UP election: Preliminary analysis of results

 

UP Election analysis based on CSDS-LokNiti exit poll data (bit.ly/36g3333 ) and poll results (vote share & seats)

(1)  There is a structural shift to a two party system in UP. Its not a temporary change: Mayawati is no longer interested in becoming CM and doesn’t have any second level leaders to take over from her. The Congress trend decline has reduced its vote share to less than that of others. Between 2017 and 2022 State elections, Congress vote share has declined by -3.1% and BSP’s vote share by -9.4%, while BJP share increased by 2.7% and the SP’s share by 12.2%. This large increase in the SP vote gave the impression to observers that it would win the election. But the structural change to a two party or bipolar system, ensured that this wouldn’t happen.

   This change in electoral structure from a multiparty system to a two party one will have long term effects. It will reduce the volatility in results and provide a more stable electoral outcome, till the SP cobbles together a group whose vote share rivals that of the BJP.  

 

(2)  The Congress vote seems to have shifted largely to SP+, while the BSP vote has decline has been shared by both the SP and the BJP, with the latter getting a larger share. The BJP vote share among Jatav has gone up from 8% in 2017 to 21% in 2022. and among “other SCs” from 32% in 2017 to 41% in 2022. The overall result is that BJP is now a much more broad-based party in UP.

  In comparison, the main opposition party in UP, the SP, appears to have become more castist-communal with the Yadav vote share increasing to 83% in 2022 from 68% in 2017 and the Muslim vote share rising to 79 % from. This shift is from other parties, not the BJP, whose vote share from Yadavs increased by 2% points and from Muslims by 3% points.  

  BJP has a large share of votes from every other community barring the Yadavs, the Muslims and to some extent the Jatavs. Thought the BSP’s vote share among Jatavs declined by 22% points, 65% of Jatavs still voted for BSP because of deep personal loyalty to Mayawati, even though she barely campaigned for the election.  The BJP will likely try to raise their vote share of SCs by offering Ms Mayawati a position in the Union Govt.

 

(3)   BJP has overcome the earlier bias against BJP among Women, going from a lower vote share from women than among men, to a 2% higher vote share among women than men. This is due to better law & order, delivery of free rations and better delivery of programs like gas cylinders, toilets and housing that affect the lives of non-working women, much more than men-folk who are out of the home during most of the day. This factor and the related social programs, also helped to counter the weakness in job market, particularly for youth, and the pandemic constrained economic opportunities.

    The SP has become the men’s party with a 6% higher vote share among men, than among men.

 

(4)   According to my 2004 model for the economics of election, the lower average per capita GDP growth rate during the 5 year tenure of the Yogi Govt, relative to the previous five years, should have reduced the vote share of the BJP in this election. The vote share however increased, because the BJP managed to convince the public that pandemic was an exogenous shock and the Govt did everything it possibly could to mitigate its huge negative impact on the population, particularly those worst affected by it. Free food has clearly played a big part in this.

    Besides this much better targeting of subsidies (e.g. on LPG), welfare transfers (such as toilets, housing) to the needy has also had the effect of increasing the confidence and the dignity of welfare recipients. The effect of the broader availability of better quality public goods (clean water, road & electricity connectivity) will be more visible once the economy is back on the sustained growth path in 2022-23.

 

Delhi State Election Results

The Delhi State election results, which swept the AAP to an unprecedented win in the Delhi State election are extremely interesting and can be interpreted at different levels:

(1) BJP's vote share was 32-33% around the same as in earlier State elections, but possibly on a mildly declining trajectory, while AAP jumped to an unprecedented 50-55%. This means that the vote bank of the Congress, BSP & other small parties switched en mass to it. Exit polls suggest that this switch was greatest among low income voters of the non-BJP parties.

(2) The common thread among AAP voters seemed to be disgust with conventional parties who were seen as part of an arrogant, corrupt, unresponsive local administrative system. Despite any other failings (that political/economic pundits often harped on) they hoped that a completely new party like the AAP would change the system, reducing corruption and force administration to serve the people instead of lording it over them.

(3) Though pundits focused on the negatives of the AAPs 49 day rule, the non-BJP voters focused on the signs of helpfulness that AAP workers had demonstrated at that time, on corruption related administrative problems. This impression may have been strengthened in low income areas if AAP workers continued to be helpful after it demitted office(as reported in the Hindu). The Delhi public is quite aware that all parties (including the AAP) promise all kinds of goodies and these promises have to be taken with a large pinch of salt. This applies to both the positive benefits and the negative side-effects of such "give-aways." Neither the potential beneficiaries nor the potential sufferers (higher cross tax-subsidies) gave this issue the importance that some analysts were giving  it (and continue to give it).

(4) Mr Kejriwal who turned from a very humble man to an arrogant one in nine months of 2013, when the pre (central) election pols projected 50-100 seats for AAP and the media crowned him a Prime Ministerial candidate, seemed to have learned his lesson from the CG election disaster. He appeared to have re-discovered his humility. This also helped restore his credibility with (temporarily) dis-illusioned potential voters. In my judgement (a high minded) arrogance also contributed in the rout of the Congress as it delayed corrective economic measures till it was too late and therefore provides a lesson to the leadership of all parties, including the BJP.

(5) Delhi voters have an idea of the difference between what the Central Govt. can do (macro economy, jobs opportunities across country etc.) and what State & local Govt. can do at the local level (public amenities, permissions and certificates). Thus the image of the Delhi BJP and its past performance (indifferent) was much more important than the performance or non-performance of the Central Govt., Though Shrimati Kiran Bedi was seen by some as an anti-corruption crusader, others saw her as a part of the high handed (rather than high minded) police fraternity of Delhi. So any potential advantage was negated.

(6) One interesting puzzle is what happened to 10-15% additional vote that Shri Narendra Modi added, during the General Election of 2014, to the core vote of the BJP in Delhi?  Though the point made at (5) above is part of the explanation, it is not sufficient. The second part has to be the unease created by what these swing voters believed to be disturbing manifestations of the (so called) "Sangh Parivars" social agenda. Many of these voters ("Right Liberals") support the economic program of the PM but not what they percieve to be the social agenda of the RSS/"Sangh Parivar". They are actively opposed to any use of violence and coercion to achieve social objectives and to an undermining of the economic agenda through divisive statements. The PM was unable to convey to these swing voters that he did not support such statements and actions. His credibility on this issue was therefore a factor that affected the swing voter, who had voted for him in the General election.

(7) The Delhi media helped greatly in conveying and magnifying these impressions and helped form firm judgment that brought people out to vote (when many may have been unsure and afraid to take a risky bet and stayed home). This included a general impression that the Congress was at least temporarily finished in the State and that the AAP could successfully challenge BJP in Delhi State to form a stable government. The prominence given to extremist voices in the Sangh Parivar and the violence of some fringe outfits under the Parivar umbrella played a role in helping consolidate the non-BJP vote behind AAP.  

          It is unclear whether the Delhi media (especially the English language media) has much influence outside the Delhi metropolitan region, even in parts of neighboring States like Haryana that lie beyond the Metro region.

(8) The above analysis throws up several lessons for the major political parties. How much of an effect is felt beyond Delhi will depend on how these parties learn the right or wrong lessons from it. For instance Delhi is a City State with the highest per capita income, low poverty, high average education & media exposure, and very high average growth rate (city of opportunity), but poor governance like every other City in India. Any implications drawn for the rural areas and for poor States and less educated regions are likely to be wrong.