President Trumps Afghan Policy: Implications

Introduction

 President Trump in his speech on Afghanistan policy on 23 August 2017 laid out a new direction for US Afghan policy in these words: "Today, 20 U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations are active in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the highest concentration in any region anywhere in the world. For its part, Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence and terror. ...In Afghanistan and Pakistan, America’s interests are clear. We must stop the resurgence of safe havens that enable terrorists to threaten America. ...  The next pillar of our new strategy is to change the approach in how to deal with Pakistan. We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond. ... It has much to lose by continuing to harbor criminals and terrorists. But Pakistan has also sheltered the same organizations that try every single day to kill our people. We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars at the same time they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting. But that will have to change. And that will change immediately. No partnership can survive a country’s harboring of militants and terrorists who target U.S. service members and officials. It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to civilization, order and to peace."

   He also restated, "Another critical part of the South Asia strategy for America is to further develop its strategic partnership with India. ..We are committed to pursuing our shared objectives for peace and security in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region."

Pakistan Sponsored Terrorism

    As experts on insurgency and guerrilla war know from history, an insurgency has never been defeated without eliminating insurgent sanctuaries and safe heavens in neighboring countries. Yet the US has fought a loosing 14 year war in Afghanistan with leaders of insurgent groups ensconced in safe heavens in cities & towns of Pakistan and insurgent fighters moving in and out of sanctuaries in Baluchistan and Northern areas of Pakistan. The US President's policy is an unambiguous recognition that victory is only possible if these safe havens & sanctuaries are eliminated.

  US & West's tacit support (Government's ignored, experts justified) for Pakistani terrorism, promoted internally as Jehad against the Kafirs, has emboldened the Pakistani military to use it as an instrument of State policy. A clear recognition by Developed country governments, analysts & academics, of the Pakistan military's role in promoting #SalafiTakfiriWahhabi Islamist terrorists is the most important step in dealing with this menace which has been allowed to flourish for 25 years. Now that the President of the USA is clearly & formally changing this policy, the risks to Pakistan Military for continued use of this policy will jump manifold. By mentioning India's role in S Asia (Afghanistan to Bangladesh) in a policy statement on Afghanistan, the US president is also signaling that the use of India bogey to justify support for terrorist killers of US citizens and soldiers is no longer acceptable. President Trump bringing India into the picture in the modified context, also expands range of options US has to force the Pakistan military to give up Jehadi Terrorism as an instrument of State policy.

  One argument made by "Pakistan experts" is that Pakistan Army doesn't have the capability to act against the terrorist who target Afghanistan, India, USA and the rest of the world. If this were true, the obvious solution is to either allow US special forces into Pakistan or allow the UN to organize a special UN anti-terrorism force to hunt these terrorists in Pakistan, starting with the Northern areas, Baluchistan & KP. The argument is actually specious, when designated terrorists, freely roam across Pakistan, appear on TV, raise funds for Jehad on street corners & outside mosques, spew hate against Kafirs in Madrassas & public parks and participate in political activity.

Effect on Pakistan

    The heightened risk to Pakistan will make the Pakistan military more cautious but not by itself change Pakistan's policy of providing sanctuaries to Taliban/Haqqani's (or Let, JUD, HM et al) unless the costs of doing so are increased substantially. For the US, the opening gambit is likely to focus on one or more of the following elements, to convey its serious intent: (1) Revoking Pakistan's status as major non-military ally (2) Sanctions against known associates and supporters of Designated Jihadists like Sirajuddin Haqqani & Masood Azhar (3) Stronger constitutionality on and consequent gradual reduction in, US Aid, of which Pakistan is among the top recipients.

   There is little cost to the USA from the first two actions and substantial benefits/savings from reducing Aid to Pakistan (which can be used to strengthen Afghan forces). Pakistan and Pakistani supporters of Jehad, clearly lose from these actions, even if as some experts suggest China steps forward to replace the Aid. This merely means that Pakistan & China share the costs, the costs don't vanish as these experts imply. Over the last 5 years China has already stepped up its announced aid commitments to $63 billion to $100bi to little affect ( https://www.devex.com/news/pakistan-s-100b-deal-with-china-what-does-it-amount-to-90872#.WZ7fKwCHJtc.twitter). Any replacement of current US Aid by China is likely to be even less effective

Pakistan's Reaction

 Will Pakistan react by disrupting the US land & air access to Afghanistan, limiting intelligence cooperation wrt global terrorists or denying tacit support to drone targeting of what they consider "bad Taliban". Possibly, but the only action that can seriously hurt the US war effort in Afghanistan is the first and this will be seen as a deceleration of unconventional war against US and will be met by actions that seriously hurt the Pakistan Military. 

Intelligence & Drone targeting

      If Pakistan cuts global intelligence cooperation, resulting in another terrorist attack linked to it in US, the US Government will hit it hard, a risk they cannot afford to take. Similarly a reduction in intelligence co-operation that results in major terrorist attack on India will be met by much stronger action by India, than earlier. Intelligence information to target "bad Taliban" is highly selective and targets those who are the greatest threat to the Pakistan military, so non-cooperation will harm them more than the US. It will also free any remaining constraints on US actions. For instance if US drones are not formally permitted to target terrorists in Pakistan, the US will be free to use other locations from which drones can be sent to target terrorists and other partners who can undertake these missions(with deniability). Pakistan foreign Aid saved can also be used to train & equip Afghan special forces to retaliate against Taliban/Haqqani's in Pakistan sanctuaries. 

US supply lines

   The only cost effective tool that Pakistan has to hurt US effort in Afghanistan is the control over transit of US military personnel and supplies to Landlocked Afghanistan. However If Pakistan cuts the US land & Air bridge to Afghanistan, US constraints restraining India from targeting terrorist leaders in Pakistan could be lifted. Alternatively, any Pakistan policy that really hurts US interest can lead to US diplomatic retaliation such as recognition of Indian position on J&K. The US (and Indian) objective in Pakistan is to shut down terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan, not to hurt Pakistani citizens. Once these sanctuaries are wound down, the US War against the #SalafiTakfiriWahhabi Taliban forces in Afghanistan is easily won.

Indian Contribution

    Can India do anything more to promote the joint US objective of diluting & eliminating #SalafiTakfiriWahhabi jihadism and terrorist safe havens from Pakistan and Afghanistan? The existing Indian efforts to promote Afghanistan's economic, institutional & military development can be intensified within the limitation of resources. Perhaps some of the resources released by reduction of US Aid to Pakistan can be used by USA to cost effectively outsource some existing US plans to India. More importantly, Co-ordination of India-US efforts to address the terrorist challenge in S Asia, must be formalized and institutionalized, perhaps under the 2+2 mechanism announced earlier. India can explore the possibility with USA & Iran of using the Chhabhar-Herat corridor for transit of military supplies for the Afghan defense forces, thus providing a competitive supply route to Afghanistan.

PM Modi’s Foreign Policy

President’s Address To Parliament

      PM Modi’s government has used the vehicle of the President’s address to spell out its foreign policy priorities: These are, (1) SAARC countries, who are also  India’s close neighbors in South Asia, (2) China, a neighbor and a Great power, which does and will continue  to impinge directly on Indian interests, (3) Japan, a long standing economic power house, which can help transform Indian Infrastructure and economy, (4) Russia a long time Strategic and defense technology partner and (5) USA, still the sole super power, which has multifarious possibilities for partnership, but whose promise has still to be fully realized. (6) The European powers (i.e. UK, France, Germany), which still have areas of technological and strategic strength from which India can benefit.  Though SAARC, a pluri-lateral organization is mentioned, the focus is clearly on bilateral relations with this set of countries, which together will have a high priority in the nation’s foreign policy. .

   Perhaps, underlying these is a more hard headed evaluation that real gains to India can come only from give and take between these countries and India rather than from drawn out discussion at (or with) multilateral and regional fora.

Foreign Policy Approach

     The selective list of countries mentioned in the speech, are those that can have the greatest impact on India’s economic development, the welfare of its people and its national security.  India’s  “values” and “soft power” will be balanced with “pragmatism” to achieve “mutually beneficial relations.” These words and inaugural actions, suggest that neither self-imposed ideological shackles nor fearful assumptions about the impact of bilateral relations on third countries, will be a constraint in pursuing India’s interests. However, PM Modi’s previously articulated interest in foreign economic relations (trade & investment) to promote India’s economic and technological development suggests a much greater emphasis on opportunities for mutual economic gain.

    The Modi led government is likely to shun grandiose concepts of global architecture and global governance and focus pragmatically on its economic and National security goals.  It is likely to have a business-like approach: Identifying opportunities and threats and pragmatically going about using the former and minimizing the latter, in co-operation with whichever country is most helpful in each case.   This does not imply an absence of strategic objectives, strategic doctrine or plan, but a shift in emphasis away from philosophical principles and moralism to more specific achievable economic and technological objectives.

SAARC

    A peaceful, economically integrated neighborhood tops the nation’s foreign policy agenda outlined in the President’s address. Historically, this included Myanmar, but the latter is now a member of ASEAN not SAARC. Though Myanmar is also a member of BIMSTEC this includes another ASEAN member Thialnd.
     Similarly, Tibet a part of India’s historical neighbor hood has for obvious regions to be dealt with as part of China policy.  The early invitation to SAARC leaders is suggestive of the fact, that the new government will give much closer attention to the SAARC countries than the previous one. Pakistan as the second largest country in SAARC, will undoubtedly get its due share (no more, no less) of attention within this grouping, both from the perspective of peace and security within the region and with respect to mutually beneficial economic integration and regional growth. 

China: Threat or Opportunity

       China, a great power neighbor obviously requires the sustained and serious foreign policy attention from India.  With the possible exception of China, all other countries in the Modi Govt’s list of foreign policy priorities can be seen as providing opportunities for economic and technological development. So is China, the second country on the list, a threat or an opportunity? China’s actions on its land (Indian) and maritime borders (S China sea and E China sea) have alerted the World to the “potential” threat of a rising and aggressive China.  But the unravelling of China's Export-Investment led growth model after the Global financial meltdown, suggests that the ultra-nationalist actions may be an attempt by the Chinese Communist Party leaders to divert public attention away from slowing economic growth to foreign concerns.  China’s economic weakness and counter-action by its maritime neighbors also provide a cautionary warning to its leadership and may strengthen those elements in China that are “pragmatic” and genuinely believe in “mutually beneficial relations” with India.  If this is true, then China can be converted from a potential threat into a potential opportunity for India.

   There are three basic issues that need to be addressed for India-China relations to become a win-win opportunity for both: (1) A border settlement: Premier Chou en Lai provided a template and a map which is reportedly still available in the Indian archive, but from which the Chinese have resiled.  This long buried proposal along with the India-China border agreement of 2005, can be the basis for a border settlement in which China accepts India’s claims in the East and India broadly accepts China’s 1960s claims in the West. Alternatively, if this is politically too difficult for the two sides to do, the ill defined LAC should be converted into a defined and agreed LOC. (2) The great asymmetry in trade relations arising from the ability of the Party (CCP) to control imports from India without any formal procedure. The massive trade imbalance can only be corrected if the party issues clear instructions to this effect.  India can provide greater access to China’s construction exports and FDI in infrastructure, in return for a shift of China’s Labor intensive export industries to India (some of its parts & components would also be imported from China). (3) China’s nuclear and missile proliferation to India’s neighbors:  By formally agreeing to support India’s entry into UNSC, NSG, MTCR, Wassanar group etc. China can partially assuage the deep distrust that such proliferation has aroused.

Japan

     To the surprise of some, Japan an economic power, is listed ahead of the USA on the list of countries that have priority in PM Modi’s administration. The primary reason for this is the perception that the Japanese government has the financial wherewithal, the ability and (under PM Abe) the will to help India solve its infrastructure problems, meet its energy deficits and efficient use of natural resources and thus accelerate economic growth significantly.  It also has a wide range of technological capabilities that it can use to help upgrade India’s strategic R&D and technological abilities. Given historical cultural links, shared democratic perspective and geographical location, it has the potential of becoming a true and equal “Strategic partner” for India in a decade or so, if it can resolve the political divisions between traditional, older pacifists and younger, modern, nationalists. Among the pending issues are an Indo-Japanese "Civil Nuclear Agreement" on the lines of those with France,UK, Russia etc and Japanese decisions on opening up Defence system sales and technology export.

Russia

   Russia is a valued partner because of its co-operation in developing strategic technology for mutual benefit. Despite the fact that its Defense industry was disrupted by the collapse of the USSR and has never quite recovered enough to meet its cost and time commitments, it remains a major partner. Its large energy and natural resources also have potential, which has not been fully exploited for mutual benefit. 

USA

      After a great start to the India-US strategic relationship under the Bush administration and some successes during the Obama administration(a la Ashton Carter, former Deputy defence secretary), the India-USA relationship has become increasingly transactional after the global financial crisis. We must however, be careful to distinguish between the Security related and Economic aspects of the relationship.  The former has the potential to become a solid and mutually satisfying strategic partnership while the latter is inherently more transactional, given the divergence in economic interests. As the Modi led government has few if any ideological constraints & self-imposed restrictions, there is an opportunity to transform the Indo-US security partnership (strategic technology, defense production, national defense, terrorism and internal security). 

   With the Govt’s desire to harness private investment & entrepreneurship private business relations are bound to flourish, given US firms are (in general) still the most technologically advanced and competitive in the World.. Thus it is advisable to use government to government interactions on economic policies to minimize the politically inspired conflicts between the two countries through honest give and take and transactional deals to satisfy political pressure groups and vested interests.

Conclusion

    Sometimes, a simple slogan can catch the essence of a new approach to National security and international relations. For PM Modi’s government there are in my view two such that people will eventually use to describe the new approach adopted by the Indian Government. These are, 
(1)    Speak Softly but Carry a Bigger Stick, ('speaking softly' may not come easy to some in BJP vis-a-vis Pakistan or China, but must be done e.g. "We want peace with Pakistan but it cannot be achieved through nuclear blackmail, terrorism and mutilation of our soldiers;" Similarly a 'bigger stick' is best signaled through informal channels rather than derogatory/rude language. Finally, those who accused PM Nehru of making empty threats in 1961-62 musn't make the same mistake).
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(2)    Deterrence without Delusions (of converting ideologically driven opponents into peace-nicks through "Pappi-Jhappi" style of International Relations: National Power & the will to use it is the only way to deter or dissuade aggression and in this context, "Actions speak louder than words").