India’s Policy Towards Pakistan

Introduction

      Forty eminent experts have asked for cancellation of talks between the Indian and Pakistan Prime Ministers. Egged on by TV anchors, several eminent Indian’s are talking about retaliation.  Others have pointed out that talks are not a favor to anyone; they are an essential part of diplomacy.  However, neither the use of force nor diplomacy can serve if we are confused about our Strategy and Objectives.  The basis of ‘strategy’ is an unsentimental understanding of the opponent and his strategy and objectives.

Past: Jihad & its Supporters

   After the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, the Pakistan Military, fully supported by the entire Pakistan establishment, developed a two pronged strategy of dealing with India: Acquire nuclear weapons and use these as a shield to carry out Jihad against India.[1]  Pakistan’s entire international policy and much of its internal policy was driven by this obsession of revenge against India. But make no mistake, it was not just a policy of the Military it was fully supported by and implemented by the elites of Pakistan (political, bureaucratic, diplomatic, business, professional), whichever country they resided in.[2] 

General Zia ul Haq (1977-98), imposed a policy of state-led Islamization, by bringing in his concept of Sharia, including the infamous blasphemy law. Under his regime, the fundamentalist Ahl-e-Hadith version of Islam, was introduced in (all) school curricula as a result of which, “An entire generation of Pakistanis studying in public (and secular) schools has grown up viewing not only non-Muslim minorities but also Muslim minorities as “the other,” as “unpatriotic,” and as ‘not Muslim enough’.”[3] Zia used to greet all Indians with expansive bear hugs.

Present: Pak Democracy

So the first question we have to answer is whether there is any change in this dual policy towards India?  The Al Qaida attack on the USA (9/11) has clearly set in motion a process of learning among the US, UK and other Western analysts and policy makers, that directly or tacitly supported this Pakistan policy by connecting all violation of global rules and practices by Pakistan to something that India did or did not do.  The erosion of the international carte blanche for Pakistan, forced a rethink by the globalized English speaking elites of Pakistan. But Inside Pakistan they are a shrinking minority, decimated by the murder of any one who exposes Pakistan military’s double dealing on Terrorism or draws the ire of the Sunni fundamentalist killers. With the coming of democracy, the leaders of the major Pakistani political parties (PPP, PML-N) have realized that their own and their parties interests are not identical to those of the Pakistan Military and appear to be willing to consider changing the anti-India policy. Mr. Nawaz Sharif has gone further than Mr. Zardari could, in making clear that more normal relations with India would also be in the interest of his party.

However, in a democracy one must ask, what is the extent of support for changing a policy of anti-India Jihad, to one of Peace. Unfortunately, as the old (English educated) elite has begun to realize that the Frankenstein terrorists they have created may destroy Pakistan itself by taking it back into a medieval age, the new Urdu speaking (Sunni) elites appear to be fully behind the terrorists.[4]

Future: India’s Policy

Keeping this background in mind what should be the Indian Governments strategy to deal with Pakistan.  As has been clear for some time it is in India’s interest to have a two pronged approach towards Pakistan:[5]

(1) Increase the costs to the Pakistan Military of its anti-India Jihad and thus affect its benefit-cost calculus. This has three elements: (a) The Military as an institution (flow of financial aid and sophisticated equipment & technology), Forceful response to cease fire violations. Targeted attack on valuable (but not iconic/symbolic) assets by a small super-specialized commando force, in response to cross-border terrorist incidents. (b) The Anti-India Jihadi organizations (Take the fight to them all over S. Asia by developing covert assets). (c) The personal interests of serving & retired Army/ISI officers: Identifying & blacklisting (UN, US, west) all those connected with terrorism.

(2)  Identify, discuss and implement economic, cultural and other policies that are good for the people of both India and Pakistan.  For instance, theory and empirical evidence points to the fact that normal trade, transit, investment backed by good trans-border and trans-Asian (from C. Asia/Iran to Myanmar) infrastructure would be in the interests of both countries and their people.  Similarly, genuinely open and symmetric social and cultural policies would be mutually beneficial and can and should be pursued without interruption.  What is completely unclear at this point is the case for India to make any asymmetric economic concessions and gestures that are only economically beneficial for Pakistan and financially costly for us. These require a much higher standard of trust in the Pakistan government and in its ability to overcome domestic objections to normalization.

Conclusion

   It is pointless putting pre-conditions for talks that we keep abandoning.  Any condition on talks must be simple, effective and enforceable.  One simple condition could be that we will not officially/formally discuss J&K's (including Siachin's) future unless effective and credible steps are taken to try known anti-India terrorists in Pakistan (i.e no formal composite dialogue with the Kashmir/Siachin sub-groups).  All issues should however be open for discussion on back channels.

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[1] Trilateral Nuclear Proliferation: Pakistan’s Euro-Chinese Bomb, IDSA Monograph Series No. 1, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, December 2006. http://www.idsa.in/monograph/TrilateralNuclearProliferationPakistansEuro-ChineseBomb_avirmani_2006 .

[2] About 6 years ago, I overheard Pakistani friends in USA referring to anti-India Jehadis as “Paltu Kutta (pet dogs).”

[3]  Ishphani, Frahnaz at http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/cleansing-pakistan-of-minorities#.UfvsfQ1Nvx8.twitter

[4] Punjab lawyers agitated to free the Punjab governor’s self-confessed killer, the courts free self-confessed killers all in the name of Islam. Businessmen fund the JUD and other front organizations of the terrorists. Recent poll showed 83% support for Osama Bin Laden (should have been protected in Abbottabad). 

[5] “Globalisation, Growth and National Security” at https://sites.google.com/site/drarvindvirmani/international-relation-security, and “World Economy, Geopolitics and Global Strategy” EPW 2006.

Changing Focus of Pakistan Army

On January 8, 2013 Pakistani soldiers crossed over the ‘Line of Control” in Mandhar sector of J&K and killed two soldiers, beheaded one of them and took the head back as a trophy.  Most of the discussion in the media has focused on the response that India has made or should make to this specific act. This note focuses on possible motives and motivation behind this act and how this should shape our response.

Objectives

                As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned the most important event that will shape its behavior in the next two years is the accelerated withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan.  This withdrawal provides it a golden opportunity to restore its hegemony in Afghanistan.  Ideally the Army would like to reestablish the dominant position it had before the Taliban driven out of Afghanistan and established its headquarters and operating bases in Pakistan (Queta Shura, Wazirstan et al).  Failing this it would be happy with a regime that subserves the Pakistan Army’s interests.  This is likely to be the central and most vital objective of the Pakistan Army and its primary operational instrument the ISI, during the next two-three years. 

The tantalizing hints of a change in Pakistan Army doctrine purportedly downgrading India’s unchallenged position as “sole enemy,” are likely diplomatic publicity designed to restore Western perceptions of Army led Pakistan as a “trusted ally”.  At the same time the Jehadis within the Army–ISI and the “Good Taliban” need to be reassured.  The following statement of Maj-Gen Asim Saleem Bajwa, DG, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) keeps open the possibility of doing both: “Army prepares for all forms of threats. Sub-conventional threat is a reality and is a part of a threat matrix faced by our country. But it doesn’t mean that the conventional threat has receded (quoted in the Express Tribune).”

Signal to Who?

What then could be the motivation for this relatively small but aggressive action across the LOC?  Several commentators have asserted that this action is designed to send a signal to the Indian Army.  To buttress this argument they have pointed to the increase in cease-fire violations compared to a year ago.  It has been argued that with the resumption of military and civilian Aid to Pakistan, the Army is again emboldened to ratchet up hostile actions against India, without fear of a serious response from the Indian Government.  The factors mentioned by these analysts are certainly relevant for the assessment of the motivation and timing of specific actions of the Pakistan Army and ISI.  However, another possibility is that the hostile action is a signal to Pakistan’s own Jehadi’s , both within the army and outside it.

Pointers

One of the interesting pointers in this direction is the statement of LeT’s Hafiz Saeed, that this incident was part of the hostile and violent Indian actions across Pakistan and India’s repeated attempts to undermine peace!  When a terrorist wanted by the USA, with a reward on his head, a hate monger who gives vitriolic speeches against Indians, talks about “Peace” it is worth noting!  Not because it reflects a change of heart, but because it reflects what his handlers would like him to say.  The fact that newspapers report that he visited POK a few days before the aggressive act, and may have had a direct or indirect role, suggests that the Army wanted the Jihadists to be fully aware of this action, even if India downplayed it (as perhaps they mistakenly expected).  Subsequently he gave an interview to the Us press trying to portray himself as an ordinary person

The second pointer is how quickly Pakistan’s civilian government (EAM Rabani) responded by its diplomatic statement of willingness to refer the incident to the UN, knowing full well that with Pakistan currently chairing the UN security council, India would be more than usually reluctant to refer the incident to anyone outside established bilateral channels.  The civilian government has repeatedly faced demands from Pakistani Jihadists to take India to the UN on Kashmir.  This was followed by an appeal from the OIC for a fact finding team to J&K.  The Army knew beforehand that such an opportunity could arise and perhaps used it as an argument to obtain prior Civilian government approval for limited action on the LOC, that could be used to counter Jehadi criticism of the Army and government “inaction” on Kashmir.  A third pointer is the discovery of mines with Pakistani markings from the Maoist insurgents and reports of ISI activity in the troubled Rhongiya areas on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border.  The Huriyat leaders who visited Pakistan soon after the incident were reportedly told by the Army brass as well as the leaders of the LeT and the JeM not to participate in any Indian Govt peace initiative for the next year.  More recently the release of ‘Afghan Prisoners’ purportedly to meet the Afghan demand (for handover of Taliban leaders based in Pakistan) half way and to aid the Afghan peace process has been followed by reports that the released leaders are back fighting the US forces.  As the middle ranks of the Taliban fighters had been depleted by US drone strikes, the Pakistan Army as usual thought it could play both sides of the aisle by replenishing depleted Taliban ranks in Afghanistan while  presenting this as a peace gesture to the Afghan government (and the USA/UK).   

Conclusion

The hostile Pakistani army action across the LOC is a signal to the Pakistani jihadists (once referred to by a Pakistani friend in Washington as “Paltu Kuttas” – ‘Pet dogs’) that the Pakistan army and Government are not abandoning their anti-India policy, in their respective quests:  The Army for a dominant role in Afghanistan, financed and underwritten to the maximum extent possible by the USA and the civilian government for normalization of relations with India so as to remove the stigma of being dubbed “terrorist central” and to reduce the control of the Army over the political system and government.  The greater challenge for India is therefore to,

(a) Help stave off a fundamentalist takeover of Afghanistan, and (b) Prepare for a renewed threat to India (including J&K) from Pakistan controlled jihadists operating from fundamentalist (re-)controlled regions of Afghanistan.  This requires a multipronged Indian effort to increase the cost to the Pakistan Army of a policy of training, financing and directing jihadists and terrorists across the sub-content.

PS: An earlier version of this note was sent to a newspaper for consideration in mid-January, soon after the incident occurred.