losses and negate the investment-growth objective.
      The first element acknowledges the benefits of a competitive market economy and puts the correction of “government failure” as its central issue. The second principle acknowledges both “government failure” and “market failure” and attempts to correct both to enhance the benefits from both. The third element is a little schizophrenic, based as it is on a historical legacy. It makes the optimistic assumption that a Modi government can attain the quality of public sector governance seen in a few countries (Japan, Singapore, S Korea, China) and mimic their relative success.  However, most developing countries, including India, have failed to maintain the quality standards needed for success.
     Classic public goods like defense and sectors with large externalities like most rural infrastructure and monopoly networks in urban areas(sewage, water, electricity distribution, roads, public transport), have been considered governments business in most countries. However, this argument does not apply to business in competitive, well-functioning markets (e.g.  metals, hotels). Thus it partially contradicts a couple of election speeches in which it was said, that “Government has no business to be in business.”
      Every economic model is constrained by political reality. Government decisions are based not just on its economic philosophy and beliefs but also on the political constraints it faces at any given time. These constraints arise from pulls and pressures inside the party, from allies, and the opposition. It is naïve to expect all actions to be consistent with economic philosophy. One hopes that the government is able to overcome the political constraints that keep it from acknowledging and acting on the empirically evidence that government cannot accelerate growth through ownership of business that operate in competitive markets.
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A version of this article appeared in Swarajya on May 21, 2015  at http://swarajyamag.com/economy/does-modi-government-have-an-economic-model/
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Tuesday, May 19, 2015

Perceptions Drive Policy: India-China Reality



Introduction

      Perceptions drive policy.  This is also true of India’s China policy. What are Indian’s perceptions of China? Leaving aside the history of the border conflict, these perceptions are driven largely by knowledge of (or lack thereof) of the economic performance of the Chinese and Indian economies. I find that most Indians who take an interest in China, fall largely into two camps: One who think of China as a super achiever, the country equivalent of a superman. The people who fall into this group are generally either overawed or intimidated by China and have a defeatist attitude for India viz China.   The second camp is the opposite of the first one.  It is generally disparaging and dismissive of China’s achievements while exaggerating of India’s achievement and/or capabilities. By thinking that all we have do is have different govt., or change our objectives, or show the will, and we will grow fast and catch up in a jiffy. It sometimes verges on dangerous bravado.  In my view both these perceptions are equally problematic when it comes to defining India’s China policy. A foreign policy that furthers and promotes India’s interest must be based on a realistic appraisal of India’s position vis-à-vis China. This essay tries to present such an appraisal.

China: Superman or Iron Man?

     What are the arguments for the super-country view of China? China’s economy has averaged a growth rate of almost 10% per annum over a period of 30 years, the fastest and longest duration of sustained high growth rate seen in history.  In 2013 Chinese economy was 5 times the size of the Indian economy, in current US$ dollars, but equal in size of to the US economy in Purchasing Power parity terms.   Actually, China’s economy is about half the size of the US economy in current US$ terms but it is easy to fall into the practice of changing  metrics to suit ones argument.  This subtle exaggeration is also true of Western analysts who are pushing a G2 approach to US policy and the World order.

Good Luck & Good Governance?

      What are the kind of arguments on the other side?  China’s  per capita GDP in current US$ terms was about the same as India’s at the beginning of the 1990s. More precisely it was 0.84 of India’s US$ GDP in 1990 and 1.06 times India’s US$GDP in 1991. Even though China’s GDP was higher in 1990 (1.1x) and 1991 (1.4x), that was because of its larger population. This population differential is, however, projected by the UN, to end in 2025. The population differential and the consequent GDP differential have been around for several millennia, but should dis-appear in a decade.  Thereafter the game will be solely one of Per capita GDP. There is nothing inherently superior about the Chinese viz Indian’s that we can’t go back to the per capita GDP parity that prevailed in 1990-91, if we have the will and make the effort.  An important reason for the 9% average Per capita GDP growth of the Chinese economy since 1990 was the Geo-economic support that China got from the US, Europe and Japan, and which the Chinese Communist Party cleverly used to implement its (version of the) export led development model.  It did this by always telling foreigners what they wanted to hear (about free markets and private enterprise), while rigorously controlling & modulating the access of foreign analysts and experts to hard and soft data.

Reality of India viz China

   The reality is revealed by a careful appraisal of the real GDP of the two countries. The only way to compare the welfare of the people of different countries is in terms of their per capita GDP (income or consumption) in terms of Purchasing power parity(PPP). AS total GDP is population times per capita GDP(PcGdp) or PcGdp is derived from GDP by dividing it by population, GDP measured in purchasing power parity is also the logical way to compare the size of  GDP.  In 2013 India’s GdpPpp was 40% of China’s or inversely China’s GDP was 2.4 times that of India’s.  If China’s GDP was converted to USD in 2013 it would have got five times the US dollars that India would get from converting its 2013 GDP into USD.  However, if these dollars were used by the Chinese to convert into to Indian rupees, it would be able to buy in India real goods & services equal to 2.4 times the real Goods and Services it could have bought in China. Similarly if India used its entire 2013 GDP to convert into Chinese Renminbi in 2013 it could buy Goods and services in China equivalent to 40% of what it could have in India, double the 20% suggested by 2013 exchange rates.

Relative size

     That is one basic reality: China’s real economy is about 2.4 times that of India, or inversely India’s real economy is about 40% the size of China’s.  As China’s GDP at PPP was about the same as India’s in 1985, it took thirty years for China to open this gap.[1] During this period Chinas growth rate (9.9%) averaged 3.4% points more than the 6.5% average Indian GDP growth rate. As people some time confuse GDP with per capita GDP, the corresponding facts are as follows: China’s real per capita GDP, which was equal to India’s in 1992 (0.99) had become 2.2 times India’s per capita GDP (PPP) by 2013. The average growth rate of per capita GDP from 1990 to 2013 was 9% for China and 4.8% for India. It thus took, 25 years for a per capita growth difference of 4.2% per year to translate into a per capita income difference  of 2.2 times. 
       By way of benchmark, note that China’s GDP at PPP is now almost equal to that of USA, even though its Per Capita GDP at PPP (PcGdpPpp)  is only about 22% of US( because its population is 4.3 times).  India’s GDP is therefore also 40% of the US, while its per capita GDP is 10% of the US.

Growth Differential

The second basic reality is that the difference in the growth rates of China and India has been narrowing during this period 1990 to 2013. Thus estimating and plotting the GDP “growth differential” and introducing a linear trend through it shows that the “growth differential” has declined by about 0.16 per cent point per year.   The per capita GDP growth differential has narrowed at the slightly slower rate of 0.15 per cent point per year. Those concerned about the new Indian data with base 2011, should be reassured that this narrowing trend was clear in the old data available up to 2013-14.  If we extend this data to include the forecast growth for 2015, we see a sharp narrowing of the GDP growth differential suggesting that the China’s growth trend will go below India’s from 2016 (actual GDP growth is virtually equal in 2014).
    Along with the GDP Gap, have been the narrowing of the gap is several ratios, known to be correlated to per capita GDP growth.  These include the Export/GDP, Import/GDP and FDI/GDP ratios. The faster growth of exports of goods and services, their imports and FDI, may in fact be driving the narrowing of the per capita GDP growth gap.

Appraisal & Projection

    A realistic appraisal of the relative position of India viz China and how we got there also provides a basis for projecting into the future.  Thus it took about 22 years for China’s real per capita GDP to become 2.2 times that of India’s with an average per capita GDP growth differential of around 4.2% per year.  Given relative population growth rates, it took about 28 years for China’s real GDP to become 2.4 times India’s with an average GDP growth differential of about 3.4% per year. If India’s average GDP growth averages about 3.4% points more than China’s, India’s GDP will take between 25 to 30 years to catch up to, and become equal to that of, China.   Thus for instance if India is able to accelerate growth to an average of 8.5%, while China’s growth slows to about  5%, it would take about 28 years to close the gap. This is however an optimistic projection from India’s perspective.
    A more realistic scenario would be for both Indian and Chinese growth rates to decline gradually, with Indian GDP growth averaging about 2.3% points higher than China over several decades. Based on this scenario, a realistic objective for Indian Growth and development would be to target an elimination of the GDP PPP gap with China by 2050.  Though this is a generational challenge it is far from impossible one.
   Adding a growth projection for USA to this scenario, suggests that the GDP at PPP of both India and China would in 2050 be about 2.5 times that of the USA, even though their per capita GdpPpp would still be 2/3rd and 3/4th (respectively) of the USA’s.
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A version of this note appeared in Economic Times Blogs under the title, “Perceptions Drive Policy” on May 19, 2015 at http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/PolicyAnalysis/relative-size-of-china-and-india/


[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all data used is from the World Development Indicators data base of the World Bank. As pre-1990 GDP PPP data has been removed from the WDI, we use IMF data for GDP PPP for 1980-89.

Friday, May 8, 2015

Political Economy of Expectations & Performance Evaluation


      How do observers analyze the performance of the Modi Government, after completing one year in office? That depends on their expectations. An added complication this time is that expectations have changed sharply during the last two years. The evaluation of the Modi Government depends on whether the observer measures performance against his expectations one year ago or his expectations two years ago.  This note however discerns a pattern, that may help readers evaluate the evaluators and thus indirectly do a better job of evaluating the actual performance of the Modi Government.

     If we go back in time to the middle of 2013 (May-June), most observers of the economy and economic policy fell into two categories: Very negative and moderately positive. The first category(I) were extremely apprehensive about the future of the Indian polity and economy.  In political terms this group consisted primarily of anti-BJP, ant-Modi persuasion. The second category(II) were mildly positive, in the hope that any change from the previous dispensation would be in a positive direction, even though the change may be incremental and slow.  This group largely consisted of all those who were positive towards candidate Modi’s economic agenda or economic management style or both.

    By the middle of 2014, each of these groups had subdivided into two (A & B), depending on their political inclinations and attitudes to the NDA government. What is most interesting is that sub-groups IB and IIBs expectation converged after the formation of the NDA government in 2014, so that there were really three views/ sets of expectations in mid-2014. One part of the original negative group’s attitude changed little- they (IA) remained negative about the Modi Government’s performance, perhaps even a little more negative than before, expecting no improvement and giving no quarter.  The second sub-group in this category (IIB) went from negative expectations to Very high expectations of what the Modi Government should accomplish. This change took time to brew below the surface, but then changed suddenly on record.

      The original positive group (II) also separated into two sub-groups in mid -2014. One sub-group (IIA) remained positive but with a greater confidence and faith that the direction of the economy and economic policy would indeed be changed in positive direction.  It therefore began to sketch out a range policy & institutional reform possibilities that had a realistic chance of being adopted and implemented.  The second sub-group(IIB) was euphoric about the Lok Sabha majority attained by the NDA and its expectations, about what the Modi government could or would do, sky rocketed. Members of both this sub-group (IIB) and the other sub-group (IB) developed a must do agenda/reform lists based on long standing views, which each member of the group felt he had a right to expect from this government. Some of these ,verged on the miraculous when viewed in the light of harsh political reality and dynamics of the political economy of vested interests. 

      Not surprisingly both these sub-groups (IB & IIB) have, in mid-2015,  expressed severe disappointment in the performance of the Modi government. Both groups have written off the Modi Government (perhaps in different ways). The difference between the two is, that the dis-appointment of sub-group IB is tinged with  quiet satisfaction that its original expectations in 2013, that “no good can come from the rise of Modi”, may yet come true. In contrast sub-group IIB is genuinely dis-appointed with what they thought were easily achievable goals for a Govt. with a LS majority, unaware of forgetting that, a Rajya Sabha majority is needed to pass all legislation (except the budget and the finance bills). 

    Sub-group IIA which had mildly positive expectations in both 2013 and 2014,  continues to have such expectations of the Modi government. The Government’s performance balance sheet from its perspective has some good positive achievements, a smaller but still significant number of negatives (boo boos or slow progress) but is mildly positive on a net basis.  Members of this “realist” sub groups may differ on specifics of the positive & negative items and of the net benefits and impact, but they remain hopeful of steady progress on economic policy, institutional (governance) reforms and economic growth and welfare improvement.