Introduction
State sponsored Terrorism is
unconventional War. Unconventional war can only be won by unconventional means: Different Strategy, tactics, weapons,
training, resources. It will be a grave mistake to try & fight such a long
term unconventional war with conventional means such as complete mobilization
or the fabled Cold Start Doctrine (which is mostly an acceleration of the very slow mobilization process followed historically). Armed
forces and security agencies need new thinking and approach and
completely different level of human resources & training and type & quality
of equipment from the conventional. For instance the use of Aerostats equipped
with infrared cameras to detect infiltration and use of armed drones to attack
terrorists, instead of Hercules aircraft for detection (used in Pathankot)
or attack helicopters to detect & attack them.
Asymmetric Defense
Given the entrenched
conventional Defense thinking in the three services, para-military border
forces, State police, politicians media & intelligentsia, we need an Asymmetric Defense doctrine (ADS) to give all players broad guidance
on how to approach this issue. The National Security Advisor could anchor and
guide the formulation of such a doctrine and ensure co-ordination, integration
& effectiveness of the diverse elements of asymmetric defense. The
creation of an empowered Chief of Defense Staff (4 star CDS) with
responsibility for strategic planning, HRD & equipment acquisition
decisions and Asymmetric Defense, would help accelerate the change. There are arguments for and against the creation
of a Special Forces Command under the CDS, given that each branch already has
its own special forces. However, a special department/division for
unconventional/asymmetric defense is needed within the Integrated defense Staff
(IDS), which includes designated posts for RAW and other intelligence agencies.
Its first task could be to develop an Asymmetric Defense Strategy (ADS). As
noted earlier this may requires unconventional ways of thinking and operating that
are alien to regular armed forces. Under the guidance of the NSA, it
could also sort out some of the operational issues (such as co-ordination) that
arise in case of a terrorist attack on a defense installation or area &
develop SOPs for the same.
. Intelligence
Formation of the Triad of counter terror (CT) institutions: NIA,
NATGRID, NCTC is needed to improve internal defense. A review of intelligence
institutions may, however, suggest greater integration of overlapping functions
through fewer organizations.
The foundation of
unconventional Defense is precise actionable intelligence. We need a quantum
jump in capability across Asia (central, west & east). For
instance the quality of intelligence required to carry out a precision drone
strike is higher than the average quality of intelligence currently available,
even for S Asia. Local language
competence/skills and
cultural understanding is essential for obtaining good intelligence and for
recruitment. The capabilities of RAW must be strengthened to deal with State
sponsored terrorism as well as potential future threats from Middle East &
North Africa. Central Asia and South East Asia must not be underestimated as
potential geographies for inteligence.
Media
A critical (new) aspect of
asymmetric war is the public narrative, domestic & international. Media is
a fundamental theater of unconventional war. Indian media barons, anchors
& personalities, must educate themselves on this issue & then educate
the Indian public about unconventional/asymmetric war that we have faced for
>20 yrs & how to counter it. For instance, it is well recognized that an
important objective of terrorism is to create panic & uncertainty and
instill fear and paranoia in the population. Therefore the calmness and
collectedness with which the government and all other institutions of democracy
and society function during such an attack is a measure of our success. Thus it
is a mark of their failure when the PM and Cabinet ministers are able to go
about their schedule business without interruption.
The media
is an important instrument for creating & influencing public, political and
intellectual opinion in democratic countries(including India & USA). A significant element of Pakistan's media game plan is to convince its targeted audience
that it is more sincere in its search for peace than India, despite its
periodic nuclear saber rattling and continued sponsorship of cross-border
terrorism. The complex game of India-Pakistan talks, including subjects to be
discussed and how, which country cancelled, started or restarted talks, is a tactical
tool for achieving its public relations objective. Both war mongering(blood curdling demands for revenge) and peace
mongering (e.g. criticism of Indian instead of Pakistan government for cancelled/stalled talks) helps
support Pakistan's media narrative. A balanced approach by discussants and
analysts on Indian media, supports India's National interests.
Diplomacy
Diplomacy is a vital element of how other countries, their foreign policy
experts and informed global public opinion perceives terrorism carried out
against us. Thus Pakistan has
successfully convinced the US, many of its allies and Indian track II
participants, that (a) General Kayani's policy of tacitly allowing extreme
Islamism to flourish under his charge, has been replaced by General Sharif's
policy of countering internal terrorism & extremism. (b) It is the hard line
attitude/approach of PM Modi & his hard-line supporters that is the main
roadblock to India-Pakistan peace [not Pakistan's unchanged strategy of
terrorism (by pet terrorists like Let, JeM & HeM) under the nuclear
umbrella].
PM Modis surprising halt in Lahore,
the discussions leading up to it, and the subsequent terrorist assault on
Pathankot Air base has given the lie to this false narrative. Indian diplomacy
and media must ensure that global public opinion understands & appreciates
this point. Indian strategic interlocutors must also ensure that we get the
equipment (e.g. armed drones) and technology needed to deal with cross-border terrorism.
Conclusion
A long term perspective is essential
for dealing with an opponent whose long term objective is to undermine India's
Strategic position in the region and whose Medium term objective is territorial
aggrandizement. Short term revenge cannot & must not be our objective. Our primary goal is to deter terrorism against us. But terror will only cease when it
entails unacceptable asymmetric cost on the sponsors of terror against us.
Acquisition and demonstration of the capability for doing so, is long overdue. The National Security Advisor and to some
extent his boss will be judged on their success in this matter during the 2019
election.
