Showing posts with label Economic Growth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economic Growth. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 29, 2015

India-China Growth Reversal & GDP Gap



Introduction

      The long anticipated deceleration in rate of the growth of China’s economy is under way. Even normally conservative World Bank and IMF, are confirming that China’s growth is slowing down and is likely to fall below 7%.  Even those analysts who had forecast a deceleration in China’s growth were unsure about when exactly the slowdown would start. The author had estimated in the 2000s that China’s growth would decelerate below 8 per cent, around the middle of the decade starting 2010.  The global financial crisis of 2008 sharply raised the probability that the slow down would occur within the following decade, despite risky efforts by China to prop up growth.

      In contrast India was forecast to achieve its potential growth rate of about 8 per cent, given its Export-import neutral growth model. The surprise in India’s case was the sharp slowdown from 2011-12, largely attributed to complacency and domestic policy mistakes. Despite these mistakes, however, India’s growth rate from 2002-03 to 2013-14 was among the ten highest in the world (using the old data series).  Though, the correction of these mistakes, may no longer be enough to restore growth to earlier levels, India can and must restore growth to the average rates achieved earlier. Again, this has been recognized by both the World Bank and the IMF.     These two developments taken together, imply that India trend growth rate is poised to  exceed that of China’s in the next few decades.

GDP Levels vs Growth rate

    This will start the long, slow process of closing the GDP gap with China, which was 1.4 times India’s real GDP in 2013.  There is a common tendency to confuse relative levels of GDP with growth rates, so it is important to understand that China’s real GDP, measured at Purchasing power parity in 2011 international dollars, is now 2.4 times that of India's GDP. China's GDP PPP was 1.1 times India's GDP PPP in 1990, with the two economies almost equal in size in the mid-1980s. During 1990 to 2013, China's growth averaged 9.9% per year, 3.4% points faster than India’s average GDP growth rate of 6.5%.  Even if the growth differential was inverted and China's GDP henceforth grows an average 3.4% points slower than India's GDP (say 5% - 8.4% = -3.4%),  it would take 30 years to eliminate the GDP gap, about the time it took to open it.

Previous Growth Forecasts

    The basic theory and empirics of growth, show that fast growing economies like Japan, S Korea, Singapore and Thailand, which grew fast when they were at low or middle income levels of per capita GDP, maintained growth at high levels for one to two decades and then slowed down as their per Capita GDP approached that of the (lower end) of the High Income economies.  The surprise in the case of China was that it maintained an average growth of almost 10% for thirty years, despite reaching middle income levels of per capita GDP about a decade ago.  Many analysts, whose predictions about China's growth slowdown had been proved wrong in the 1990s, became much more cautious thereafter. Those of us who were willing to take a reputational risk, have been proved right, as China’s economy slowed below 8% in 2012 and is now projected to slow below 7% by the multilateral institutions.
    The global financial crisis ensured that growth of World trade would slow sharply below the very high growth seen in the previous decade, aided by a correction of the bubble like growth seen just prior to the crisis.  This meant that China’s (net) export-investment model was no longer sustainable and would produce slower growth in the 2010s.  To delay this slowdown China pumped large amounts of credit into the economy, with the official Debt-Gdp ratio rising from 55.2% of GDP in 2008 to 88.1% in 2013, an average increase of 6.6% points of GDP per year. Analysts have estimated that the debt in the shadow banking system may have increased by an equivalent amount, with total debt rising to dangerously risky levels.  Based on historical experience of such debt bubbles, some analysts predict that this bubble is now likely to burst and reduce China’s growth rate to the 3% to 4% range. Analysts who have greater confidence in the ability of the Chinese Communist party to manage economic crisis, nevertheless predict a deceleration of the trend rate of growth to a range of 6% to 7%. A safe intermediate prediction is a gradual growth slow down to 5 to 6 per cent rate over the next 10 years.

Comparative Growth

   Based on World Bank, World Development Indicators data till 2013 (till which year India's GDP base 2004-5 was fully available), we can examine and compare the growth rates of China & India. A plot of these rates shows that the growth rate difference has been narrowing since 1990, due to a gradual deceleration of China and a stronger acceleration of India. Underlying this narrowing growth difference are variables that are drivers of or correlated with, GDP growth and productivity. These include FDI and exports, which are indicators of competitiveness and Imports which reflect openness.
     The difference between China and India’s FDI-GDP ratio has been on a declining trend, from about 3.5% of GDP in 1990 to a little over 2% of GDP in 2013. Underlying this is slow but steady progress in attracting technology and risk capital to India, with a milder decline in China’s attractiveness. China’s Export GDP ratio which was 8 per cent points higher than India’s in 1990, rose 10% points to an average of 18% during 2005 to 2007. It then narrowed rapidly to about 1% in 2013, indicating that India’s exports have held up to the global decline in world trade since 2008, much more effectively than China’s. The difference between China and India’s Import-GDP, which fluctuated around an average of 7.1% points between 1990 and 2007 declined dramatically to -5.2% by 2011-13, indicating that the Indian economy is now significantly more open than China’s.

Base Change Implications

       Analysis and forecasting of Indian growth has been confounded by the appearance of a new GDP series (2011 base) which has made some fundamental changes in methodology and data sources used.  As this new series provides less than three years of growth data it is impossible to estimate the underlying trend growth rate using this series.  After the mid-year 2014 budget I had written that “The measures taken in the budget will be sufficient to increase growth by about 1 per cent point over the last year’s 4.7% to 5.7%. Actualization of some of the measures indicated in the budget will however be necessary to raise growth to the 6.5 to 7% range in 2015-16.”  Given that the average growth rate as per the new data is about 1% point above that, using the new data, a projected growth rate of 7.5% to 8% is quite conservative. This seems to be the reasoning underling the World Bank’s and IMF’s  projections for India’s growth in 2015 and 2016.
      The CSO has however projected a growth rate of 7.4% for 2014-15 and a growth acceleration to 8% in 2015-16 would not be wildly optimistic.  As many observers have pointed out however, high frequency data, such as the Index of Industrial production for manufacturing, quarterly results for companies and tax revenues from excise and corporate income tax, do not appear consistent with these high growth levels. The author has argued in the policy paper, “Indian Growth Puzzle,” ( Policy Paper No. WsPP 3/2015, New Delhi, April 2015 ) that the global financial crisis (GFC) and the consequent global demand recession and excess capacity, have affected not only the export led Chinese economy, but also the globally competitive and connected corporate (GCC) sector of India. Post GFC, the GCC corporations will lag overall recovery, instead of leading it, as they did in 2002-3 to 2007-8. Thus all indicators connected with these companies, such as IIP, corporate profits, corporate & excise tax revenue would also lag the GDP recovery. The Indian Government needs to be aware of this issue and be prepared to manage central government expenditures subject to a slower recovery in tax revenues.

Conclusion

    Based on the theory and empirical evidence provided by high growth economies, some analysts had predicted since the 2000s, a slowing of the Chinese economy during the decade of the 2010s to rate of growth below that of the Indian (“China-India growth Projections” and other papers at https://sites.google.com/site/drarvindvirmani/growth).  By making the export-investment led strategy of development unviable, the global financial crises made this highly likely if not inevitable. It was also assumed in the forecasts that the Indian government would continue to carry out the minimum reforms necessary to maintain India’s growth rate at an average of the previous decade. Because of complacency and policy mistakes by the Indian Government between 2010 and 2012, the Indian economy, faltered seriously. The corrections introduced in the last two years, have restored some of the momentum.
    Sustained growth of 8 to 8.5% over the next few decades, however requires implementation of the reform agenda and continuing sensitivity to shocks that can derail growth, given that the World environment is far from conducive to sustained high growth.  If this is done we should expect to see India growing faster than China and beginning to close the wide gap that has opened between the per capita GDP of the two countries. This has implications for China and India's foreign policy towards each other, that need to be kept in mind. Given the wide Gap between the GDPs of the two countries, it is however, likely to take at least 30 years for India to eliminate the GDP gap with China.
-----------------------------
A version of this article appeared as the Lead article in The Hindu dated 29th April 2015 under the banner. "Tracking Two Growth Stories" :

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

Per Capita GDP growth and Vote Share



Introduction

    In 2004 the BJP lost the general election, despite their belief that the Indian economy's performance was outstanding and the voters would reward it for this performance.   Many analysts and most opposition parties accepted the contention that the economy was performing very well, but the fruits of this growth had not reached the “Aam Admi / Aurat” who voted against the BJP.  As a contrarian I argued that the economic performance was in fact worse than during the previous regime and the voters had in fact punished the government for poor economic  outcomes (Virmani(2004))[i].
     Last week the Prime Minister gave a press conference to assert that the economic performance of his government had been outstanding and the Congress party was therefore likely to win the election again. Unfortunately he is making a mistake very similar to the one made by the BJP.  The actual performance that matters to the “Aam Admi / Aurat” voter, is much worse than the performance benchmark (as per the model developed by the author). The outcome is therefore likely to be equally disappointing for the Congress party.

The Model

    Under normal circumstances, elections are held every five years. At the end of the five years, the simplest way for the “Aam Admi / Aurat” to judge a Government’s performance is to see how (s)he and his(her) family, friends, neighbors and acquaintances have done during those five years and compare this with what happened during the previous five years (earlier government).  If the performance is better/worse than in the benchmark years there would be an increased/reduced likelihood (probability) of him(her) voting for the party in power.
   Reduced to the barest essentials, there are three economic indicators that in our view matter to the independent/swing/marginal voter.  These are Economic Growth, Public Goods and Services (popularly referred to as “Bijli, Pani, Sadak”) and transfers/subsidies net of taxes (“populist giveaways”).  The growth of per capita income determines not only the change in living standards of the average voter but also the employment opportunities (job or self-employment) created and available to the average person.  Public goods include a range of local & municipal services such as roads, drinking water, sewage, sanitation, drainage, public health and basic education. An improvement (worsening) in the quality and/or volume of such services would tend to have a positive (negative) impact on the voter and thus tend to increase (reduce) the ruling party’s vote share.  A change in net transfers (subsidy - taxes) would be similarly associated with a change in vote shares. It must be kept in mind that it is not the paper laws, verbal announcements or budgetary allocations (expenditures or subsidies) that matter to the Aam Aurat, but the actual delivery of services at the ground levels and the delivery experience. The quality of governance and the degree of corruption & harassment are a very important element of the Aam Aurat’s judgment about improvement or deterioration in delivery . 
   In this note we focus on the growth of per capita GDP as an indicator of the improvement or worsening of economic conditions for the average of marginal voter: Thus, if the rate of growth of per capita income has increased (decreased) the vote share of the ruling party is likely to increase (decline).

Past Elections

       Given this hypothesis, let us look briefly at the past two elections. The NDA government was in power from 1999-2000 to 2004-5 when the general elections were held. During this tenure the Per Capita GDP at factor cost grew at an average of 4.1% per year compared to an average of 4.5% per year in the previous five years. Thus average per capita growth during the NDA government's tenure was 0.4 per cent points per year (9%) lower than during the previous five years making a reduction in BJP-NDAs vote share likely.  It appears that the “India Shinning” campaign may have jarred with the reality as seen by the more aware/better informed urban voters and thus exaggerated the relatively small decline in per capita growth. Another potential factor may have been that new highway programs and Gram Sadak Yojna (very important "public goods") had not yet produced results that the Aam Admi could feel in the small towns and villages of India. The result was a reduction in the BJP’s vote share by 6.7 per cent points from 23.8% to 22.2%
      The Cong party consequently came into power in 2004-5 and ran the Government as part of the UPA till 2008-9.  During this period the growth of per capita GDP accelerated by an incredible 2.7 per cent points (69%) to 6.8 per cent per year.  As predicted by our model this 69% acceleration in the rate of growth of per capita income, resulted in an increase in the vote share of the Congress party, leading to a sweeping victory in the 2009 general election. This growth acceleration had such a large impact on the "Aam Aadmi/ Aurat" that the effect of other infrastructure & social programs was completely overshadowed.  The vote share increased by only 7.9% to 28.6% (from 26.5% in 2004).
       As is apparent from the varying results of different pols, the translation of votes shares into seat shares is a very difficult exercise. It depends on the distribution of victory margins, the number of serious parties (two or more) in the States as well as on alliances.  Consequently in 2009, the increase in the proportion of seats won by the Congress was much higher (49%) than the increase in the vote share..   

2014 General Election

   What does the model say about the forthcoming general election?  During the tenure of the current government (UPA2) from 2009-10 to 2013-14, per capita GDP growth is likely to average about 5.4 per cent per annum.  This is a decline of 1.4 per cent points or 21% relative to the growth rate during the previous five years. Thus (ipso facto) the fall in Cong vote share in the 2014 general election is likely to be greater than that of the BJP in the 2004-5 election but less than the gains of the Cong in the 2004 election. This suggests a decline in vote share between 6.5% and 7.5%.
   Two questions have been raised with respect to this model's predictions for the next election. One is whether the fact that part of the decline in growth is due to global factors matter?  In my view, what matters to the "Aam Admi/Aurat" is what they feel and see on the ground, not the data and analysis that financially sophisticated people spend so much time reading and discussing. The Second question is how important is economic performance during the most recent period, say the last 6 to 18 months, to the voters judgement?  We know that in a sophisticated economy and highly educated polity like the USA, the recent period is overwhelmingly important.  It is therefore likely that economic performance in the last few years (2-3) has a greater weight in the decisions of  highly educated, well informed, urban Indian voter.  However, what happens during the past 4-5 years is still much more relevant to the "Aam Aadmi."

Conclusion

     The slowdown in per capita income growth during 2009-10 to 2013-14, relative to the average per capita growth during 2004-5 to 2008-9, will have a substantial negative effect on the Congress party’s vote share in the general election.  In addition, the issue of Central government corruption and governance will also affect voter behavior as it is directly related to the quality and volume of public goods and services supplied by the government, as well as to the effectiveness & efficiency of welfare transfers.  Both these will have a further adverse effect on Congress party’s vote share, thus offsetting any positive effect of programs like NAREGA.  The "rights laws" and increased petroleum, fertilizer and electricity subsidies will have little or no effect on vote shares in the general election.

-----
A version of this article appeared on the editorial page of The Indian Express, on January 16, 2014, under the Banner, "The GDP Poll."   https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=767588630765354778#editor/target=post;postID=7024682515623021753 


[i] Arvind Virmani, “Economic Growth, Governance And Voting Behaviour: An Application to Indian Elections,” Working Paper No. 138, ICRIER, July 2004. http://www.icrier.org/page.asp?MenuID=24&SubCatId=175&SubSubCatId=233 .