Thursday, June 8, 2017

UnConventional War: Counter Terror Strategy



Introduction

   Though there is no sign of the creation of an Unconventional War command or Directorate in the Integrated Defense Staff, a  more comprehensive Counter Terror strategy, seems to be emerging.[i]  This emerging Counter Terror (#CT) strategy attempts to increase the costs & reduce the benefits, of unconventional war to the Pakistan Military. The CT strategy has the following elements:

Cross-Border War

    Identification of the Pakistan Army in Pakistan occupied J&K as a terrorist army, engaged in unconventional war against India and therefore a target of unconventional Defence against the terrorists it trains, manages and pushes across the LOC. The Pakistan army's targeting of army bases in J&K, using their Jehadi terrorist subalterns, has finally broken the back of the Indian Pacifist camel. No distinction need now be made between the Jehadi army in occupied J&K and its Jehadi subalterns operating in J&K. The Indian army will no longer wait till they push Jehadis across the line of control under covering fire, but will act proactively to disable the terrorists and their army facilitators & bosses as soon as they can be identified.

Media

    The northern army command will become the single point conduit for day to day communication with the media, on anti-Terror and cross border actions. This will cut out leaks and debilitating speculation. The change was first instituted with the DGMO announcing surgical strikes & followed recently by army spokesman announcing destruction of terrorist-army bunkers. Whether this will result in a formation of a professionally staffed and well equipped media, communication and public relations cell, remains to be seen. 

Domestic

    A clear policy on terrorism/Jehad within J&K. The Jehadis and their facilitators and sympathizers must choose whether they are with the terrorist or against the terrorists. If the former don't expect to be treated as peaceful law abiding citizen, but as a terrorist sympathizer. If you are not with the Jehadis, not only can you exercise your full rights as a citizen of India but you can expect us to facilitate economic opportunity for you & your family everywhere in the country. All elements of this approach are not yet fully developed/elaborated. The fact that it's difficult to distinguish, is no excuse for not trying to identify those who have run with the hares and hunted with the hounds and to categorize the fence sitters who deliberately provoke the security forces. An unconventional war cannot be won without getting the majority of population to rise against terrorist violence and join the diplomatic process of grievance redressal.

Financing

    Terrorist financing channels will be identified, pro-actively investigated and pursued with a view to choking off flows from Pakistan and other Salafi-Takfiri-Wahhabi sources. This includes much more rigorous scrutiny of FCNR funding for so called charities & religious institutions, beside the hawala channels traditionally use by corrupt politicians and therefore often shielded from scrutiny in the past. NIA raids on Hawala channels and J&K separatists are an indicator.

Diplomacy

     An important element of the anti-terror strategy is sharpened diplomacy to expose Pakistan's double game of simultaneously financing, training, managing & directing terrorists and appearing to help the US in tracking terrorists who threaten the USA. More importantly, this exposure is to be supplemented/complimented by responding to Pakistan's allegations wrt Kashmir Valley, by exposing Pakistan military's war against civilians in Pakistan occupied J&K, Baluchistan and Sindh (including its capital Karachi). However a foreign media strategy must be developed and implemented as part of overall diplomatic strategy.

Jehadi Leadership in AfPak 

   It remains unclear how the Pakistan and Afghan based Jehadi leaders of the Pakistan army's pet terrorist organizations are to be undermined or incapacitated? But perhaps it is best to let some of this remain a little vague.

References

 

No comments: